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Abstract
How should central banks conduct and communicate their policies to serve the goal
of stabilizing the macroeconomy? This thesis – consisting of three self-contained
essays on dynamic macroeconomics – is mainly intended as a progress report on
exploring the normative aspect of monetary policy.
The main result of the first essay is, that in the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the
public revelation of information about uncertain aggregate outcomes can be detri-
mental. By announcing informative signals on non-insurable aggregate risk, the
policy maker distorts agents’ insurance incentives and increases the riskiness of the
optimal allocation that is feasible in self-enforceable arrangements. We consider a
monetary authority that may reveal changes in the inflation target, and document
that the negative effect of distorted insurance incentives can very well dominate
conventional effects in favor for the release of better information.
In the second essay, we study optimal monetary policy with the nominal inter-
est rate as the single policy instrument. Firms set prices in a staggered way with-
out indexation and real money balances contribute separately to households’ utility.
The optimal deterministic steady state under commitment is the Friedman rule for a
broad range of parameters. Optimal monetary policy in the short run is then charac-
terized by stabilization of the nominal interest rate instead of inflation stabilization
as the predominant principle.
In the third essay, I examine whether the existence and the timing of real balance
effects contribute to the determination of the absolute price level. As the main
novel result, I show that there exists a unique price level sequence that is consistent
with an equilibrium under interest rate policy, if beginning-of-period money yields
transaction services. Predetermined real money balances can then serve as a state
variable, implying that interest rate setting should be passive – a violation of the
Taylor-principle.
Keywords:
Social value of information, Transparency, Optimal monetary policy, Real and
nominal determinacy
Zusammenfassung
Wie sollten Zentralbanken Geldpolitik gestalten und der Öffentlichkeit kommuni-
zieren, um die Ökonomie bestmöglich zu stabilisieren? Diese Dissertation, beste-
hend aus drei selbständigen Essays in dynamischer Makroökonomik, widmet sich
in erster Linie dem normativen Aspekt von Geldpolitik.
Das Hauptresultat im ersten Essay ist, dass bei idiosynkratischen Risiko die öf-
fentliche Bekanntgabe von Informationen zu aggregierten Risiko einen negativen
Effekt auf die soziale Wohlfahrt haben kann: durch die Veröffentlichung von Infor-
mationen zu nicht-versicherbaren aggregierten Risiko werden die Versicherungs-
anreize der Individuen verzerrt und damit das individuelle Konsumrisiko erhöht.
Als eine Anwendung, analysieren wir die Situation einer Zentralbank, die die Mög-
lichkeit hat, Veränderungen in ihren Inflationszielen anzukündigen und dokumen-
tieren, das der negative Effekt der verzerrten Versicherungsanreize konventionelle
positive Aspekte der Ankündigung überwiegt.
In zweiten Essay untersuchen wir optimale Geldpolitik in Falle von nomina-
len Rigiditäten und einer Transaktionsfriktion. In einem Standardmodell, Money-
in-the-Utility function, zeigen wir, dass das langfristige Optimum durch die Fried-
mansche Regel gegeben ist. Daraus folgt für die kurze Frist, dass das Primat von
Geldpolitik auf die Stabilisierung der Zinsen und nicht auf Inflationsstabilisierung
ausgelegt sein sollte.
Im dritten Essay untersuche ich, ob die Existenz und die Terminierung von
Realkasseneffekten eine wichtige Rolle für die Determiniertheit des allgemeinen
Preisniveaus spielen. Als wichtigstes neues Resultat zeige ich, dass auch bei Zins-
politik ein eindeutiges Preisniveau bestimmt werden kann, wenn die Geldmenge
zu Beginn der Periode in Transaktionen verwendet wird. Unter diesen Umständen,
hat prädeterminiertes reales Geld die Funktion einer Zustandsvariable und die
Zinspolitik sollte passiv sein, um eindeutige, stabile und nicht-oszillierende Gleich-
gewichtssequenzen zu erreichen.
Schlagwörter:
Sozialer Nutzen von Information, Transparenz, Optimale Geldpolitik, Nominale
und reale Determiniertheit
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1 Introduction
1.1 Scope of the study
Interest rate decisions made by the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), or other prominent central banks are given much attention even by
the general public. Thus, there is a strong interest to understand how monetary pol-
icy decisions influence the developments of inflation, employment and GDP, i.e. the
monetary transmission mechanism. Consequently, a question of equal importance
– given a particular transmission mechanism of monetary policy – is: how should
central banks conduct and communicate their policies to serve the goal of stabilizing
the macroeconomy? This thesis is mainly intended as a progress report on exploring
the normative aspect of monetary policy.
This study focuses on three issues in dynamic macroeconomics and monetary eco-
nomics. The first one is concerned with optimal disclosure policies of policy mak-
ers in particular central banks. In particular, Vadym Lepetyuk and me investigate
in chapter 2 whether these institutions should reveal their future policies and eco-
nomic projections to the public or whether they should be closemouthed. While
central banks in the past where well known for their secrecy and mystique, things
have changed over the past decade. In particular, since Ben Bernanke serves as
the chairman, the Federal Reserve System provides more information, and provides
it earlier to the public than ever before in history. To give an example, the federal
open market committee of the Fed recently decided to increase the frequency of their
economic projections and balance of risks statements from a biannual to a quarterly
basis. The natural question that arises is whether these recent developments are nec-
essarily good or whether there are still reasons for central banks not to share their
insights and plans with the public. To address this question we develop a model
that incorporates aggregate risk, e.g. random changes in GDP, and idiosyncratic risk
that captures the random dispersion of income across households. The latter type of
1
2risk is – at least in parts – insurable in contracts consistent with voluntary participa-
tion incentives, or equivalently, contracts in a situation without commitment. That
means that the exchange of goods prescribed by the contract must be such neither
party under any circumstances has an incentive to renege. We model communica-
tion policies of policy makers as being concerned with the aggregate non-insurable
risk, and assume that political decisionmakers have the possibility to publicly an-
nounce information on this type of risks early. We embed this specification of risk
and information into a monetary production economy and assess the social value of
policy announcements.
The second question – which I try to answer (jointly with Paustian Matthias) in
chapter 3 – is how monetary policy should be conducted in the presence of con-
flicting policy aims in a stochastic general equilibrium model. The conflict in goals
stems from the presence of two frictions that cannot be offset simultaneously if the
nominal interest rate is the only policy instrument. The first friction is a transaction
friction that results in a demand for cash. In order to equate the private opportunity
costs for holding money to the zero social costs to produce it, the nominal inter-
est rate should be zero. The second friction are nominal rigidities or price sticky
prices. Unless, the nominal interest rate corresponds to the real interest rate, rela-
tive prices are distorted and resources are inefficiently used. However, in this case
money holdings are costly. Analyzing optimal monetary policy in the short and in
the long run we find that the resolution of this trade-off depends not only on the
frequency of price adjustment – an argument which is stressed in the literature (e.g.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2004, 2007; Woodford 2003). In addition, the interest elas-
ticity of money demand plays a key role as the relevant determinant for the welfare
costs of positive nominal interest rates. A paper version of this chapter has recently
been accepted for publication at the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Paus-
tian and Stoltenberg 2008).
The third topic I examine is how monetary policy should be conducted to prevent
unnecessary fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates. To be more specific I ask
whether the conditions for local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences
and the determination of the absolute price level are affected by the existence and
timing of real balance effects as suggested by Patinkin (1949, 1965). The analysis is
set in a dynamic general equilibrium model with flexible prices. Real balance effects
are introduced with the money-in-the-utility-function specification (Sidrauski 1967),
where consumption and money balances enter in a non-separate way such that
this approach is equivalent to a shopping-time or real-resource costs-of-transactions
specification. I employ two different assumptions on the stock of money that is as-
3sumed to deliver transaction services, either the one at the beginning or at the end
of the period. While the former can be interpreted as a timing of markets, where
the goods market is closed before the asset market is opened, the timing of markets
is reversed if end-of-period money yields transaction services. Following the tradi-
tion of Sargent and Wallace (1975), I investigate for the different timing conventions
whether the implementation of monetary policy with a nominal interest rate rule or
a money growth rule plays a role for the determination of the price level and for
conditions that ensure macroeconomic stability.
Summing up, the topics of my thesis fall into three popular fields in dynamic
macroeconomics and monetary economics: efficient risk-sharing arrangements and
the social value of public information, optimal fiscal and monetary policy, and the
interactions of monetary policy, real and nominal determinacy. In the following, I
provide a brief review of the literature on these three issues. I then summarize the
results of my thesis in relation to the previous work.
1.2 Literature review
In this section I overview the existing literature on efficient risk-sharing arrange-
ments and on the social value of public information, optimal fiscal and monetary
policy, and on the interactions of monetary policy, real and nominal determinacy.
While the last two fields are closely connected, there are almost no intersections be-
tween the fields and the first theme. In general, for ease of exposition, I report on
the main contributions to each topic in a chronological order.
1.2.1 Efficient risk-sharing arrangements and the social value of
public information
The literature that I review in this subsection relates to the chapter 2 of my thesis.
The two strands of literature that I cover here, the literature on efficient risk-sharing
and on global games are quite distinct, and thus they are treated separately.
Efficient risk-sharing arrangements
Hirshleifer (1971) was among the first to note that public information on insurable
risks may make agents worth off from an ex-ante perspective. He considers the fol-
4lowing example. There are two states of the world, agents are risk averse and the
distribution of income differs across the agents. The random dispersion of income
constitutes the idiosyncratic risk that agents are willing to share. If agents can trade
the risk in complete asset markets before uncertainty about the state of nature is re-
alized, they will share the risk. Intuitively, if the agents are aware of the state before
they have the possibility to trade, there will be no trade at all, and each agent con-
sumes his endowment. From an ex ante perspective this is inferior to an allocation
of risk when the uncertainty is not resolved.
Schlee (2001) generalizes the result of Hirshleifer and states conditions under which
all agents in a competitive equilibrium are worth off by an increase in precision of
public information on tradable risks. In particular, he shows this is true in the ab-
sence of aggregate, non-insurable risk or when some agents are risk neutral. Even
more important, better information is undesirable if the economy’s aggregate de-
mand for consumption has the representative agent property. That means that the
aggregate demand function does depend on aggregate wealth but not on the partic-
ular distribution of wealth across agents. The latter result is surprising and points
to an inconsistency of the representative agent approach: the representative agent
consumes all the wealth and is therefore indifferent to information. This implies
that starting with a representative agent is Pareto-inconsistent with the preferences
of the agents of an economy with heterogenous endowments though the economy
features the representative agent property in the sense described above.
In general, the precision of information must not be exogenous. Thus a natural
question that arises is what happens to the Hirshleifer result if the arrival of public
information on the insurable risk is endogenous. Berk and Uhlig (1993) study this
question in a multiperiod model of asset markets which is dynamically complete if
no additional information is released at intermediate nodes. Dynamic completeness
means that though there does not exist enough long-lived state-contingent securities
to span all possible nodes in the final period, the number of securities may be suffi-
cient if agents are allowed to trade not only in the initial period but in intermediate
periods, too (e.g. Duffie and Huang 1985; Kreps 1982). Berk and Uhlig show that
an economy with dynamically complete markets may convert into an incomplete
markets economy if the arrival of information on idiosyncratic risks is endogenous.
If at least one agent achieves a higher utility in the incomplete markets equilibrium,
and heterogeneity in preferences across agents is large enough, the agent is willing
to bear the costs for releasing information early. After uncertainty is resolved, the
idiosyncratic risk cannot be traded anymore at intermediate nodes rendering the
economy dynamically incomplete.
5One observation from individual consumption data is, that – for given per capita
consumption – individual consumption is not only positively correlated with the
average income but with current individual income, too (e.g. Cochrane 1993;
Townsend 1994). Assuming a frictionless economy, this fact indicates an inefficient
allocation of risk across agents. To put it differently, agents share only partially their
idiosyncratic income risk. A growing literature argues this result can be an opti-
mal individual consumption response in the absence of a commitment technology
to induce enforcement of risk-sharing arrangements between agents (e.g. Coate and
Ravallion 1993; Kocherlakota 1996a; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002; Thomas and
Worrall 1988; Townsend 1994).
Focusing on long-term wage contracts as an example, Thomas and Worrall (1988)
were among the first to analyze self-enforcing contracts or contracts consistent with
voluntary participation incentives, i.e. contracts in which neither party has an incen-
tive to renege. A long-run wage contract specifies a wage at each node, contingent
on current and past wages. They find that wages in the optimal contract as opposed
to spot market wages, which serve as the outside option, are sticky and less variable.
Coate and Ravallion (1993) characterize the best arrangement between two individ-
uals that are subject to idiosyncratic risk as a non-cooperative equilibrium outcome
in a simple repeated game. Restricting the attention to stationary, ‘pure insurance’
contracts, i.e. contracts that are contingent on current but not on past income re-
alizations, they examine how the outcomes relate top the first best. They empha-
size the relevance of this approach to understand consumption patterns in agrarian
economies that often lack a legal and financial system to enforce contracts.
Kocherlakota (1996a) studies optimal consumption allocations as subgame-perfect
allocations of a repeated game or equivalently as outcomes of an optimal consump-
tion contract under two-sided lack of commitment, when information is symmet-
ric. The idea is that under lack of commitment the exchange of goods proposed by
the contract must be such that at any node agents at least weakly prefer to keep
the agreement than defecting to autarchy as their outside option. He shows that if
the first-best allocation is not in the set of sustainable allocations, current optimal
consumption is indeed correlated with current income. In that sense, constrained-
efficient allocations are consistent with consumption data. Furthermore, he pro-
poses a sufficient statistic to discriminate in the data between allocations resulting
from two-sided lack of commitment and symmetric information, and allocations
that result under asymmetric information and monitoring costs as an alternative
explanation (e.g. Atkeson and E. 1992; Phelan and Townsend 1991; Wang 1995).
6The social value of information in global games
Should central banks announce precisely their future policies and economic fore-
casts to the public? This question is probably one of the most heavily discussed top-
ics in media and in the literature on global games (e.g. Angeletos and Pavan 2007;
Morris and Shin 2002; Morris, Shin, and Tong 2006; Svensson 2006; Woodford 2005).
In particular in the light of Federal Reserve’s shift in disclosure policy towards more
transparency under chairman Ben Bernanke, this dispute is an active issue.
Morris and Shin (2002) examine the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of
public information in a ‘beauty contest’ model, in which agents decide on their opti-
mal actions based on private and public information on the underlying fundamen-
tal state. In their setup agents face a strong coordination motive stemming from
strategic complementarities in their actions. In their economy agents care about two
things, choosing an action that is appropriate given the state of the economy and
opting for an action that is sufficiently close to what the other agents are doing. To
give an example, suppose that there is a large number of investors, that have to
decide how much to invest in a variety of stocks. The return of stocks is linked to
monetary policy by no-arbitrage conditions. Intuitively, the profits of the investors,
depend on both, on investors’ private information on future monetary policy and
on public announcements of central banks. Since the return of stocks hinges on
specific characteristics as well as on the development of the economy as a whole,
investors have a motive to coordinate their actions and beliefs employing the public
information provided by policy makers as a focal point.
Remarkably, Morris and Shin assume quadratic preferences such that individual
preferences but not social welfare depend on the coordination motive. As their main
result they find that an increase in precision of public information may be harmful
to welfare if the coordination motive is strong enough and public information sig-
nificantly less precise than private information. While an increase in the precision
of the private information increases social welfare, the effect of an increase in the
precision of the public signal is ambiguous. On the one hand, it will increase the
accuracy of each market participant’s assessment of the current state of the econ-
omy, with the result that equilibrium actions are on average more appropriate to
current fundamentals. But on the other hand, it will reduce the weight that each
market participant puts on her private information in forming her estimate of cur-
rent conditions and hence in choosing her action, and increase the weight placed on
the public signal instead. The latter effect results in an average action that is less ap-
propriate to the current state: While the errors in participants’ private signals cancel
7out on average, the error in the public signal affects everyone’s action. This effect
may outweigh the first one when agents wish to coordinate is sufficiently strong and
private information is more precise than public information. Fueled by the socially
undesirable coordination motive, agents place an inefficiently high weight on the
relatively imprecise signal, instead of reacting to the more reliable private informa-
tion, and the increase in volatility leads to welfare losses in the aggregate. However,
in the absence of a signal-extraction problem – when public information is the only
source of information – an increase in precision is always desirable.
Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2006) criticize the Morris-Shin result from a norma-
tive perspective and doubt whether the particular conditions necessary for a nega-
tive social value of information are of any practical relevance for central banks. In
particular, Woodford’s main criticism is that the strong coordination incentive nec-
essary to render the value of public information negative, is ad odds with the type
of preferences typically assumed in macroeconomic modeling. Moreover, he points
out that the Morris-Shin result hinges crucially on the assumption that individual
preferences but not social welfare feature the coordination motive. Svensson finds
that the negative value of information requires a degree of precision in private in-
formation that is much superior to the one under public information: the former
precision must be at least 8 times as great as the latter. This is not obvious if one
thinks of the fundamental aggregate state as partially influenced by future policy
actions.
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) develop a general framework to analyze equilibrium
and efficiency of information in the presence of a signal extraction problem with
strategic complementarity or substitutability. As an efficiency criterion they employ
the notion of a decentralized command optimum. This optimum can be interpreted
as the solution to a social planner’s problem that maximizes ex-ante welfare, where
the planner can perfectly control agents’ incentives and their use of information,
but cannot affect the precision of information. Referring to this benchmark, they
classify economies by how the equilibrium use of information resulting form coor-
dination or substitution relates to the efficient use of it. In particular, they clarify
the Morris-Shin result and show that an increase in precision of public information
can be detrimental to welfare only if the degree of coordination is higher than the
socially optimal one.
In chapter 2 of my thesis, which is joint work with Vadym Lepetyuk, we analyze
the social value of information in an environment where agents face aggregate risk
- which is not insurable between agents - and idiosyncratic risk. In our specifica-
8tion households partially insure the idiosyncratic risk in contracts consistent with
voluntary participation incentives. We assume that the policy maker learns about
the aggregate shock before it directly impacts on the allocation, and can decide to
provide that information to the public with certain precision.
1.2.2 Optimal fiscal and monetary policy
Chari and Kehoe (1999) provide an analysis of optimal fiscal and monetary policy
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model under flexible prices and perfect
competition. In the absence of monetary policy, they study first how the govern-
ment should set taxes on labor and capital income and the state-contingent interest
on debt to finance a given stream of government expenditures. Throughout their
analysis of Ramsey-optimal allocations with the primal approach they assume that
the government does not have access to a non-distortionary lump-sum tax instru-
ment. Their main lessons for policymaking reflect the Ramsey-taxation principle
to smooth distortions over time and states of nature (Ramsey 1927). In particular,
taxes on capital should be high initially and then zero (on average), holding taxes on
labor constant and the state-contingent return is used to provide insurance against
adverse shocks. Second, they introduce a transaction friction – either a cash-in-
advance, money-in-the utility and shopping-time specification – and explore under
which conditions the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate is optimal. Re-
markably, they find this to be the case under fairly general homotheticity and sep-
arability assumptions on preferences. Due to the optimality of a zero interest rate,
inflation varies substantially over the business cycle, thereby absorbing the effects
of government expenditure shocks.
A more recent literature studies Ramsey-optimal fiscal and monetary policy in envi-
ronments with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. In contrast to flexible
prices the policy maker faces two distortions: price dispersion due to incomplete
nominal adjustment calls for an optimal inflation of zero, implying costs of money
holdings. However, the monetary distortion can only be offset by setting the nom-
inal interest rate to zero. While Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Benignio and
Woodford (2003) analyze the interaction of optimal fiscal and monetary policies,
another part of the literature focuses on optimal monetary policy when the govern-
ment has access to a lump-sum tax (Adão, Correia, and Teles 2003; Benignio and
Woodford 2005; Khan, King, and Wolman 2003; Rotemberg and Woodford 1997;
Woodford 2003).
9Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) set up a stochastic production economy with sticky
prices and a transaction friction but without capital. To finance an exogenous stream
of expenditures, the government taxes labor income, issues debt or prints money.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe assume real resource costs of transactions and calibrate
their model to match stylized facts for the US economy. Due to the presence of nom-
inal rigidities, they find that the optimal volatility of inflation is zero and that the
Friedman is no longer optimal. The difference to Chari and Kehoe (1999) stems from
the fact that under sticky prices, fluctuations in inflation induce distortions in rela-
tive prices leading to an inefficient allocation of resources. Correspondingly, the use
of inflation as a shock absorber becomes less attractive when prices are imperfectly
flexible, and the Ramsey planner relies on changes in the tax rates and in the level
of public debt as a response to shocks.
While the Ramsey-approach is silent about the implementation of the optimal al-
location, Woodford (2003) focuses on optimal monetary policies and their imple-
mentation in a linear-quadratic framework when prices are imperfectly flexible. He
derives a quadratic strictly-microfounded policy objective as a second order approx-
imation to representative household’s utility and employs linear approximations to
the conditions that describe the competitive equilibrium. Since it is assumed that
the government finances her expenditures by a lump-sum tax the only policy in-
strument is the interest-rate operating target. Choosing price stability as the long
run policy target (and approximation point), he shows that stabilization of the in-
flation rate is the main principle of optimal monetary policy in the short run – even
in the presence of a transaction friction captured by a money-in-the-utility-function
specification. As long as shocks affect the natural rate of interest (the nominal inter-
est rate under flexible prices), Woodford points out that variations in interest rates
are required to keep inflation stable. To put it differently: there is not only a well-
known long-run conflict between offsetting the transaction and the pricing-friction
but also a short-run trade-off in the optimal response to shocks. Bridging the gap
to the practice of central banks, Woodford derives optimal linear interest-rate and
inflation-targeting rules to implement the optimal allocation.
Adão et al. (2003) derive principals of optimal monetary policy in a stochastic max-
imizing economy, in which households’consumption expenditures are subject to a
cash-advance constraint and firms set prices one period in advance. In contrast to
previous contributions (Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; Woodford 2003) they find
that the Friedman rule is optimal and show that the social planner under sticky
prices can improve upon the optimal allocation under flexible prices if the planner
has enough policy instruments. The logic of their argument goes as follows. If the
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nominal interest rate is zero the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding, and the
level of real money balances is indeterminate. While there exists a unique equilib-
rium in consumption and labor under flexible prices, the allocation depends on the
path of money supply when prices are sticky. Adão et al. show that the flexible-price
allocation is included in the set of implementable allocations under imperfectly flex-
ible prices. Correspondingly – depending on the specification of the fundamental
shocks – the social planner is capable to achieve higher welfare if the policy maker
has an additional policy instrument to pin down money supply and the optimal
allocation, simultaneously.
Khan et al. (2003) provide an analysis how optimal policy should be conducted in
the short and in the long run in the presence of nominal rigidities and a demand
for cash modeled as a reduction in shopping-time when money is used in trans-
actions. In contrast to Woodford (2003), Khan et al. (2003) treat the optimal deter-
ministic steady state as the long run policy target as an integral part of the optimal
policy problem that the Ramsey planner solves. Calibrating the model to match
stylized facts of the US economy, they find that the Friedman rule is not optimal in
the long run. Instead, the nominal interest rate should be positive but sufficiently
low to allow for mild deflation. In the short run, they find support for the principles
advocated by Woodford (2003): optimal monetary policy is characterized by price
stability, thereby allowing for fluctuations in the interest-rate operating target.
Existing studies emphasize the frequency of price adjustments as determinant to
quantify the welfare costs of nominal rigidities compared to utility losses stemming
from a transaction friction. In chapter 3, which is joint work with Matthias Paustian,
we show that the latter welfare costs crucially depend on the sensitivity of money
demand with respect to changes in the nominal interest rate – a key fact which
has been disregarded in the literature. Employing a standard money-in-the-utility-
function specification, we show that this elasticity increases strongly as interest rates
fall. In this environment we study optimal monetary policy in the short and in the
long run when the nominal interest rate is the only available policy instrument.
1.2.3 Monetary policy, real and nominal determinacy
In their seminal paper Sargent and Wallace (1975) discuss the relationship between
monetary policy and the determination of the absolute price level. In the context of
a dynamic IS-LM model in which there is long-run neutrality of money and under
rational expectations they compare the implications of alternative monetary poli-
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cies. To be more precise, they compare how the implementation of monetary policy
that either pegs the money growth rate or the nominal interest rate affects equilib-
rium determination. As their main result, they argue while the money growth rule
leads to an uniquely determinate price level, the nominal interest rate peg leaves the
absolute price level indeterminate (nominal indeterminacy). The rationale for this
result is a homogeneity property of the economic system under interest rate policy:
in the rational expectations equilibrium, the amount of real money balances but not
prices and money separately are determined. This implies that there is an infinite
number of equilibrium pairs for nominal money balances and the price level, and
even equilibria may occur that are due to self-fulfilling revisions of people’s expec-
tations (sunspot equilibria). Assuming a welfare measure that punishes fluctuations
in prices, Sargent and Wallace conclude with Friedman (1969) that monetary policy
should rather target monetary aggregates than interest rates.
As a response, McCallum (1981) shows that the famous Sargent-Wallace indetermi-
nacy arises only in case of purely exogenous interest-rate rules including contin-
gency on the complete history of exogenous disturbances. However, if one allows
for the possibility of an endogenous feedback – for example on the price level or
inflation – the indeterminacy result is not inevitable.
In a series of papers (Leeper 1991; Sims 1994; Woodford 1994, 1995, 1996) highlight
the role of fiscal policy for the determination of the absolute price level. Correspond-
ingly, this line of research is often called the fiscal theory of the price level. The main
result of this literature is that the Sargent-Wallace indeterminacy vanishes even un-
der an interest rate peg if fiscal policy is specified in a way that breaks down the
homogeneity property of the rational expectations equilibrium.
Leeper (1991) studies the local dynamics of interactions of fiscal and interest rate
feedback rules in a stochastic maximizing endowment economy. If the fiscal author-
ity is free to set her instrument without paying attention to the state of real govern-
ment debt, fiscal policy is called ‘active’, ‘passive’ otherwise. A monetary policy is
called ‘active’, if the central bank responds to a one percent increase in inflation with
more than an one percent increase in the nominal interest rate. To put it differently,
while an ‘active’ monetary policy increases the real interest rate, a ‘passive’ interest
rate setting lowers it. Applying this classification, an interest rate peg is an exam-
ple for a ‘passive’ monetary policy. Leeper shows that the absolute price level is
determinate if at least one policy authority pursues an ‘active’ policy, otherwise the
equilibrium is characterized by nominal indeterminacy. However, government’s in-
tertemporal solvency requires at least one of the policies to be set in a ‘passive’ way
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such that two ‘active’ policies violate the government budget constraint. In particu-
lar it follows that an interest rate peg uniquely determines inflation if fiscal policy is
‘active’.
In a cash-in-advance model Woodford (1994) shows that while the stationary equi-
librium associated with Friedman’s rule of deflation yields the highest utility, im-
plementing this policy by a constant money growth rate may be undesirable. The
reason is that under the considered ‘active’ fiscal policy, the equilibrium under low
constant money growth rates is prone to indeterminacy and the existence of sunspot
equilibria. On the contrary, if the monetary authority implements Friedman’s rule
with an interest rate peg, the equilibrium is rendered unique. Key for these results is
the type of fiscal policy under consideration: it involves no feedback on real govern-
ment debt. This implies that in contrast to Sargent and Wallace (1975), the intertem-
poral government budget constraint adds to the set of equilibrium conditions which
breaks down the homogeneity property of the rational expectations equilibrium.
Sims (1994) presents a representative-household endowment economy in which a
demand for money stems from real resource costs of transactions. Sims extends
and generalizes Woodford (1994) and Leeper (1991) in moving from local linear ap-
proximations techniques to the exact model solution. Validating Woodford (1994)
globally, he finds that while a constant money growth rule may lead to an indeter-
minacy of the price level, an interest rate peg may not – depending on fiscal policy.
In addition, he highlights that fiscal policy plays an important role for the determi-
nation of the price level, but the real allocation is in general independent of the fiscal
policy regime as long as taxes are lump-sum.
Nowadays researchers mainly focus on policy regimes summarized by interest rate
feedback rules, such as Taylor (1993), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a),
Dupor (2001), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, 2005) or Woodford (2003). Correspond-
ingly, the central problem of the theory of monetary policy is to provide guidelines
how the central banks’s interest-rate operating target should be set in response to
various kinds of exogenous disturbances and endogenous variables.
Probably the most famous example of a proposal for setting the nominal interest rate
is the one put forward by John Taylor (1993). The Taylor-rule says that the federal
funds rate it is a linear function of the current inflation rate pit and the output gap
as the difference between log actual yt and log potential real output y
p
t :
it = 0.04+ 1.5(pit − 0.02) + 0.5(yt − ypt ), (1.1)
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where Taylor’s numerical specification indicate an inflation target and a real federal
funds rate of 2 percent on an annually basis. Taylor’s proposal serves two purposes.
On the one hand it provides a description of the actual policy of the U.S. Federal
Reserve under chairman Alan Greenspan. On the other hand it is intended as a nor-
mative description how policy should be conducted. In particular, he emphasizes
the importance to responding to a one percent increase of inflation above target with
an increase of more than one percent in the policy instrument to ensure macroeco-
nomic stability. The importance and robustness of an interest rate setting that is
‘active’ Leeper (1991) or consistent with the Taylor-principle, is a highly disputed
topic in the literature on the conduct of monetary policy.
While Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008) emphasize the necessity of this principle
for local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences like inflation or output
(real determinacy) in cashless economies, Benhabib et al. (2001a), and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001) analyze conditions for real determinacy in economies that feature
a demand for cash.
Benhabib et al. (2001a) analyze conditions under which interest-rate feedback rules
that set the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of inflation lead to a de-
terminate equilibrium. They consider two types of fiscal policies, Ricardian or non-
Ricardian fiscal policies. Ricardian policies ensure that the present discounted value
of total government liabilities converges to zero under all possible off-and on equi-
librium paths of endogenous variables like the price level, inflation or the nominal
interest rate.
Benhabib et al. emphasize that the determination of the price level crucially depends
on the nature of fiscal policy but not on monetary policy: under non-Ricardian fis-
cal policies the price level is determined, while it is indeterminate under Ricardian
policies. However, whether the real allocation is determined hinges on the stance of
monetary policy and on the way in which money enters preferences and technology.
In the context of a money-in-the utility-function model u(ct, mt) with consumption
and real money balances entering as Edgeworth-substitutes (ucm < 0) and under
flexible prices, they show that an active interest rate policy leads to multiple equi-
libria independent of the lump-sum fiscal policy regime. But if money is produc-
tive the Taylor-principle may lead to macroeconomic instability even in the more
realistic case of Edgeworth-complements or real balance effects (ucm > 0). Money
is called productive if an increase in real money balances used in the production
process leads to an increase in output available for consumption. Under these cir-
cumstances a ‘passive’ interest policy – responding to a one percent increase in the
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inflation measure with a less than one percent increase in the nominal interest rate
– is necessary and sufficient for local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium se-
quences. When prices are imperfectly flexible, and fiscal policy is non-Ricardian
or ‘active’, equilibrium sequences under a ‘passive’ interest rate setting converge
asymptotically to the deterministic steady state. In contrast, if the central bank sets
the interest-rate operating target according to the Taylor-principle multiple equilib-
ria may arise.
Assuming intertemporal government solvency, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) study
conditions for real determinacy of forward-looking Taylor-rules in a money-in-the-
utility- function model under differing assumptions about which stock of money
balances enters the utility function. The first timing convention is similar to a typi-
cal cash-in-advance timing. The amount of balances that yields utility is the one that
households hold before entering goods trading but after adjusting their beginning-
of-period money holdings through buying and selling bonds on the financial mar-
ket. Alternatively, the authors assume that end-of-period money delivers utility.
Their main results are as follows. Under cash-in-advance timing a necessary and
sufficient condition for real determinacy is a ‘passive’ interest rate policy. However,
if end-of-period money balances yield transaction services the equilibrium is deter-
minate unless monetary policy responds with an increase of exactly one percent to
an one percent increase in expected inflation above target.
Stressing the short-run perspective, existing studies on the conduct of monetary pol-
icy often ignore physical investment by assuming a fixed capital stock (Galí 2008;
Walsh 2003a; Woodford 2003). In general, bonds and money are the only assets
to transfer wealth across periods. Dupor (2001) adds physical investment to a stan-
dard continuous-time New Keynesian model and shows that an ‘active’ interest rate
policy does not generate a locally unique equilibrium. On the contrary, a ‘passive’
monetary policy is necessary to bring about local equilibrium uniqueness.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) analyze conditions for local determinacy in a New Key-
nesian model with physical investment, too, but in discrete-time. In contrast to Du-
por (2001), they find support for the Taylor-principle as a stabilizing device even
in the presence of capital accumulation. The reason for this result is that the no-
arbitrage relationship between capital and bonds is different. In a discrete-time set
up, the expected marginal productivity of capital equals the real interest rate; in con-
tinuous time, today’s marginal productivity of capital equals the real interest rate.
Exactly this difference alters the determinacy conditions across the two models.
The studies by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, 2005) and Dupor (2001) emphasize the
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importance of timing issues, and Benhabib et al. (2001a) highlight the role of prefer-
ences and technology for stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences. Com-
bining these insights, I examine in chapter 4 of my thesis whether the existence and
the timing of real balance effects affect conditions for local equilibrium uniqueness
and stability of interest rate feedback rules. Throughout the chapter, I assume fiscal
policies of the Ricardian type, implying that the intertemporal government budget
constraint does not add to the set of relevant conditions in a competitive equilib-
rium, and fiscal policy is not capable to pursue policies that pin down the price
level. In this context, I analyze whether the timing of real balance effects contribute
to the determination of the absolute price level under interest policy as suggested
by Patinkin (1949, 1965).
1.3 Outline of the thesis
In chapter 2 we analyze the welfare effects of public information provided by pol-
icy makers on future aggregate risks, including their future policies and economic
forecasts. Agents in the economy face aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. The lat-
ter risk is partially insurable between households in self-enforcing contracts. The
policy maker learns about the aggregate risk before it actually impacts on the allo-
cation and has the option to announce this information to the public. We embed this
specification of risk and information in a monetary production economy and exam-
ine whether central banks should perfectly or partially reveal their information on
aggregate risks to the public.
In chapter 3 we address the question of optimal long run and short run monetary
policy in the presence of conflicting policy aims. In particular, we consider an econ-
omy with nominal rigidities captured by firms setting prices in a staggered way, and
a transaction friction modeled as a textbook money-in-the-utility-function specifica-
tion. Throughout our analysis we abstract from interactions with fiscal policy and
focus on the optimal setting of the interest-rate operating target as the only policy
instrument. First, we determine the optimal deterministic steady state as the opti-
mal long run policy target. Second, we approximate the model’s structural equa-
tions around the optimal steady state and derive a purely quadratic approximation
to households’ ex-ante utility. This strictly-microfounded loss function serves as a
policy objective for evaluating optimal monetary policy in the short run as optimal
responses to various shocks that hit the economy.
In the last chapter of the thesis I examine the role of real balance effects for equi-
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librium determination. Monetary policy is either specified in terms of a current
or forward-looking feedback rule for the nominal interest rate or as a peg for the
growth rate of money supply. I examine how the determination of the absolute price
level and the conditions for local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences
are affected by both – the implementation of monetary policy and preferences spec-
ifying the existence and timing of real balance effects.
2 Policy Announcements and Welfare
with Vadym Lepetyuk
In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about uncertain ag-
gregate outcomes such as policy choices can be detrimental to social welfare. By announcing
informative signals on non-insurable aggregate risk, the policy maker distorts agents’ insur-
ance incentives and increases the riskiness of the optimal allocation that is feasible in self-
enforceable arrangements. As an application, we consider a monetary authority that may
reveal changes in the inflation target, and document that the negative effect of distorted in-
surance incentives can very well dominate conventional effects in favor for the release of
better information.
2.1 Introduction
Nowadays central banks all over the world provide more information and release it
earlier to the public than ever before in their history (Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher,
Haan, and Jansen 2008; Crowe and Meade 2008; Eijffinger and Geraats 2006; Wood-
ford 2008). There seems to be widespread agreement that these recent changes in
disclosure policies are socially beneficial. We argue that the case for disclosure is not
that obvious. In particular, we show that by providing better information on future
aggregate risk, e.g. by announcing future policies or revealing economic forecasts,
policy makers may decrease social welfare by distorting private insurance incen-
tives.
We consider an environment with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. Households
can voluntarily participate in insurance arrangements to reduce their consumption
risk. Such arrangements are self-enforceable or compatible with voluntary partic-
ipation incentives if in any period following the realization of idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty, households choose not to walk away from the arrangement, and live in au-
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tarky from that period on. The latter option may be tempting for households with a
high current income since the insurance arrangements prescribe transfers from these
households to households with a low income in the current period. The lack of com-
mitment thus creates a tension for high income households between higher current
consumption and the future benefits of insurance promised in the arrangements.
Information plays a crucial role in households’ trade-off between future insurance
and current incentives. We study disclosure polices by introducing a public signal
through which the future aggregate state is revealed. The signal is common to all
agents and does not resolve households’ idiosyncratic uncertainty. After the real-
ization of current period idiosyncratic income and given the public signal on future
aggregate risks agents decide to participate in social insurance.
As our main result, we formally show that less precise public information about the
future aggregate state is preferable over perfect public information when incentive
constraints matter. The mechanism is the following. Under the socially optimal
insurance arrangement, the amount of the consumption good that the agents with
high income in the current period are willing to transfer reflects future benefits of
the insurance relative to the outside option. The key point is that agents value the
insurance arrangement conditionally not only on their idiosyncratic realization but
also on the signal about the aggregate state. In particular, if the signal indicates that
the future aggregate state is likely to be one in which the benefits of the arrangement
are relatively large, then the agents are willing to give up a larger share of current
period consumption goods for these future benefits of the arrangement. Similarly, if
the signal informs of a future aggregate state in which the gains of the risk-sharing
agreement are relatively low, then agents with a high current income are less willing
to share their good fortune. When the signal on the aggregate state becomes more
informative, the optimal consumption allocation spreads out to account for all pos-
sible realizations of the signal. For high income agents, the expected utility before
the signal materializes is the same under informative and uninformative signals.
This implies that the consumption allocation of high income agents under perfect
information is riskier than under imperfect information. Since households are risk
averse, under perfect information high income agents are less willing to transfer
goods to low income households. Correspondingly, under imperfect information
low income households are better off, and from an ex-ante perspective agents prefer
uninformative policy announcements.
Unlike Hirshleifer (1971) and his successors (Berk and Uhlig 1993; Schlee 2001), we
focus on the welfare effects of more precise signals on aggregate, not on idiosyn-
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cratic risk. This difference is substantial: there are aggregate states in which more
precise signals actually lead to better risk sharing, which cannot happen in case of
signals on idiosyncratic risk. In these states, the value of the arrangement relative to
the outside option is high, and thus better informed high income agents are willing
to share more. Like in Hirshleifer, the overall effect of information is negative but
relies here on the relevance of voluntary participation incentives for risk sharing. If
agents were to respect commitments or trade a complete set of perfectly enforceable
insurance contracts, better public information on aggregate risk would not affect
social welfare.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to shed light on the welfare effects of
announcements on risks that are common to all agents under the plausible assump-
tion that the idiosyncratic risk is not completely, but only partially insurable.
As our main application, we develop a stochastic equilibrium model that integrates
the risk-sharing mechanism into a monetary production economy in which house-
holds are subject to cash-in-advance constraints and face idiosyncratic employment
opportunities. To insure against the idiosyncratic risk, households may engage in
risk-sharing arrangements consistent with voluntary participation incentives. The
monetary authority is assumed to pursue a stochastic inflation target. The target is
known to the monetary authority one period in advance, and the authority may
choose to release that information with certain precision. Our novel finding in
this environment is that more precise announcements on future monetary policy
are detrimental to social welfare. Furthermore, we show that the level of patience
needed to sustain perfect risk sharing as the first best allocation is strictly increasing
in the precision of the monetary policy announcement.
To evaluate the detrimental effect of policy announcements, we extend the model by
introducing a fraction of firms, which need to set prices one period in advance. With
this extension, better information affects the economy in two ways. First and con-
ventionally, more precise announcements allow the sticky price firms to preset their
prices more accurately, thereby resulting in less price distortions and a better alloca-
tion of resources. Second – and this is the new effect – early announcements distort
risk sharing, increase consumption inequality and thereby worsen the contractual
insurance possibilities ex-ante. We calibrate the monetary production economy to
match basic inflation and income characteristics of the U.S. economy on an annual
basis. The negative effect of information on aggregate risk is sizeable: the cost of in-
formation disclosure accounts for 18 percent of the benefit from removing aggregate
fluctuations all together. Employing recent evidence on the frequency of price ad-
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justments (Bils and Klenow 2004), the negative effect of information quantitatively
dominates the positive aspect for reasonable degrees of risk aversion. Furthermore,
the recent increase in income inequality in the U.S. (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2002;
Krueger and Perri 2006) amplifies the negative rather than the positive effect of pub-
lic information.
The social value of information has been extensively studied in the literature. Our
paper builds a bridge between two distinct strands of literature: the literature on
global games that focuses on aggregate risk, and the literature on efficient risk shar-
ing that concentrates on the insurance of idiosyncratic risk. The model we develop
puts us into the position to analyze the welfare effects of more precise informa-
tion on the aggregate state of the economy under the realistic assumption that the
idiosyncratic risk is not fully diversifiable. Moreover, the analysis of the welfare ef-
fects of better information on aggregate risk involves technical challenges that are
absent in frameworks that focus on idiosyncratic risk.
In a global games framework, Morris and Shin (2002) show that better public infor-
mation on aggregate risks may be undesirable in the presence of private information
on these risks when the coordination of agents is driven by strategic complementar-
ities in their actions. The result is due to the inefficiently high weight that agents
assign to public information relative to private information. While the conditions
for a welfare-decreasing effect of more precise public information are rather special
and controversial (see e.g. Svensson 2006; Woodford 2005), Angeletos and Pavan
(2007) draw a general conclusion that in the presence of a signal-extraction problem
the social value of information is ambiguous if the first best is different from the
equilibrium under perfect information. The main focus in this field is on aggregate
risk, while idiosyncratic risk is either absent or assumed to be completely insurable
due to the existence of complete financial markets.
Our study is closely related to the literature on efficient risk sharing. Hirshleifer
(1971) is among the first to point out that perfect information makes risk averse
agents ex-ante worse off if this leads to evaporation of risks that otherwise could
have been shared in a competitive equilibrium. Schlee (2001) shows under which
general conditions better public information about idiosyncratic risk is undesirable.
Kocherlakota (1996a) shows that the lack of commitment can explain the empirically
observed positive correlation between current income and current consumption.
The properties of stationary contracts in comparison to the first best are character-
ized by Coate and Ravallion (1993). Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and Krueger and
Perri (2005) argue that in economies where agreements are not enforceable, public
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insurance may crowd out private insurance arrangements. This literature focuses on
the role of information on idiosyncratic risk in efficient risk-sharing arrangements.
More relevant and important from a practical perspective, we consider the role of
information on aggregate risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we start with
a simple two-period example to highlight the basic voluntary risk-sharing mecha-
nism involved, and state our main result in that simple environment. In Section
2.3 we set up a model that integrates the mechanism into a monetary production
economy with infinite horizon and flexible prices. In Section 2.4 we state the main
results for that application. In Section 2.5 we evaluate the importance of the distor-
tions of risk-sharing possibilities caused by policy announcements. The last section
concludes.
2.2 Simplified two-period real economy
We set up a simple example that captures the interaction between individual incen-
tives for sharing idiosyncratic risk and the precision of public signals on aggregate
risk. When participation in a risk-sharing arrangement is voluntary we show that
risk averse agents prefer completely uninformative public signals on the aggregate
risk over perfectly informative signals.
Consider a two period pure exchange economy with a continuum of ex-ante iden-
tical agents. In each period an agent obtains either a high endowment yh or a low
endowment yl with equal probability – independent across time and agents. Fur-
thermore, in the second period households’ income is affected by taxes.1 To ease the
exposition, we assume that with equal probability the government can either tax
away all goods (type-b policy) or impose zero tax (type-g policy), and assume that
tax revenues are completely wasted by the government.
The preferences of agents are given by
E[u(c1) + βu(c2)], (2.1)
where c1 and c2 are consumption in the first and in the second period respectively,
β is the discount factor, and the period utility function u(c) is increasing and strictly
1The tax is a convenient and general way to introduce aggregate risks associated with government
policies. It also includes the inflation tax we consider in the next section.
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concave. We measure social welfare according to (2.1), i.e. as households’ expected
utility before any uncertainty has been resolved.2
If agents are able to commit before their endowments realize in the first period, the
optimal risk-sharing arrangement is perfect risk sharing. The commitment require-
ment is crucial. After observing current endowments an agent with a high income
may have an incentive to deviate from the perfect risk-sharing agreement, making
such an agreement unsustainable.
To capture this rational incentive we analyze risk-sharing possibilities under two-
sided lack of commitment by introducing voluntary participation constraints. In
the two-period model, the voluntary participation constraints apply only for the
first period and characterize the trade-off between the first period consumption and
the value of risk sharing provided by the arrangement in the second period. A
risk-sharing arrangement is sustainable if each agent after observing his first period
endowment at least weakly prefers to follow the arrangement than to defect into
autarky. In other words, it is in the best rational interest of each agent to support
the agreement. For the second period we assume that agents respect the commit-
ments made in the first period. Otherwise, if voluntary participation were allowed
in both periods, there would be no room for social insurance as agents would always
choose to consume their endowments. While commitment for the second period is
necessary for the existence of insurance in the two-period model, we do not need to
impose any commitment in the infinite horizon model provided in the next section.
We compare two environments different in information precision about the future
government policy. In the environment of perfect information agents know the sec-
ond period government policy when in the first period they decide to sustain the
risk-sharing agreement or to deviate to autarky. In the environment of completely
imperfect information agents are left uninformed about the government policy.
In the first environment, when future government policy is known, participation
constraints are given by
u(ch1g) + β
1
2
(
u(chh2g) + u(c
hl
2g)
)
≥ u(yh) + β1
2
(
u(yh) + u(yl)
)
(2.2)
u(ch1b) + βu(0) ≥ u(yh) + βu(0) (2.3)
2We consider equal Pareto weights across ex-ante identical agents. If we were to allow for non-
equal Pareto weights social welfare would still be higher under imperfect information than under
perfect information about aggregate risk.
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u(cl1g) + β
1
2
(
u(clh2g) + u(c
ll
2g)
)
≥ u(yl) + β1
2
(
u(yh) + u(yl)
)
(2.4)
u(cl1b) + βu(0) ≥ u(yl) + βu(0), (2.5)
where ci1k is period-1 consumption of an agent with y
i first period endowment un-
der type-k government policy, and cij2k is period-2 consumption of an agent with y
i
endowment in the first period and yj endowment in the second period. In the con-
straints we explicitly substituted cij2b = 0 for type-b policy. The first two constraints
are relevant for agents with high first period income and the latter describe the in-
centives of agents with low first period income. The left hand side of each constraint
constitutes expected utility of the arrangement, and the right hand side is the value
of living in autarky as the outside option.
The resource feasibility constraints are
1
2
(
ch1g + c
l
1g
)
=
1
2
(
ch1b + c
l
1b
)
=
1
4
(
chh2g + c
hl
2g + c
lh
2g + c
ll
2g
)
=
1
2
(
yh + yl
)
. (2.6)
The optimal risk-sharing arrangement in the perfect information environment is a
consumption allocation {ci1k, cij2k} that maximizes ex-ante utility (2.1) subject to par-
ticipation constraints (2.2)-(2.5) and resource constraints (2.6).
The second environment is set to represent completely imperfect information. In
the first period after observing their current endowments – without knowing the
government policy in the second period – agents decide about participation in the
risk-sharing agreement. Correspondingly, the voluntary participation constraints
read
u(ch1) + β
1
4
(
u(chh2g) + u(c
hl
2g) + 2u(0)
)
≥ u(yh) + β1
4
(
u(yh) + u(yl) + 2u(0)
)
(2.7)
u(cl1)+ β
1
4
(
u(clh2g) + u(c
ll
2g) + 2u(0)
)
≥ u(yl)+ β1
4
(
u(yh) + u(yl) + 2u(0)
)
, (2.8)
where ci1 is period-1 consumption of an agent with y
i first period endowment, and
resource feasibility requires
1
2
(
ch1 + c
l
1
)
=
1
4
(
chh2g + c
hl
2g + c
lh
2g + c
ll
2g
)
=
1
2
(
yh + yl
)
. (2.9)
The optimal risk-sharing arrangement under completely imperfect information is a
consumption allocation {ci1, cij2k} that maximizes ex-ante utility (2.1) subject to par-
ticipation constraints (2.7)-(2.8) and resource constraints (2.9).
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Our goal is to highlight that information about aggregate risk can be harmful for
social welfare since it distorts the insurance of idiosyncratic risk under voluntary
participation. The result is formally stated in Theorem 2.1. The intuition is the fol-
lowing. From an ex-ante perspective, the agents desire to share their idiosyncratic
endowment risk. The optimal insurance scheme prescribes transfers from high in-
come agents to low income agents in all states. While agents with a low income are
never worth-off in the agreement, for agents with a high income to live alternatively
in autarky may be an attractive outside option. The better informed high income
agents are about the future tax policy the less willing they are to transfer resources
to the less fortunate agents.
Theorem 2.1. Under completely imperfect information social welfare is strictly higher than
under perfect information about future government policies.
Proof. One can distinguish three cases depending on which participation constraints
are binding. In the first case, all participation constraints for high endowment agents
under perfect and imperfect information are binding. In the second case, only the
participation constraints for high income agents under type-b policy are binding. In
the third case, which is an intermediate case between the first two, for high income
agents the participation constraints under type-b policy and imperfect information
are binding.
In the first case, it follows from the optimal risk-sharing problem that consumption
of the agents under type-g policy should be perfectly smoothed over time for both
information environments. In the imperfect information environment this condition
reads
ch1g = c
hh
2g = c
hl
2g,
and similarly under imperfect information
ch1 = c
hh
2g = c
hl
2g.
The algebraic details for this result are provided in the technical appendix. Under
type-b policy, agents consume nothing in the second period, and we immediately
obtain that in the perfect information environment ch1b = y
h and cl1b = y
l. We thus
compare the information environments in terms of the first period allocations. From
the binding participation constraints (2.2), (2.3), and (2.7) it follows that the first
period allocations under the two informational environments are characterized by
the following inequalities ch1g < c
h
1 < c
h
1b, which are further illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal allocations for perfect and imperfect information under binding
participation constraints.
From the binding participation constraints (2.2), (2.3), and (2.7) it also follows that
agents with a high first period endowment obtain the same expected utility under
perfect and imperfect information(
1
2
+
β
2
)
u(ch1g) +
1
2
u(ch1b) =
(
1+
β
2
)
u(ch1). (2.10)
Therefore the consumption allocation for the high income agents under perfect in-
formation is riskier from an ex-ante perspective. Due to strictly concave preferences,
Equation (2.10) implies that(
1
2
+
β
2
)
ch1g +
1
2
ch1b >
(
1+
β
2
)
ch1. (2.11)
For the expected utility of agents with a low income in the first period under perfect
and imperfect information this implies(
1
2
+
β
2
)
u(cl1g) +
1
2
u(cl1b) <
(
1+
β
2
)
u
(
1+ β
2+ β
cl1g +
1
2+ β
cl1b
)
(2.12)
=
(
1+
β
2
)
u
(
yh + yl − 1+ β
2+ β
ch1g −
1
2+ β
ch1b
)
<
(
1+
β
2
)
u(yh + yl − ch1) =
(
1+
β
2
)
u(cl1),
where the first inequality is due to strict concavity and the second one is implied
by (2.11). Thus, agents with low first period endowments are strictly better off un-
der completely imperfect information. Taking unconditional expectation, adding up
(2.10) and (2.12) we get that imperfect information is strictly preferable for this case.
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In the second case when the participation constraints in the environment of imper-
fect information are not binding, the optimal allocation in this environment is per-
fect risk sharing. This outcome is preferable to the one under perfect information
where the first best is not incentive compatible because the participation constraints
for type-b policy (2.3) and (2.5) always hold with equality.
In the third case when the participation constraints for high first period endowment
agents under type-g policy (2.2) are not binding but the participation constraints
for high income agents in the completely uninformative environment (2.7) do bind,
imperfect information is still preferable. It can be seen that as agents become more
patient the first period allocation for perfect information cannot be improved upon,
but under imperfect information social welfare is still increasing towards the first
best.
Compared to the literature on efficient risk sharing and public information (e.g. Berk
and Uhlig 1993; Hirshleifer 1971; Schlee 2001), we show that not only public infor-
mation on idiosyncratic risk but also on non-insurable aggregate risk can be harmful
to social welfare. Unlike in that literature, there are aggregate states, in which per-
fectly informative signals improve risk sharing. This occurs when the government
reveals type-g policy. Since the expected utility of the arrangement is high relative
to the outside option, high income agents in this state are willing to share more with
low income agents (see Figure 2.1).
The result of the negative social value of public information about the second pe-
riod government policy is robust to any policies which lead to a non-identical dis-
persion of agents’ disposable income. For example, if the tax were lump sum or if
the government were to redistribute the tax revenues equally among agents, better
information on the taxes would be still undesirable. Moreover, it is not crucial for
the finding in Theorem 1 to require a policy under which the idiosyncratic risk van-
ishes completely. Even if taxation were not as extreme as a 100% tax, the result on
the negative value of information stays valid.
Morris and Shin (2002) too provide an argument for a negative value of better infor-
mation on aggregate risk in the presence of a signal-extraction problem. However,
their argument has been criticized from a normative perspective (Woodford 2005).
Woodford’s main criticism is that the strong coordination incentive necessary to ren-
der the value of public information negative is at odds with the type of preferences
typically assumed in macroeconomic modeling. Moreover, he points out that the
Morris-Shin result hinges crucially on the assumption that individual preferences,
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but not social welfare feature the coordination motive. In contrast, we show that the
social value of information can be negative even under standard preferences and
even when individual preferences and social welfare coincide.
There are numerous possible applications including the welfare assessment of an-
nouncements on future tax, spending, debt or monetary policies, as well as the wel-
fare effects of the public disclosure of economic forecasts. Because of its value for
many economic decisions, even the general public pays special attention to infor-
mation revealed by monetary authorities. Announcements by fiscal authorities on
the other hand are less surprising since in developed countries fiscal decisions are
mainly adopted through prolonged parliamentary mechanisms.
In the next section we therefore embed the risk-sharing mechanism into a richer en-
vironment with a monetary authority which announces a signal on its future infla-
tion target. In that application we extend the simple example in several dimensions.
First, we do not impose any commitment and consider an economy with an infinite
number of periods. Second, we allow for continuity in information precision.
2.3 Monetary policy and infinite horizon
We proceed by integrating the voluntary risk-sharing mechanism into a monetary
production economy. In this section we introduce an economy and describe the
notion of equilibrium. In the economy, households’ consumption expenditures are
linked to nominal balances from the previous period with a cash-in-advance con-
straint originated by Clower (1967). As in Lucas (1980), each household consists of
a worker-shopper pair. The production part comprises two sectors. Each sector is
populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms (Blanchard and Kiy-
otaki 1987; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Sectors differ in the productivity of the monopo-
listic firms. The random assignment of workers to firms with different productivity
constitutes idiosyncratic risk. The notion of equilibrium is introduced in two steps.
First, we define an equilibrium for given risk-sharing transfers among households.
Second – and this is our main contribution here – we introduce the possibility for
households to insure the idiosyncratic risk in arrangements that are consistent with
their rational participation incentives (Kocherlakota 1996a). The exchange of con-
sumption goods prescribed by the arrangements is reflected in risk-sharing trans-
fers among households. Furthermore, we define the optimal pure insurance trans-
fers under voluntary participation in order to find out how informative signals on
future inflation affect the optimal insurance.
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We consider an infinite-period production economy with a continuum of house-
holds of measure one and a single perishable consumption good.
Households are identical ex-ante, and their preferences over the stream of consump-
tion are given by
E
[
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(cit)
]
, (2.13)
where cit is consumption of household i in period t, 0 < β < 1 is the time discount
factor, and u(c) is the period utility function. We assume the period utility function
to be twice-differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
Each household consists of two members: a shopper and a worker. Each period,
the worker earns idiosyncratic income and inelastically supplies one unit of labor
to one of the two production sectors, while the shopper buys consumption goods.
Money is the only means for facilitating transactions and transferring wealth across
periods. The period budget constraint of household i is
Mit + ptc
i
t = M
i
t−1 + ptw
f
t + dt + ptτ
i
t , (2.14)
where Mit are nominal money holdings at the end of period t, dt are shares of nomi-
nal profits of monopolistically competitive firms, τit are real transfers prescribed by
a risk-sharing arrangement, w ft is the real wage in production sector f where the
worker is employed, and pt is the aggregate price level.
A shopper and a worker are distinguished by activities. In each period, while a
worker works and earns money, a shopper exchanges the money earned by the
worker in the previous period for consumption goods
ptxit = M
i
t−1, (2.15)
where xit = c
i
t − τit is the amount of the consumption good directly bought in the
market.3
The production part of the economy is represented by two production sectors. Both
sectors include a final good firm and a continuum of intermediate good firms. In
each period the final good firms in both sectors produce an identical consumption
good by aggregating over sector-specific differentiated intermediate goods. The in-
termediate goods are aggregated into the final good with a constant elasticity of
3Alternatively, the cash-in-advance constraints can be stated with inequalities. However, allowing
for inequalities and therefore for self-insurance does not affect our main results. In Section 2.5, we
conduct the latter exercise as a robustness check.
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substitution
y ft =
(∫ 1
0
(y f jt )
1−ρdj
)1/(1−ρ)
, (2.16)
where y ft is the amount of the consumption good produced by the final good firm in
sector f , y f jt is an intermediate good produced by differentiated good firm j in sector
f , and ρ is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods.
The production technology of the differentiated good firms is given by
y f jt = a
f
t l
f j
t , (2.17)
where l f jt is the labor input. The productivity of the differentiated good firms a
f
t is
the same for all intermediate good firms within a production sector, but different
across the sectors.
Acting under perfect competition, final good firms minimize costs by choosing the
factor demand for each intermediate good to satisfy aggregate demand. The cost
minimization problem is
min
∫
p f jt y
f j
t dj (2.18)
subject to the technology constraint (2.16), where p f jt is the price of the intermediate
good j that the final good firm in sector f takes as given.
The intermediate good producers operate under monopolistic competition. A mea-
sure λ of monopolistically competitive firms maximize profits subject to the actual
demand for their product. The profit maximization problem of the monopolistically
competitive firms with flexible price-setting is
max p f jt y
f j
t − ptw ft l f jt , (2.19)
given the demand of the final good firm and nominal sector wages, and subject
to the production technology (2.17). The other (1− λ) firms preset prices a period
ahead based on a public signal on inflation by solving the expected profit maximiza-
tion problem
max Et−1[p
f j
t y
f j
t − ptw ft l f jt |st−1], (2.20)
where st−1 is the signal released in period t− 1 about inflation target in period t.
In each period, a worker is randomly assigned either to be employed in the sector
of high productivity ah, or to work for firms with low productivity al. After selling
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the final goods to the shoppers, a worker obtains labor income and an equal share
of profits of all monopolistically competitive firms.
Monetary policy is characterized by a stochastic inflation target. All agents in the
economy are rational and know the stochastic properties of the inflation target pro-
cess. In addition, the monetary authority knows the inflation target one period in
advance, and provides a public signal on the future inflation target with a certain
precision. The exogenous process for the gross inflation target pij is given by an
i.i.d process with two states of equal probability: high inflation pih and low inflation
pil.4 Similarly, the public signal on the next period inflation target takes two values,
a high realization sh and a low realization sl. The precision of the public signal is
given by κ ≡ Prob[pij|sj], with 1/2 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
The actual inflation coincides with the inflation target by appropriate money in-
jections in all states. Since seigniorage is spent on government expenditures,5 the
government budget constraint reads
ptgt = Mt −Mt−1, (2.21)
where gt denotes real government expenditures, and Mt is the aggregate money
supply.
Definition 2.2. An incomplete markets equilibrium is an allocation {cit, xit, Mit, d ft , y ft , y f jt ,
Mt, gt} and a price system {pt, p f jt , w ft } such that given exogenous processes for the infla-
tion target {pit}, the public signal {st}, the assignments of households to production sectors
{ait}, and the risk-sharing transfers {τit}, and initial conditions for the distribution of nom-
inal money balances {Mi−1}, and initial price setting of non-flexible price firms {p f j0 }, the
following conditions hold
(i) for each household i given prices {pt, w ft } and profits {d ft }, the allocation {cit, xit, Mit}
maximizes household’s utility (2.13) subject to the budget constraint (2.14) and the
cash-in-advance constraint (2.15),
(ii) for each production sector f given prices {pt, w ft }, the production allocation {y ft , y f jt },
prices {p f jt } and profits {d ft } solve the cost minimization problem of the final good
firms (2.18), and the profit maximization problems of the differentiated good firms
(2.19) and (2.20),
4The inflation target process and productivity are assumed to be non-degenerate pil < pih and
al < ah.
5Alternatively, when seigniorage is equally distributed back to households our main results stated
in Theorem 2.12 stay valid.
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(iii) monetary injections are consistent with the inflation target
pt = pit pt−1,
(iv) the government budget constraint (2.21) is fulfilled, and
(v) markets clear∫
citdi + gt =
∫
y ft d f ,
∫
Mitdi = Mt,
∫
l f jt dj =
1
2
.
We assume that the low realization of the inflation target is large enough to satisfy
the resource feasibility with non-negative government expenditures. When we refer
to social welfare derived from a certain allocation, we mean the ex-ante utility (2.13),
which is evaluated before any uncertainty has been resolved.
The main element of our model is households’ risk-sharing arrangement under vol-
untary participation. Without risk-sharing transfers the consumption allocation that
results from the incomplete markets equilibrium is not efficient from an ex-ante per-
spective due to market incompleteness which prevents households from optimal
borrowing and lending. However, the efficient use of a complete set of securities
requires commitment or enforceability of the arrangements. In the absence of com-
mitment the consumption allocation can still be improved by risk-sharing transfers
consistent with voluntary participation incentives. We determine the socially opti-
mal transfer scheme under voluntary participation in the incomplete markets equi-
librium. Voluntary participation in social insurance provided by the risk-sharing
transfers means that in each period households may decline the offered risk-sharing
arrangement. In such a case they live forever in an economy with no transfers, con-
suming only the goods bought directly in the market.
With this mechanism we seek to capture financial market imperfections in an ab-
stract way – either incompleteness of the financial markets themselves or private
agents’ limited access to it. When participation incentives matter, the resulting equi-
librium consumption allocations share key properties with individual consumption
patterns in the data (Krueger and Perri 2006). In particular, lack of commitment re-
sults in a positive correlation between current income and current consumption –
a stylized fact that cannot be explained in models with complete financial markets
(Kocherlakota 1996a).
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 2.2. In each period, first, agents obtain a
public signal on next period’s inflation target and observe the current period infla-
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Figure 2.2: Timing of events in the monetary production economy.
tion target.6 Second, households decide on sustaining a risk-sharing arrangement
that prescribes transfers {τit}. Third, workers and shoppers separate, and the former
inelastically supply their labor services into the production process. Fourth, market
exchange takes place. Flexible price monopolistic firms set prices for the current pe-
riod, shoppers receive consumption goods in exchange for cash held from the previ-
ous period, workers receive wages and shares of profits and the government collects
seigniorage from money injections. Fifth, among shoppers an exchange according
to the risk-sharing arrangement takes place. Finally, members of each household
meet again, consume, money balances are passed from the worker to the shopper
for next period consumption purchases, and sticky price firms preset prices for the
next period based on the public signal on the future inflation target.
Formally, the risk-sharing arrangement is built upon the consumption allocation
of the incomplete markets equilibrium with no transfers as the outside option. This
“off-equilibrium” allocation coincides with the equilibrium amount of consumption
goods directly bought in the market {xit} since there is no choice how much money
the agents hold from this period to next, and therefore how much they purchase.
Moreover, since the equilibrium on the goods’ market is not linked to the distribu-
tion of consumption among households, prices in the equilibrium without and with
transfers are identical.
Let the individual public state at time t be hit = (x
i
t, Xt, st), where st is the public
signal about inflation in period t + 1, and Xt denotes aggregate resources available
for private consumption. We restrict our analysis to pure insurance arrangements as
emphasized by Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993), and Ligon et al. (2002),
which implies that the current risk-sharing transfers do not depend on transfers
received in the past. Models that allow for history-dependent arrangements tend
to overpredict the extent of risk sharing in practice (Alvarez and Jermann 2001;
Krueger, Lustig, and Perri 2008). Tractability is an additional benefit. With pure
insurance transfers we can analytically characterize the effect of information on so-
cial welfare.
6An alternative timing of events that leads to exactly the same results and does not require the
awareness of current period inflation includes shoppers’ trading first, followed by the risk sharing
decision, and workers’ realization of income.
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Definition 2.3. A consumption allocation {cit} is sustainable if there exist transfers {τit}
such that
(i) the consumption allocation {cit} solves the incomplete markets equilibrium with the
transfers τit (h
i
t),
(ii) for each household i and state hit, the consumption allocation {cit} is weakly preferable
to the outside option {xit}
E
[
∞
∑
j=0
βt+ju(cit+j)|hit
]
≥ E
[
∞
∑
j=0
βt+ju(xit+j)|hit
]
, (2.22)
(iii) and the transfers {τit} are resource-feasible∫
τit (h
i
t)di = 0. (2.23)
The key element of the information set in period t is the public signal on inflation
provided by the monetary authority. The signal helps to resolve inflation uncer-
tainty for the agents.
Definition 2.4. A socially optimal arrangement under voluntary participation is a con-
sumption allocation {cit} that provides the highest expected utility among the set of sustain-
able allocations.
It is natural to compare the optimal arrangement under voluntary participation to
an optimal arrangement under commitment. We define the optimal commitment allo-
cation as a consumption allocation that provides the highest expected utility among
the set of consumption-feasible allocations. An allocation is consumption-feasible if
it solves the incomplete markets equilibrium with resource-feasible transfers {τit}.
2.4 Negative social value of information
In this section we deliver our main result that policy announcements about future
monetary policy can be detrimental to social welfare. We show that better precision
of policy announcements is not desirable because it harms individual risk-sharing
possibilities when rational participation incentives matter. In addition, we show
that under more informative signals perfect risk sharing requires a higher degree of
patience to be supported as a sustainable allocation.
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To highlight the main effect we abstain in this section from the effect of public signals
on optimal pricing decisions of firms. We avoid the pricing friction on the firm side
by assuming in this section that all intermediate firms are flexible price firms. In
the next section we extend the main result by illustrating a trade-off in public signal
precision when a fraction of firms has to preset prices one period in advance: more
precise information reduces the dispersion in relative prices between flexible and
sticky-price firms and thereby leads to a better allocation of resources.
2.4.1 Optimal risk sharing under voluntary participation
In the following paragraphs we characterize the incomplete markets equilibrium
under flexible prices, then proceed to state the problem to design the socially op-
timal arrangement in recursive form and derive general properties of the optimal
solution.
As an initial point of our analysis we compute the incomplete markets equilibrium
in the absence of transfers. Due to constant labor supply and since all firms are
flexible in their price setting, the income of household i earned in period t depends
only on worker’s productivity in that period. From (2.16)-(2.19) the real income of a
worker employed in sector f is equal to
w ft +
dt
pt
=
1
µ
a f +
µ− 1
µ
ah + al
2
,
where µ = 1/(1− ρ) is a fixed mark-up above real marginal costs. The first term is
labor income and the second term is profit equally distributed among households.
From the cash-in-advance constraint (2.15), equilibrium consumption in the absence
of transfers – the outside option – is given by
xit = x
f (pij) =
[
1
µ
a f +
µ− 1
µ
ah + al
2
]
/pij, (2.24)
when inflation in period t is pij and the worker was assigned to sector f in period
t− 1. Combining the goods’ market clearing condition with the government bud-
get constraint (2.21) and the cash-in-advance constraint (2.15), government expen-
ditures are
gt = yt − yt−1/pij = a
h + al
2
pij − 1
pij
. (2.25)
It follows from (2.24) and (2.25) that the equilibrium consumption in the absence of
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transfers and the government expenditures is independent of the precision of the
inflation target signal.
With risk-sharing transfers, from Definition 2.3 and Equation (2.24), period-t equi-
librium consumption of household i is given by
cit = c
f (pij, sk) =
[
1
µ
a f +
µ− 1
µ
ah + al
2
]
/pij + τ(a f ,pij, sk),
when period-t signal of period-t + 1 inflation is sk, period-t inflation is pij, and the
worker of the household was assigned to production sector j in period t− 1. With
pure insurance transfers the equilibrium period-t consumption depends only on
period-t direct purchases xit, total resources available for private consumption Xt,
and the signal st on the period t+ 1 inflation target realized in period t. In particular,
this implies that the current transfers prescribed by the arrangement do not hinge
on the individual transfers received in the past. This allows us to write the optimal
risk-sharing arrangement problem in a recursive form.
For two inflation states and two signals on next period inflation rate the optimal
contract problem given in Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 leads to the following recursive
description
max
{c f (pij,sk)≥0}
1
1− βVrs (2.26)
subject to participation constraints for high and low signals
u(c f (pij, sh)) + βκVrs(pih) + β(1− κ)Vrs(pil) + β
2
1− βVrs ≥
u(x f (pij)) + βκVout(pih) + β(1− κ)Vout(pil) + β
2
1− βVout ∀ f , j, (2.27)
u(c f (pij, sl)) + βκVrs(pil) + β(1− κ)Vrs(pih) + β
2
1− βVrs ≥
u(x f (pij)) + βκVout(pil) + β(1− κ)Vout(pih) + β
2
1− βVout ∀ f , j, (2.28)
and consumption-feasibility constraints
∑
f
c f (pij, sh) =∑
f
c f (pij, sl) =∑
f
x f (pij) ∀j, (2.29)
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with the period values of the arrangement
Vrs(pij) ≡ E
[
u(c f (pij, sk))
∣∣∣pij] , Vrs ≡ E [Vrs(pij)] ,
and of the outside option
Vout(pij) ≡ E
[
u(x f (pij))
∣∣∣pij] , Vout ≡ E [Vout(pij)] .
As the first point in characterizing socially optimal arrangements, we show that the
optimal arrangement exists and is unique.
Lemma 2.5. The socially optimal arrangement exists and is unique. The arrangement and
the social welfare are continuous functions in the precision of the public signal.
The proof provided in the technical appendix employs the Theorem of the Maxi-
mum, and relies on the convexity of the set of allocations that satisfy participation
constraints.
Next, we highlight some valuable characteristics of the optimal risk-sharing ar-
rangement. Among the participation constraints (2.27) and (2.28) only restrictions
for high productivity agents can potentially be binding for the optimal arrangement.
Households assigned to low productivity firms are never worse off under the opti-
mal arrangement relative to their outside option because the arrangement prescribes
transfers from high productivity households as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. The socially optimal arrangement satisfies
xl(pij, sk) ≤ cl(pij, sk) ≤ ch(pij, sk) ≤ xh(pij, sk).
The proof is provided in the technical appendix. First, we show that under the op-
timal arrangement in any state high income households consume at least as much
as the low income households. Otherwise, if there are states such that low income
households obtain more than the high income households, then an arrangement that
prescribes perfect risk sharing in those states is sustainable and welfare improving.
Second, we show that high income agents obtain not more than the outside option.
By contradiction, either the participation constraint of some low productivity house-
holds is violated or a deviation can be constructed that yields higher social welfare.
As an immediate corollary from Lemma 2.6, the socially optimal arrangement satis-
fies Vrs(pij)−Vout(pij) ≥ 0 for all inflation states pij. In other words, in any inflation
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state the value of the optimal arrangement cannot be lower than the value of the
allocation in the equilibrium without transfers.
2.4.2 Information, patience, and folk theorems
Before we proceed to our main result, we first pin down the cases when information
precision does not affect social welfare, and then show that perfect risk sharing is
less likely to be sustainable when the precision of public announcements increases.
The following lemmas help to exclude these possibilities by characterizing the sus-
tainability of the optimal commitment allocation and conditions when the outside
option is the only sustainable allocation.
One potential candidate for the optimal risk-sharing arrangement is the optimal
commitment allocation. Since all households are ax-ante the same, the optimal
commitment allocation is perfect risk sharing cit = (x
h
t + x
l
t)/2 for all households.
Though voluntary participation imposes additional restrictions on the socially op-
timal arrangement, this does not mean that the optimal commitment allocation is
never attainable. Indeed, perfect risk sharing may still be the socially optimal ar-
rangement if the discount factor β is high enough. This result, commonly known as
the folk theorem is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. There exists a value β¯ such that for any discount factor β ≥ β¯ the socially
optimal arrangement for any signal precision is perfect risk sharing.
Proof. Perfect risk sharing provides the highest ex-ante utility among the
consumption-feasible allocations. The existence of β¯ follows from monotonicity
of participation constraints in β and V¯rs > Vout, where V¯rs is the value of the perfect
risk-sharing arrangement. In the participation constraints (2.27) and (2.28) a higher
β increases the future value of perfect risk sharing relative to the allocation in the
equilibrium without transfers, leaving the current incentives to deviate unaffected.
Therefore, if the participation constraints are not binding for β¯, they are not binding
for any β ≥ β¯.
On the lower end of sustainable arrangements, if the level of patience is relatively
low, the set of sustainable allocations may shrink to one point, which is the equilib-
rium allocation in the absence of transfers. If the equilibrium with no transfers is the
only sustainable allocation for a certain level of patience then the socially optimal
allocation is again the outside option if households are even less patient.
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Lemma 2.8. If for a certain discount factor β the equilibrium allocation in the absence of
transfers is the socially optimal arrangement for any signal precision, then for any β ≤ β
the socially optimal arrangement is the equilibrium allocation in the absence of transfers.
Proof. Assume that for some β ≤ β there exists an optimal arrangement different
from the equilibrium allocation with no transfers. The arrangement allocation is
sustainable. By Lemma 2.6, the value of this arrangement is at least as high as the
value of defecting into the outside option for any inflation state. Then for β the allo-
cation is also sustainable since the value of the arrangement other than the outside
option gets an even higher weight in the participation constraints. This contradicts
that for β the optimal arrangement is the no-transfer equilibrium allocation.
In order to characterize the amount of consumption that high productivity house-
holds are willing to share with low productivity households it is useful to distin-
guish two opposite effects. The first effect is due to the increase in disposable re-
sources available for consumption and therefore we refer to it as the wealth effect.
Under low inflation, the disposable resources are higher, which tends to scale up
the value of the arrangement, the value of the outside option, and the gain of the ar-
rangement relative to the allocation of the no-transfer equilibrium. The second effect
is related to the benefits of insurance, and we name the effect the risk aversion effect.
Under high inflation consumers’ disposable resources are lower, but this may lead
to even higher benefits of risk sharing relative to the outside option if households’
risk aversion is high enough.
In general, the wealth and the risk aversion effects lead households to value insur-
ance differently in different inflation states. However, there is the degenerate possi-
bility that these two effects exactly offset each other. This is the case when the rela-
tive gain of the optimal arrangement Vrs(pij)− Vout(pij) is the same for all inflation
states pij.7 Throughout the following analysis we exclude this possibility. Instead,
either the wealth effect dominates when Vrs(pil)−Vout(pil) > Vrs(pih)−Vout(pih), or
the risk aversion effect dominates when the inequality is reversed.
We can now analyze how informative policy announcements influence the outcome
of the optimal insurance arrangement under voluntary participation. Signal pre-
cision plays an important role for the sustainability of perfect risk sharing. In the
7The relative gain of the insurance arrangement for homogenous preferences vanishes when the
degree of homogeneity converges to zero. The risk aversion effect (the wealth effect) dominates for
a degree of homogeneity smaller (larger) than zero.
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following proposition we show that the level of patience that is needed to sustain
perfect risk sharing increases in the precision of the signal.
Proposition 2.9. Let β¯(κ) be the cutoff point such that for each β ≥ β¯(κ) perfect risk
sharing is the socially optimal arrangement. The cutoff point β¯(κ) is strictly increasing in
the precision of the public signal.
The proof is provided in Appendix 5.1.4. The cutoff point is determined by a par-
ticipation constraint for high productivity households that imposes the tightest re-
striction. Which particular constraint is the tightest depends on the gains the perfect
risk-sharing arrangement offers relative to the equilibrium in the absence of trans-
fers as can be seen from (2.27) and (2.28). The gain can be higher either under low or
under high inflation. This depends on whether the wealth or risk aversion effect is
dominant. However, in both cases the tightest constraint imposes a stronger restric-
tion under informative signals than under uninformative signals. Suppose without
loss of generality that the risk aversion effect dominates, i.e. the perfect risk sharing
arrangement provides higher value relative to the equilibrium allocation without
transfers under high inflation than under low inflation. While for high productivity
agents the current period loss of staying in the arrangement is independent of signal
precision, under the low next period inflation signal the expected future gain of in-
surance is lower for informative signals than for uninformative signals. Therefore,
the level of patience needed to sustain the perfect risk sharing allocation is higher
under an informative signal.
2.4.3 Information and welfare under partial risk sharing
A number of studies indicate that the more realistic case is when risk sharing is nei-
ther perfect nor absent, but partial.8 This case is analyzed below. We show that the
transfers prescribed by the arrangement depend on signal precision, and the signal
can shape the resulting consumption allocation significantly. As our main result, we
provide conditions for social welfare to be decreasing in the precision of the public
signal. We exclude the cases when the optimal arrangement is either perfect risk
sharing or the outside option and signal precision does not directly affect the ar-
rangement and social welfare. Lemmas 2.10 and 2.11 provide sufficient conditions
for a socially optimal arrangement that is neither perfect risk sharing nor the outside
option.
8See e.g. Townsend (1994) or more recently Ligon et al. (2002).
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If perfect risk sharing is not sustainable, a number of participation constraints of
high productivity agents are binding. Which constraints are binding depends on the
current loss relative to the outside option and the future value of the arrangement.
We focus on the case when all constraints are binding and state below sufficient
conditions for this case to apply.
Lemma 2.10. If all participation constraints for high productivity agents are violated under
an arrangement that prescribes perfect risk sharing in all states then all the constraints are
binding under the optimal arrangement.
The proof of this lemma is provided in the technical appendix. First, under the con-
ditions of the lemma, we show that for all states the optimal arrangement satisfies
strict inequalities cl(pij, sk) < ch(pij, sk). Second, by contradiction we show that a
Lagrangian multiplier on any participation constraint of a high productivity agent
cannot be zero, since otherwise the inequalities do not hold.
Binding participation constraints imply that perfect risk sharing is not optimal, how-
ever on the other hand, the optimal arrangement may be given by another extreme,
which is the outside option. In the following lemma we provide conditions under
which there exists a socially optimal arrangement different from the consumption
allocation in the absence of transfers. In particular, we consider a situation when the
signal is uninformative.
Lemma 2.11. Consider the case of an uninformative public signal with all participation
constraints for high productivity agents binding in the optimal arrangement. If and only if
1
2
(
u′(xl(pih))
u′(xh(pih))
+
u′(xl(pil))
u′(xh(pil))
)
>
2− β
β
, (2.30)
then the socially optimal arrangement is not the consumption allocation of the equilibrium
in the absence of transfers.
The proof is provided in the technical appendix. Under binding participation, the
optimal arrangement should necessary solve a fixed point problem in terms of the
value of the risk-sharing arrangement. The outside option is always a solution to
the fixed point problem. The condition stated in the lemma guarantees that for an
uninformative signal there exists another solution to the fixed point problem, which
is a sustainable arrangement and is strictly preferable to the outside option.
From the perspective of an agent with a high current period income, risk sharing in
future periods is attractive if the agent values the future significantly enough and
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if the agent is subject to high enough consumption risk in the equilibrium without
transfers. Both aspects are reflected in condition (2.30) of Lemma 2.11. Taking it to
one extreme, if future consumption is worthless for agents (i.e. β = 0), then the
outside option is the only sustainable arrangement. Therefore, the threshold for β
implied by condition (2.30) is strictly positive. On the other hand, if the consump-
tion risk in the equilibrium without transfers is significant, the marginal utility for
consuming the low income relative to the high income, u′(xl(pij))/u′(xh(pij)), may
become substantial, and thus the required level of patience for engaging in social
insurance is low.
In the following theorem we establish our main result that social welfare is strictly
decreasing in the precision of the public signal.
Theorem 2.12. If all participation constraints for high productivity agents are binding and
the equilibrium allocation in the absence of transfers is not the only sustainable arrangement,
then social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision of the public signal on future inflation.
The proof is provided in Appendix 5.1.7. For any two values of signal precision κ1 <
κ2, we construct a consumption allocation for κ1 based on the optimal allocation for
κ2 as follows. The allocation is constructed to satisfy participation constraints for
κ1 with equality while the value of the arrangement in future periods corresponds
to the optimal arrangement for κ2. We show that this allocation delivers strictly
higher welfare than the optimal allocation for κ2, and is also sustainable for signal
precision κ1. Thus, since the optimal allocation for κ1 must be at least as good as the
one constructed, welfare is strictly higher for lower signal precision.
The negative influence of informative signals on social welfare can be illustrated as
follows. Assume that the risk aversion dominates the wealth effect. Suppose further
the realized signal indicates that the next period inflation is more likely to be low.
From the signal households infer that the future value of the arrangement relative
to the outside option is lower, which is an unfavorable outcome for all households.
Therefore the high productivity agents require higher current period consumption.
In contrast, under the high inflation signal, which indicates a higher value of the
arrangement relative to the outside option, the high productivity agents can be sat-
isfied with lower current period consumption. Compared to uninformative signals,
the consumption allocation prescribed by the optimal arrangement diverges as pre-
cision increases, i.e. the consumption allocation of high income agents becomes
riskier ex-ante. Binding participation constraints imply that the expected utility of
high income agents before the signal realization is independent of signal precision.
Since households are risk averse, high income agents are less willing to share their
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good fortune with low income agents when information gets more precise. Corre-
spondingly, from the resource constraint it follows that low income households are
better off under imperfect information. Therefore, ex-ante risk averse agents prefer
uninformative policy announcements.
The negative value of information does not depend on whether the wealth effect or
the risk aversion effect is dominant. If the wealth effect dominates, the high produc-
tivity agents require lower current period consumption following a low inflation
signal, and demand higher current period consumption following a high signal.
Nonetheless, from an ex-ante perspective such divergences are still welfare decreas-
ing for risk averse agents.
We prove that social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision when all participation
constraints for high productivity agents are binding. This is a sufficient condition.
Our numerical computations reveal that as long as perfect risk sharing is not sus-
tainable for uninformative signals, social welfare is strictly decreasing in precision
no matter how many constraints are binding at the optimal arrangement. Evidently,
if perfect risk sharing is sustainable under uninformative signals but not under in-
formative signals – which can occur since the minimum level of patience needed
to sustain perfect risk sharing is increasing in precision (see Proposition 2.9) – less
information is still preferable.
The strongest effect of information on welfare is observed – measured as the dif-
ference in social welfare between uninformative and perfectly informative signals
– when all participation constraints for high productivity agents are binding. The
effect is weaker when in some inflation states the optimal allocation exhibits per-
fect risk sharing, which is the case when participation constraints are not binding in
those states. Intuitively, in such a case the influence of information on risk sharing is
limited to states with binding constraints, and the overall effect on the consumption
allocation is smaller.
The result in Theorem 2.12 is robust with respect to the value of the outside option.
The assumption of agents living forever in the equilibrium without transfers when
a given risk-sharing arrangement is declined constitutes a harsh penalty. The main
result stays valid qualitatively if this assumption is relaxed. Suppose the penalty
were weaker, for example, if agents were allowed to reengage in social insurance.
Then under the optimal arrangement the high income agents would be less willing
to share the risk with the low income agents. In this case, since the marginal utility of
low income households is higher, public information plays an even more significant
role than under harsher punishment.
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In this section we have characterized how the precision of public signals on future
inflation affects optimal insurance under voluntary participation when prices are
flexible. If the optimal arrangement is partial risk sharing, the precision of the signal
effectively influences the distribution of consumption in the risk-sharing arrange-
ment. We show that higher precision in signals is socially undesirable because this
decreases the willingness of high income households to transfer resources to less for-
tunate households. In addition, we find that the level of patience needed to sustain
the perfect risk sharing allocation is strictly increasing in the precision of the signal.
The reason for this is that the public information provided by the monetary author-
ity does not help agents to make better decisions for the future. In the next section
we extend our framework to allow for a beneficial role of public information, and
thereby assess the importance of the detrimental effect of policy announcements on
risk sharing.
2.5 Assessment of risk-sharing distortions
The main purpose of this section is to evaluate the risk-sharing effect. To serve this
goal, we introduce a positive effect of information by considering imperfectly flex-
ible prices. We assume that a positive fraction of intermediate good producers pre-
set their prices one period in advance (Woodford 2003), which results in increasing
aggregate resources with better public information. We proceed to quantitatively
assess the importance of the negative and positive effects of information by setting
up a numerical example that shares some salient features with the U.S. economy.
We find that the negative effect of information prevails for reasonable degrees of
risk aversion. Furthermore, the increase in the U.S. income inequality over the last
decades tends to amplify the negative role of public information about aggregate
risk on social welfare. As robustness checks, we subsequently allow for a weaker
penalty for default, for self-insurance, and staggered-price setting (Calvo 1983). As
an alternative possibility to measure the negative effect of information and inde-
pendent of a particular positive effect of information, we then compare the gain of
uninformative signals relative to the elimination of all inflation fluctuations (Lucas
2003).
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2.5.1 Imperfectly flexible prices
When some monopolistically competitive firms have to preset prices, firms’ prob-
lems become non-trivial. Solving first the cost minimization problem of the perfectly
competitive final good firms (2.18) we get the demand for each of the variety goods
y f jt =
(
p f jt
pt
)−1/ρ
y ft , (2.31)
where the aggregate price level is defined by
pt =
(∫ 1
0
(p f jt )
1−1/ρdj
)1/(1−1/ρ)
. (2.32)
Using the production technology (2.17), the final good firm demand (2.31), and inte-
grating over all monopolistically competitive firms within a sector, production per
worker in sector f is given by
y ft =
a f
∆ ft
, (2.33)
where price dispersion ∆ ft ≡
∫ ( p f jt
pt
)−1/ρ
dj satisfies ∆ ft ≥ 1 by Jensen’s inequality.
The highest level of production is achieved when all differentiated goods firms are
flexible in their pricing decision and, therefore, set the same price p f jt = pt.
Signal precision under imperfectly flexible prices affects the outcome of the optimal
insurance arrangement in two different ways. First, it influences the willingness of
high productivity households to share with low productivity households, as high-
lighted in the previous section. Second, it affects the amount of resources that can
be shared among the households. The influence of the latter effect can be illustrated
by a particular participation constraint. With a fraction of prices preset and for price
dispersion, which is symmetric in predicted and realized inflation,9 the constraint
in the recursive formulation for a high inflation signal (2.27) is modified to
u(c f (∆ f−1,pij, sh)) + βκVrs(∆
f ,pih) + β(1− κ)Vrs(∆ f ,pil) + β
2
1− βVrs ≥
u(x f (∆ f−1,pij)) + βκVout(∆
f ,pih) + β(1− κ)Vout(∆ f ,pil) + β
2
1− βVout, (2.34)
9Symmetry implies that price dispersion for any signal realization depends on the precision of the
signal but not on the signal itself.
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where ∆ f and ∆ f−1 are the current and the previous period price dispersions, pij is
the current period inflation, and Vrs and Vout are the value of the arrangement and
the value of the outside option defined accordingly. An increase in precision dis-
torts risk-sharing opportunities when risk sharing is partial, but on the other hand
it allows sticky price firms to set their prices more accurately, thereby resulting in
less price distortions and a better allocation of resources. Taking it to the extreme, if
the socially optimal arrangement is either the outside option or perfect risk sharing,
then the expected utility of households is increasing in signal precision.
We compute social welfare in two steps. First, for any given precision we calcu-
late prices and production by solving the problems of final good firms (2.18), and
monopolistically competitive firms (2.19) and (2.20). Second, taking the resources
available for consumption as given, we derive the value of the outside option and
compute the optimal consumption allocation according to (2.26)-(2.29).
2.5.2 Quantitative assessment: imperfectly flexible prices
We set up a numerical example to assess quantitatively the effect of public an-
nouncements. The baseline is constructed to match stylized facts for the U.S. econ-
omy on an annual basis. We calibrate the inflation process to the postwar U.S. con-
sumer price index that results in two states with 1.2 and 5.7 percent inflation rates.
We set the variance of the productivity process σ2y to 0.1, which is the average of the
variance for the transitory component of within-groups income for the U.S. between
1980 and 2003 as estimated by Krueger and Perri (2006).10 Throughout the exam-
ple we employ standard preferences that feature constant relative risk aversion, and
calibrate the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods to a value of 6
following Woodford (2003). The fraction of sticky price firms is set to 13 percent,
which is the value found by Bils and Klenow (2004) using U.S. data for 1995-1997
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We keep the discount factor at the highest
value such that all participation constraints are violated under perfect risk sharing
(the condition of Lemma 2.10) for any precision.
We measure the social value of policy announcements as the percentage difference
in certainty equivalent consumption between uninformative and perfectly informa-
tive signals. In other words, this measure captures the percentage amount of annual
consumption agents are willing to give up until they are indifferent between per-
fectly informative announcements and no announcements at all.
10 Violante (2002) provides similar numbers for wage inequality.
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Figure 2.3: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informa-
tive signals expressed in percentage certainty equivalent consumption as a function
of risk aversion.
We find that the optimal announcements are either no announcement (κ = 1/2) or
perfect announcements (κ = 1). The negative effect of information dominates for
any coefficient of relative risk aversion that exceeds 4.66, which is not an unreason-
ably high value of the coefficient.11 The result is illustrated in Figure 2.3 where the
social value of information is shown as a function of risk aversion for three different
fractions of preset prices, 1− λ, including 13%, which is our baseline value.
When a larger fraction of prices is adjusted more frequently the social value of in-
formation becomes negative for even lower degrees of risk aversion (see the dotted
line for 1 − λ = 0.05 in Figure 2.3). It is a well-documented fact the U.S. have
experienced a substantial increase in income inequality over the last decades (see
Gottschalk and Moffitt 2002; Krueger and Perri 2006). We capture this evidence by
an increase in the variance of the income process σ2y which results from the random
assignment of workers to sectors of different productivity. How does this increase
11There is quite a controversy about the magnitude of the constant risk aversion coefficient (see
Campbell 2003; Kocherlakota 1996b; Mehra and Prescott 1985). Kocherlakota (1996b) summarized
the prevailing view “... that a vast majority of economists believe that values for [the coefficient of
relative risk aversion] above ten (or, for that matter above five) imply highly implausible behavior
on part of the individuals.”
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Figure 2.4: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informa-
tive signals expressed in percentage certainty equivalent consumption as a function
of the fraction of prices preset.
in income inequality affect the trade-off between the destruction of insurance possi-
bilities on one hand and the better allocation of resources on the other hand, when
policy announcements become more precise? For this exercise we set the coefficient
of relative risk aversion to 4.66 – implying that the positive and negative effect of
more precise information cancel out for the average of the idiosyncratic variance in
the U.S. between 1980 and 2003. Employing our baseline calibration we obtain that
for the variance of the idiosyncratic component of within-group income observed in
1980, the social value of information was positive. From 1980 to 2003 the variance
increased from 8 percent to 12 percent (Krueger and Perri 2006). This renders the
social value of information negative. This result is illustrated in Figure 2.4. For the
income inequality observed in 2003, a secretive inflation target is desirable unless
the fraction of prices preset for one year were exceeding 16 percent.
We proceed further by conducting three robustness checks: lower the penalty for
default, allowing for self-insurance, and Calvo pricing.
Weaker penalty for default
The negative effect of information on social welfare is amplified when the penalty
48
for default is decreased, i.e. the value of the outside option is higher. To illustrate
this property, we compute the social value of information when households are al-
lowed to reengage in social insurance after one period instead of living in the equi-
librium without transfers forever. The corresponding participation constraint for a
high inflation signal (2.34) is modified to
u(c f (∆ f−1,pij, sh)) + βκVrs(∆
f ,pih) + β(1− κ)Vrs(∆ f ,pil) ≥
u(x f (∆ f−1,pij)) + βκVout(∆
f ,pih) + β(1− κ)Vout(∆ f ,pil).
Though qualitatively similar to our standard case in which agents are not allowed
to reengage in risk sharing arrangements, the results differ quantitatively. Under a
lower penalty for default, the negative aspect of information dominates the positive
one for even lower degrees of risk aversion and even when idiosyncratic income
uncertainty is lower (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6 in the technical appendix). For example,
when the fraction of preset prices equals the value found by Bils and Klenow (2004),
the negative effect of information outperforms the positive effect for degrees of risk
aversion higher than 3.5. Moreover, even for an idiosyncratic income variance from
1980, the social value of policy announcements becomes negative in this scenario.
Self-insurance
Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we allow for the possibility of self-
insurance captured by the cash-in-advance constraints written as inequalities, i.e.
ptxit ≤ Mit−1 instead of (2.15). This permits agents to save money for purchases
in future periods. In our numerical example, agents nevertheless optimally choose
not to save in the optimal arrangement. Self-insurance and voluntary transfers both
facilitate consumption insurance, but self-insurance is associated with the burden of
inflation costs, and therefore agents find it inferior.
The cash-in-advance constraints written with inequalities do however influence the
optimal arrangement through the outside option. When deciding about participa-
tion in a risk-sharing arrangement, agents take into account that self-insurance in-
creases the value of their outside option.12 This implies that the high productivity
agents have smaller incentives to share with the low productivity agents, and con-
sequently, the optimal arrangement is worse from an ex-ante perspective. For our
baseline calibration with flexible prices and coefficients of risk aversion from 1 to
12The value of the outside option is now the result of an optimization problem. To get accurate
solutions for this optimal self-insurance problem we iterate on the value function subject to the cash-
in-advance constraints formulated as inequalities.
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4.66, the utility loss can add up to 3% measured in consumption equivalents. This
implies a larger degree of consumption dispersion between high and low produc-
tivity agents, and the marginal gain of redistribution that can be achieved by unin-
formative signals is now higher than in the absence of self-insurance. As a result,
the negative effect of information on social welfare is stronger, e.g. for a relative de-
gree of risk aversion of 4, the welfare gain of uninformative signals in consumption
equivalents is 0.024% with self-insurance as compared to 0.011% in the absence of
it.
Staggered-price setting
Remarkably, the positive effect of information is mitigated under staggered price
setting as in Calvo (1983), where each period firms face an invariant probability to
reset their prices. Calvo firms weight over the current and an infinite number of
future periods – the next one where the signal is informative and over the following
periods in which they rely only on unconditional expectations. On the contrary, in
our environment firms preset prices for one period only and thus put all the em-
phasize on that period for which the signal is informative. Correspondingly, all
distortions in relative prices root in imperfect information on the aggregate state in
that period. This in turn implies that the positive effect of information on aggregate
resources is in general stronger when a fraction of firms has to preset prices one
period ahead than under Calvo pricing.
2.5.3 Quantitative assessment: aggregate fluctuations
Instead of introducing a positive effect of information, the negative effect of policy
announcements on future inflation targets can be evaluated relative to the well stud-
ied welfare gain from complete removal of aggregate fluctuations (Lucas 2003). For
the baseline calibration with flexible prices, we calculate first the socially optimal
arrangement with constant inflation equal to the average U.S. postwar consumer
price inflation. Second, we compute social welfare with stochastic inflation under
perfectly informative and under uninformative signals. A number of values for the
coefficient of relative risk aversion are considered up to 50, which is the value im-
plied by risk-premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985). We find that the welfare
gain of completely uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative signals
measured in certainty equivalent consumption is in the range of 9 to 53 percent of
the welfare gain under a constant inflation rate (see Table 2.1). Even for reasonable
degrees of relative risk aversion below five (see Kocherlakota 1996b), the relative
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Coefficient of relative risk aversion, σc 2 5 10 20 50
Welfare gain, % 9.1 17.6 35.3 44.2 53.3
Table 2.1: Welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informative
signals as a percentage of welfare gain from inflation stabilization measured in cer-
tainty equivalent consumption.
welfare gain of uninformative signals on aggregate fluctuations accounts for up to
approximately 18 percent, which can be referred to as sizeable.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the welfare effects of policy announcements about future
aggregate risk in the presence of idiosyncratic risk. We developed a stylized model
of a monetary production economy that integrates optimal insurance arrangements
for idiosyncratic risk under voluntary participation. In this environment, we ana-
lyzed how the precision of signals on future inflation targets affects social welfare.
The main message of the paper is that more precise announcements on future mon-
etary policy can be detrimental to social welfare. By revealing information on future
realizations of the aggregate risk, the policymaker distorts households’ insurance in-
centives and thereby increases the riskiness of the optimal consumption allocation
that is consistent with rational participation incentives.
The effect we describe is one additional channel through which public announce-
ments affect social welfare. In the stylized model we show that the effect is size-
able relative to the commonly considered positive effects of information, and to the
removal of aggregate fluctuations. While we focus on monetary policy announce-
ments, the effect is relevant for any announcements of public policy. It should be
taken into consideration by policymakers. The size of the effect for each particu-
lar application is subject of assessment and further research. This would require
developing a fully-fledged stochastic general equilibrium model that comprises the
insurance mechanism and is moreover able to match the salient facts of business
cycles.
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A.2 Additional figures
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Figure 2.5: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informa-
tive signals as a function risk aversion when households are allowed to reengage in
social insurance after one period.
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Figure 2.6: The welfare gain of uninformative signals relative to perfectly informa-
tive signals as a function the fraction of prices preset when households are allowed
to reengage in social insurance after one period.
3 Optimal Interest Rate Stabilization
in a Basic Sticky-Price Model
with Matthias Paustian
This chapter studies optimal monetary policy with the nominal interest rate as the single
policy instrument. Firms set prices in a staggered way without indexation and real money
balances contribute separately to households’ utility. The optimal deterministic steady state
under commitment is the Friedman rule – even if the importance assigned to the utility of
money is small relative to consumption and leisure. We approximate the model around
the optimal steady state as the long-run policy target. Optimal monetary policy is charac-
terized by stabilization of the nominal interest rate instead of inflation stabilization as the
predominant principle.
3.1 Introduction
What is the primary aim of optimal monetary policy? In the existing literature there
are two major views that deliver opposite recommendations for the optimal conduct
of monetary policy in the short and in the long run. The first branch goes back to
Friedman (1969) and evaluates monetary policy in the long run with fully flexible
prices and under perfect competition. In order to equate the private opportunity
costs for holding money to the zero social costs to produce it, the nominal inter-
est rate should be zero. The other view considers optimal monetary policy in the
short run in the presence of nominal rigidities and imperfect competition (e.g. Be-
nignio and Woodford 2005; Khan et al. 2003; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2004, 2007;
Woodford 2003,b). A key feature of this literature is that the authors consider small
fluctuations around the (almost) zero inflation steady state, implying that optimal
policy nearly completely offsets the distortions due to price dispersion – even in the
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presence of a monetary friction. The predominant principle is inflation stabiliza-
tion, while the nominal interest rate should adjust relatively freely to support this
principle.
In this paper we revisit the issue of optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model
in the presence of a transaction friction. The foremost contribution is to challenge
the conventional view that the Friedman rule loses out to the goal of price stability
once price stickiness is introduced. We show that the widely used money-in-the-
utility-function model (MIU) implies that Friedman’s rule is optimal even when
large amounts of price stickiness are present. This is in contrast to the key message
of papers such as Woodford (2003), Khan et al. (2003), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004) and others. Second, we find that the primary aim of optimal policy in the
short run is to stabilize the nominal interest rate instead of inflation.
Our analysis is set in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition and Calvo’s staggered price setting without indexation. A transaction
friction is introduced via the textbook money-in-the-utility-function approach fol-
lowing Sidrauski (1967) and more recently Woodford (2003) or Walsh (2003a) with
consumption and real money balances entering in a separable way. We abstract from
interactions between fiscal and monetary policy by assuming that that the govern-
ment has access to lump-sum taxes. Since we assume an output subsidy that offsets
the steady state distortion created by monopolistic competition, the policy maker
faces two distortions: price dispersion due to staggered price setting calls for an op-
timal inflation of zero, implying costs of money holdings. However, the monetary
distortion can only be offset by setting the nominal interest rate to zero.
We choose the long-run target of monetary policy to be the welfare-maximizing de-
terministic steady state. Remarkably, we find that even for very low values for the
weight of money in the utility function relative to consumption and leisure, it is op-
timal to fully offset the monetary distortion and to allow for a small degree of price
dispersion. I.e. the Friedman rule is optimal even in the presence of Calvo-style
staggered price setting. This result holds for a wide range of parameter values in-
cluding low weights for real money balances in the utility function. To understand
this finding, note that the welfare cost of price dispersion arising from long-run de-
flation required by the Friedman rule is small relative to the loss from a positive
nominal interest rate. While the welfare loss due to price dispersion hinges primar-
ily on the frequency of price adjustment, the utility loss of a positive interest rate
crucially depends on the sensitivity of money demand to the nominal interest rate.
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In an MIU framework, the latter increases strongly as interest rates fall. Thereby, the
taxation of money holdings via a positive interest rate becomes suboptimal.
We linearize the model around the optimal steady state and derive a quadratic ap-
proximation to the utility of the representative household. This welfare based loss
function serves as the central bank’s objective, and it depends on three arguments:
the unconditional variances of inflation, of the output gap, and of the nominal inter-
est rate. While the weight for the variation in the output gap relative to inflation de-
pends exclusively on structural parameters unrelated to policy, the relative weight
for interest rate variability also hinges on steady state values that are under con-
trol of policy in the long run. Remarkably, the preference to stabilize fluctuations of
the nominal interest rate increases as optimal steady state inflation moves towards
Friedman’s rule of deflation. This increase is primarily driven by the rise in the in-
terest elasticity of money demand. Correspondingly, the importance to account for
monetary frictions depends upon the steady state chosen for approximation: The
long-run optimal policy is key for optimal policy reactions in the short run. Since
we approximate our model around a steady state implied by the Friedman rule, the
primary goal of optimal monetary policy is to stabilize variations in the interest rate
rather than in inflation. Given the high weight attached to interest rate stabilization,
optimal monetary policy requires abstaining from fluctuations in the nominal inter-
est rate. Instead, the nominal interest rate is literally fixed in response to various
kinds of disturbances.
We show that choosing a long-run deflation target according to the Friedman rule
does not generally undermine the central banks ability to stabilize the welfare rele-
vant fluctuations around that target. On the contrary, the welfare loss arising from
fluctuations around the Friedman steady state can be lower than the loss arising
from fluctuations around the zero inflation steady state. Overall, we find support
for the Friedman rule even in case of a reasonable amount of nominal rigidity due
to staggered price setting a la Calvo: The Friedman rule yields higher steady state
utility and can also improve welfare effects of fluctuations around the steady state
compared to price stability.
We address the issue of the zero bound constraint on the nominal interest rate in
the following way. First, we impose that the gross nominal interest rate exceeds
unity in the deterministic steady state by a small amount. This assumption does
not exclude the possibility of an occasionally binding lower bound constraint in
response to shocks. Second, we approximate the probability of hitting the lower
bound. We find that it is minor. To be more precise the standard deviation of the
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nominal interest rate under optimal policy is so small relative to the buffer between
the steady state nominal rate and unity that the likelihood of a binding lower bound
is low.
Related Literature
We now turn to the related literature. Most closely related to our paper is the work
by Woodford (2003, chapters 6-7), and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Woodford
also studies optimal monetary policy in a money-in-the-utility-function framework
with staggered price setting. In contrast to our analysis, the model is log-linearized
around the zero inflation steady state. This approximation point then implies dif-
ferent dynamics for the nominal interest rate. In his analysis, the nominal interest
rate reacts rather sharply to shocks while the optimal path of inflation is relatively
smooth over the cycle, see Woodford (2003, p. 504). Our contribution is to show that
the optimal policy prescriptions differ substantially once one takes into account the
interactions between long run and short run optimal policy.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Khan et al. (2003) also analyze optimal mone-
tary policy with nominal rigidities and a monetary friction. These papers adopt a
transaction technology approach to introducing money into the model. While Khan
et al. (2003) use a different time dependent pricing model than we do, the economic
environment of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) is more similar to our framework.
They analyze a medium scale model with staggered price setting a la Calvo and
various additional distortions. They find that the central bank should aim at price
stability and stabilization of inflation as the main principle. The difference between
their key finding and our results is explained as follows. The money-in-the-utility-
function approach we employ has different implications for money demand at low
interest rates compared to the transactions technology in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe.
The MIU framework implies that the interest elasticity of money demand increases
by large amounts as the nominal interest rate approaches the lower bound. Corre-
spondingly, welfare costs of taxing money balances with positive interest rates in
the long run and varying the nominal interest rate in the short run increase substan-
tially. This is not the case for their transaction cost technology. Our contribution is to
show that both the degree of price dispersion and the sensitivity of money demand
with respect to nominal interest rates at low levels are decisive for the conduct of
optimal policy.
We are not the first in showing that the Friedman rule can be optimal in economies
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with sticky prices. Adão et al. (2003) prove that the Friedman rule is optimal in an
economy with imperfect competition, a cash in advance constraint, and prices that
are set one period in advance. In contrast, our analysis assumes Calvo staggered
price setting, which implies that there are costs to deflation due to the dispersion of
relative prices. Closer to our work is King and Wolman (1996). They show that set-
ting the nominal interest rate at a minuscule amount above zero maximizes steady
state welfare in a model with Calvo pricing and a transaction cost technology. We
obtain the same result in an MIU framework. While King and Wolman (1996) focus
on a static analysis of optimal policy our main contribution is dynamic: We derive
the guiding principles for the optimal conduct of policy in the short run that follow
of choosing the Friedman rule as long-run target.
Methodologically, this paper differs from Khan et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007) by working with the linear-quadratic framework, rather than with the
time invariant Ramsey approach. By showing that the weight on nominal interest
stabilization in the loss function depends on the steady state values under control of
the central bank, this approach helps to point out intuitively how long run optimal
policy and short run stabilization policies are interrelated. In addition, the guiding
principle of optimal monetary policy is directly transparent in the size of the relative
weights attached to interest rate, inflation, and output gap stabilization.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we set up the model. In
section 3 we compute the welfare-maximizing deterministic steady state and derive
a quadratic approximation of the utility of the representative household. In section
4 we derive the optimal monetary policy responses in the short run for two policy
regimes: the first one has Friedman’s Rule, and the other one has zero inflation as
its long-run target. The last section concludes.
3.2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of a continuum of infinitely lived households
indexed with j ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that households have identical initial asset en-
dowments and identical preferences. Household j acts as a monopolistic supplier of
labor services lj. Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. At the
beginning of period t, households’ financial wealth comprises money Mjt−1, a port-
folio of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment
Zjt, and one period nominally non-state contingent government bonds Bjt−1 carried
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over from the previous period. Assuming complete financial markets let qt,t+1 de-
note the period t price of one unit of currency in a particular state of period t + 1
normalized by the probability of occurrence of that state, conditional on the infor-
mation available in period t. Then, the price of a random payoff Zt+1 in period t+ 1
is given by Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]. The budget constraint of the representative household
reads
Mjt + Bjt + Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1] + Ptcjt
≤ Rt−1Bjt−1 + Mjt−1 + Zjt + Ptwjtljt +
∫ 1
0
Djitdi− PtTt, (3.1)
where ct denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption with elasticity of substi-
tution θ, Pt the aggregate price level, wjt the real wage rate for labor services ljt of
type j, Tt a lump-sum tax, Rt the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds,
and Dit dividends of monopolistically competitive firms. Further, households have
to fulfill the no-Ponzi game condition, limi→∞ Etqt,t+i(Mjt+i + Bjt+i + Zjt+1+i) ≥ 0.
The objective of the representative household is
Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt{u(cjt, ζt)− v(ljt) + z(Mjt/Pt)}, β ∈ (0, 1), (3.2)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor and Mjt/Pt = mjt end-of-period
real money balances. Note that our specification of utility is consistent with recent
findings by Andrés, López-Salido, and Vallés (2006) for the Euro area and by Ireland
(2004b) for the US. They estimate the role of money for the business cycle and find
that preferences are separable between consumption and real money balances.
We assume that households’ utility can be affected by a disturbance term ζt with
mean 1 that can alter the utility of consumption. To avoid additional complexities,
we set ucζ = uc at the deterministic steady state. For each value of ζ, the instanta-
neous utility function is assumed to be non-decreasing in consumption and real bal-
ances, decreasing in labor time, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable,
and to fulfill the Inada conditions.
Households are wage-setters supplying differentiated types of labor lj which are
transformed into aggregate labor lt with l
(et−1)/et
t =
∫ 1
0 l
(et−1)/et
jt dj. We assume
that the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor, et > 1, varies
exogenously over time. The time variation in this markup parameter introduces a
so called cost-push shock into the model that gives rise to a stabilization problem
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for the central bank even in the absence of a transaction friction. Cost minimiza-
tion implies that the demand for differentiated labor services ljt, is given by ljt =
(wjt/wt)−et lt, where the aggregate real wage rate wt is given by w1−ett =
∫ 1
0 w
1−et
jt dj.
Maximizing (3.2) subject to (3.1) and the no-Ponzi game condition for given initial
values Mt0−1 > 0, Z0, Bt0−1, and Rt0−1 ≥ 0 leads to the following first order con-
ditions for consumption, money, the real wage rate for labor type j, government
bonds, and contingent claims:
λjt = uc(cjt, ζt), vl(ljt) = wjtλjt/µwt , (3.3)
λjt − zm(mjt) = βEt
λjt+1
pijt+1
, qt,t+1 =
βλjt+1
pit+1λjt
, λjt = βRtEt
λjt+1
pit+1
(3.4)
where λjt denotes a Lagrange multiplier, pit the inflation rate pit = Pt/Pt−1, and
µwt = et/(et − 1) the stochastic wage mark-up with mean µ¯w > 1. The first order
condition for contingent claims holds for each state in period t + 1, and determines
the price of one unit of currency for a particular state at time t + 1 normalized by
the conditional probability of occurrence of that state in units of currency in pe-
riod t. Absence of arbitrage opportunities between government bonds and contin-
gent claims requires Rt = 1/Etqt,t+1. The optimum is further characterized by the
budget constraint (3.1) holding with equality and by the transversality condition
limi→∞ Etβiλjt+i(Mjt+i + Bjt+i + Zjt+1+i)/Pjt+i = 0.
The final consumption good Yt is an aggregate of differentiated goods produced by
monopolistically competitive firms indexed with i ∈ [0, 1] and defined as y
θ−1
θ
t =∫ 1
0 y
θ−1
θ
it di, with θ > 1. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good i set by firm i and
the price index for the final good. The demand for each differentiated good is ydit =
(Pit/Pt)
−θ yt, with P1−θt =
∫ 1
0 P
1−θ
it di. A firm i produces good yi using a technology
that is linear in the labor bundle lit = [
∫ 1
0 l
(et−1)/et
jit dj]
et/(et−1): yit = atlit, where
lt =
∫ 1
0 litdi and at is a productivity shock with mean 1. Labor demand satisfies:
mcit = wt/at, where mcit = mct denotes real marginal cost independent of the
quantity that is produced by the firm.
We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price setting as developed
by Calvo (1983). Each period firms may reset their prices with the probability
1 − α independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction
α ∈ [0, 1) of firms are assumed to keep their previous period’s prices, Pit = Pit−1,
i.e. indexation is absent. Firms are assumed to maximize their market value,
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which equals the expected sum of discounted dividends Et ∑∞T=t qt,TDiT, where
Dit ≡ Pityit(1 − τ) − Ptmctyit and we used the fact that firms also have access
to contingent claims. Here, τ denotes an exogenous sales tax introduced to offset
the inefficiency of steady state output due to markup pricing as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). In each period a measure 1 − α of randomly selected firms set
new prices P˜it as the solution to maxP˜it Et ∑
∞
T=t α
T−tqt,T(P˜ityiT(1− τ)− PTmcTyiT),
s.t. yiT = (P˜it)−θPθTyT. The first order condition for the price of re-optimizing pro-
ducers is given by
P˜it
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1
Ft
Kt
, (3.5)
where Kt and Ft are defined by the following expressions:
Ft = Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tuc(cT, ζ
(1)
T )yT
(
PT
Pt
)θ
mcT (3.6)
and
Kt = Et
∞
∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tuc(cT, ζ
(1)
T )(1− τ)yT
(
PT
Pt
)θ−1
. (3.7)
Aggregate output is given by yt = atlt/∆t, where ∆t =
∫ 1
0 (Pit/Pt)
−θdi ≥ 1 and
thus ∆t = (1 − α)(P˜t/Pt)−θ + αpiθt∆t−1. The dispersion measure ∆t captures the
welfare decreasing effects of staggered price setting. If prices are flexible, α = 0,
then the first order condition for the optimal price of the differentiated good reads:
mct = (1− τ) θ−1θ .
The public sector consists of a fiscal and a monetary authority. The central bank
as the monetary authority is assumed to control the short-term interest rate Rt as
the single instrument. The fiscal authority issues risk-free one period bonds, has
to finance exogenous government expenditures PtGt, receives lump-sum taxes from
households, transfers from the monetary authority, and tax-income from an exoge-
nous given constant sales tax τ, such that the consolidated budget constraint reads:
Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + PtGt = Mt + Bt + PtTt +
∫ 1
0 Pityitτdi. The exogenous govern-
ment expenditures Gt evolve around a mean G¯, which is restricted to be a constant
fraction of output, G¯ = y¯(1− sc). We assume that tax policy guarantees government
solvency, i.e., ensures limi→∞ (Mt+i + Bt+i)∏iv=1 R
−1
t+v = 0. Due to the existence of
the lump-sum tax, we consider only the demand effect of government expenditures
and focus exclusively on optimal monetary policy.
We collect the exogenous disturbances in the vector ξt = [ζt, at, Gt, µwt ]. It is as-
sumed that the percentage deviation of each of the elements of the vector from their
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means evolve according to autonomous AR(1)-processes with autocorrelation coef-
ficients ρζ , ρa, ρG, ρµ ∈ [0, 1). The innovations are assumed to be i.i.d. The recursive
equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. Given initial values, Mt0−1 > 0, Pt0−1 > 0 and ∆t0−1 ≥ 1, a mon-
etary policy and a Ricardian fiscal policy Tt ∀ t ≥ t0, a sales tax τ, a rational expec-
tations equilibrium (REE) for Rt ≥ 1, is a set of sequences {yt, ct, lt, mct, wt, ∆t,
Pt, P˜t, mt, Rt}∞t=t0 satisfying the firms’ first order condition mct = wt/at, (3.5) with
P˜it = P˜t, and P1−θt = αP
1−θ
t−1 + (1 − α)P˜1−θt , the households’ first order conditions
uc(yt − Gt, ζt)wt = vl(lt)µwt , uc(yt − Gt, ζt)/Pt = βRtEtuc(yt+1 − Gt+1, ζt+1)/Pt+1,
zm(mt) = uc(yt − Gt, ζt)(Rt − 1)/Rt, the aggregate resource constraint yt = atlt/∆t,
where ∆t = (1− α)(P˜t/Pt)−θ + α(Pt/Pt−1)θ∆t−1, clearing of the goods market ct +Gt =
yt and the transversality condition, for {ξt}∞t=t0 .
3.3 The linear-quadratic optimal policy problem
In a first step, we compute the optimal deterministic steady state of the economy as
the one that maximizes steady state utility. This steady state is our point of expan-
sion for the log-linear approximation of the model’s equilibrium conditions as well
as for the derivation of the purely quadratic welfare measure. As we will see, long
run and short run optimal policy are closely interrelated. Throughout we assume
that the steady state is rendered efficient by an appropriate setting of the tax rate.
3.3.1 The optimal steady state
Our approach to optimal policy in the long run is to maximize steady state utility.
Wolman (2001) shows that this criterion gives slightly different prescriptions to op-
timal policy in the long-run than the time invariant Ramsey concept, but these dif-
ferences are quantitatively very small. Both approaches differ in our case due to the
presence of forward-looking equations and one endogenous state variable, namely
price dispersion.
The nonlinear optimization problem for the central bank is to choose steady state
values for output, price dispersion, the denominator (K) and the numerator (F), the
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nominal interest rate and inflation to maximize steady state utility of the represen-
tative household
max U = u(y− G, ζ)− v(∆y/a) + z(m(R, y− G, ζ)), (3.8)
subject to the firms’ optimal pricing condition, the recursive formulation of the func-
tions K and F, the evolution of the dispersion measures and the euler equation:
ρ(pi)
1
1−θ K =
θ
θ − 1 F (3.9)
K = uc(y− G, ζ)(1− τ)y + βαKpiθ−1 (3.10)
F = vl(y∆/a)yµw + αβFpiθ (3.11)
∆ = (1− α)ρ(pi) θθ−1 + α∆piθ (3.12)
and
pi = βR, (3.13)
with ρ(pi) ≡ (1− αpiθ−1)(1− α)−1.1
To simplify the analysis and to solve for the optimal steady numerically, we assume
that households’ utility is given by the usual CRRA specification:
c1−σc
1− σc − a2
l1+ω
1+ω
+ a1
m1−σm
1− σm , (3.14)
σc, σm positive and ω non-negative. Here, a1 ≥ 0 denotes the weight for the utility
stemming from real money balances relative to the utility of consumption and a2 the
corresponding relative weight for the disutility of labor.2 We assume that the zero
bound on the nominal interest rate is not binding in expectations. This is equivalent
to assuming that inflation in the deterministic steady state is at least pi ≥ β+ e for
a small parameter e > 0. The reason for this assumption is twofold. Economically,
the resulting buffer allows the central bank to adjust its instrument downward in re-
sponse to a shock (at least by a small amount). Technically, the CRRA preferences do
not display a satiation point for real money balances at a finite level. However, by
imposing a lower bound on the steady-state nominal interest rate, real money bal-
ances are still bounded – even if inflation equals β+ e (and R− 1 = β−1e). Then all
1To simplify the notation, steady-state values in the following are denoted without a time sub-
script.
2The first order conditions and the constraints of the optimization problem of the central bank in
the deterministic steady state for the assumed CRRA preferences can be found in appendix 5.2.1.
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first and second partial derivatives of utility with respect to c and m exhibit well de-
fined finite limiting values (e.g. zmm < 0) as c, m approach their corresponding finite
values at the e lower bound, ce, me. In particular, this implies that the interest elas-
ticity of money demand, ηR(Re) = zm(me)[mezmm(me)(Re − 1)]−1 is well-defined
and finite since Re − 1 = β−1e is a small positive scalar.
In our baseline calibration we set θ = 6 and α = 0.66, where the latter can be found
for example in Walsh (2005) or Woodford (2003). The parameter a2 is set such that
agents work 1/3 of their available time in the steady state.
We calibrate the money demand block of our model to be in line with the existing
literature and U.S. times series data. In particular, we set the annual interest semi-
elasticity of money demand, ∂ log m/∂R = −[R(R − 1)σm]−1 equal to - 4.47 at an
annual interest rate of R = 1.083. This is in line with Lucas (2000) and Woodford
(2003). In calibrating this elasticity we have assumed an average annual inflation
rate of 4 per cent together with a real interest rate of 4.3 per cent such that R = 1.083.
It then follows that σm = 2.5. Note that the semi-elasticity and the elasticity of
money demand, ηR(R) ≡ [(R− 1)σm]−1 > 0, increases (in absolute terms) as interest
rates decrease. We assume a degree of relative risk aversion σc = 2. This implies
an output elasticity of money demand σc/(scσm) = 1. Furthermore, we set the
parameter a1 = 1/99 such that at a nominal interest rate of R = 1.083 the annual
ratio of M1 over nominal GDP equals 0.2. This value is consistent with postwar U.S.
data and similar to the one used by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007).
Then the following numerical result for the e steady state holds:
Result 3.2. If a1 ≥ 1/3513 and the other parameters are given by the baseline calibration,
optimal inflation in the deterministic steady state pi is β + e = 0.9901. The associated
optimal price dispersion ∆¯ is 1.0014, while the optimal nominal interest rate R¯ is 1.0001 >
1.
Under the baseline calibration, we find that the optimal steady-state value for infla-
tion is the lower bound, pi = β+ e, i.e. it involves deflation. Correspondingly, the
nominal interest rate is almost zero.
Since a1 is an unobserved preference parameter, it is difficult to assess whether the
critical value a1 = 1/3513 implies a large or small role for money in the utility
function. However, the annual steady state ratio of M1 over nominal GDP implied
by this critical value is 0.048. Hence, even if the importance of money in transactions
- as measured by this ratio - falls by 76% from its baseline value of 0.2, the Friedman
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rule would still be optimal. Therefore, the Friedman rule is optimal in our model
even when money provides a very small flow of utility.
Why does the Friedman rule turn out to be optimal even when the importance of
real money balances in the utility function is very low? Optimal monetary policy
seeks to minimize two distortions created by price dispersion and the transaction
friction, since the monopolistic distortion is eliminated in the steady state by an out-
put subsidy.3 Price dispersion calls for an inflation rate of zero, while the monetary
friction requires deflation. Correspondingly, we expect our optimal gross inflation
rate to be found between β and unity. While studies such as Kiley (2002) and As-
cari (2004) have shown that relatively small amounts of trend inflation are associ-
ated with relatively large welfare costs under Calvo pricing, this is not the case for
long run deflation. Figure 4 in the appendix shows that the price dispersion arising
from long run deflation is relatively small. The second reason for the optimality of
Friedman’s rule is an adaption of a general principle of optimal taxation in public
finance. Since the interest rate acts like a tax on money holdings, it should be low
due to the fact that money demand is elastic with respect to interest under price
stability. While the choice for e is arbitrary, our results are not very sensitive to the
magnitude of e (see Figure 1 ). The graph plots optimal annual inflation against the
degree of price dispersion α. Remarkably, our threshold levels for the optimality of
Friedman’s rule differ substantially from the results obtained by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007, Figure 1). While the Friedman rule in our model is optimal until the
degree of price dispersion reaches 0.81, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe find a consider-
ably lower breaking point of approximately 0.46 (see the vertical line in Figure 1),
since the welfare costs of positive interest rates are lower in their transaction costs
specification. To be more precise the MIU framework, unlike theirs, implies that
the interest elasticity of money demand increases by large amounts as the nominal
interest rate approaches the lower bound.4
Which parameters influence the lower bound on a1, i.e. the minimum weight for
money in the utility function that renders the Friedman rule optimal? Put differ-
3The output subsidy of τ = 1− (1− αβpiθ−1)µwθρ(pi)1/(θ−1)[(1− αβpiθ)(θ − 1)]−1 < 0 depends
on steady state deflation. However, this feature does not favor the Friedman Rule in the steady state.
If we were to apply the subsidy under zero-inflation, τ = 1− µwθ/(θ− 1), the Friedman Rule would
be optimal for even smaller relative weights of money in the utility function. The reason is as follows.
Note that steady state output is lower when the subsidy does not depend on trend deflation. Note
further that the utility loss that households suffer due to a positive steady state price dispersion is
weighted with the steady state output.
4While not uncontroversial this property is not special to our MIU formulation. It can be obtained
in non-separable MIU specifications as well as in MIU models with a satiation point for real money
balances and in transactions cost models.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal annual inflation and Calvo parameter α. The vertical line de-
notes the critical value in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) for which the Friedman
rule ceases to be optimal.
ently, which structural features work in favor for the Friedman rule and when does
price dispersion become the main focus of monetary policy? To gain intuition for
this question, we compare the outcomes of the Friedman rule and a zero inflation
policy and derive an analytical expression of the threshold for which the former
dominates the latter policy.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that preferences are of the separable CRRA type and logarithmic,
σm = σc = 1, and a2 = 1. Then the Friedman Rule steady state, piFR = β + e, yields
higher utility than the zero inflation steady state, piZERO = 1, if and only if
a1 > a1 ≡
∆FR−1
(1+ω)sc +
ω
1+ω ln[∆FR]
ln[RFRηR,FR(RZEROηR,ZERO)−1]−ω/(1+ω) ln[∆FR]
with ∆FR as the price dispersion associated with pi = β+ e and
RFRηR,FR(RZEROηR,ZERO)−1 = (1− β)(1+ β−1e)/β−1e.
Proof see appendix 5.2.2.
RZERO = β−1 and RFR = 1+ β−1e denote the gross nominal interest rate under zero
inflation and Friedman’s rule. Evidently, the Friedman rule performs better than a
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zero inflation regime, when the degree of price dispersion associated with the Fried-
man rule, ∆FR is small. But at least equally important is the sensitivity of money
demand with respect to interest rates under Friedman’s rule, ηR,FR, compared to the
corresponding elasticity if zero inflation applies, ηR,ZERO. If these elasticities differ
substantially, the amount and utility of real money balances in both regimes differ,
too. As will become clear below, this elasticity heavily influences the possible wel-
fare losses due to positive interest rates. Furthermore, a large fraction of private
consumption, sc, favors the Friedman rule. The intuition is as follows. Consider a
value for a1 such that the Friedman rule delivers the same steady state welfare as
the zero inflation policy. If the fraction of government expenditures decreases, peo-
ple have to work less since less output has to be produced. Due to price dispersion,
people work more under the Friedman Rule, such that their marginal disutility of
labor is always higher than under the zero inflation regime. Correspondingly, a one
percent decrease in labor in both regimes leads to relatively larger utility gains in
the Friedman Rule regime.
In the following subsection we consider optimal monetary policy in the short run,
assuming the baseline calibration, such that β+ e is the optimal inflation rate.
3.3.2 Approximating the model around the optimal steady state
The model is log-linearized around the optimal deterministic steady state pi = β+
e < 1, i.e. under trend deflation and closely follows the approximation around trend
inflation as in Ascari (2004). The rational expectations equilibrium for the log-linear-
approximate model is then a set of sequences {ŷt,pit, m̂t, R̂t, F̂t}∞t=t0 consistent with
the following set of equilibrium conditions: the Euler equation, the money demand
function, the aggregate supply curve, and the numerator in (3.5)
σ(Etŷt+1 − ŷt + gt − gt+1) = R̂t − Etpit+1, (3.15)
m̂t =
σ
σm
(ŷt − gt)− ηR,FRR̂t, (3.16)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ∗(ω+ σ)(ŷt − ŷzt ) +
κ∗(p¯i − 1)
1− αβpiθ [(σ− 1)ŷt + F̂t] (3.17)
F̂t = (1− αβpiθ)[(1+ω)ŷt + µ̂wt − (1+ω)ât)] + αβpiθEt(θpit+1 + F̂t+1), (3.18)
where ηR,FR = [σm(RFR − 1)]−1, sc = c/y, σc = −uccc/ucc > 0, σ = σcsc−1,
ω = vll l/vl > 0, gt = (Gt − G)/y + σ−1ζ̂t, κ∗ = (1− αpiθ−1)(1− βαpiθ)/(αpiθ),
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disturbances are collected in
ŷzt = ((1+ω)ât + σgt − µ̂wt )/(ω+ σ),
σm = −zmm(m¯)m¯/zm(m¯) > 0, the transversality condition, for a monetary policy,
a sequence {ξ̂t}∞t=t0 , and given initial values Mt0−1 and Pt0−1. 5 Further ẑt denotes
the percent deviation of a generic variable zt from its steady-state value z. In addi-
tion we assume that the bounds on the fluctuations of the shock vector ‖ log ξt‖ are
sufficiently tight, such that ξt remains in the neighborhood of its steady-state value.
3.3.3 A quadratic policy objective
In this section we derive a purely quadratic welfare measure for the utility of the
average household as the relevant objective for optimal monetary policy in the short
run.
We assume that the welfare-relevant objective is the expected and discounted aver-
age utility level of all households, which is given by
Uto ≡ Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0{u(ct, ζt)−
∫ 1
0
v(ljt)dj + z(Mt/Pt)}. (3.19)
Our aim is to derive a quadratic loss function that yields an accurate second or-
der approximation of the average utility of all households. We seek to evaluate the
approximated level of utility by using the log-linearized conditions (3.15)-(3.18) de-
scribing the competitive equilibrium – that is, we set up the familiar linear-quadratic
optimal policy problem. A correct welfare ranking of alternative policies requires a
second-order approximation of utility that involves no linear terms – at least in ex-
pectations, see Woodford (2003, ch. 6).
The existence of a non-zero linear term in the utility approximation crucially relies
on the distortions of the steady state output relative to the efficient output level
as consequences of price and wage-setting power, distortionary taxation and trend
deflation that are represented in φ:
1− φ = ρ(pi) 11−θ (1− τ)θ − 1
µwθ
1− αβpiθ
1− αβpiθ−1 =
vl
uc
. (3.20)
5The derivation of the aggregate supply curve can be found in appendix 5.2.3.
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If this inefficiency gap is zero or only of first order in φ, the linear term in the sec-
ond order approximation vanishes. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) we
assume that the sales tax plays a role of an output subsidy that offsets exactly the
steady state output distortion. Since we assume separability between consumption
and real money balances, this implies that real balance effects do not contribute to
this inefficiency measure.
As Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) point out, the inclusion of money demand funda-
mentally changes optimal monetary policy responses even if one assumes – as we
do – that real balances do not affect the dynamic evolution of inflation and output
in the competitive equilibrium. The reason is that variations in the nominal interest
rate contribute to the relevant distortions the policy maker seeks to stabilize. As
we will show below, the relative weight of variations in the interest rate that enters
the welfare measure is substantially increased if we approximate around the opti-
mal steady state. In the following Proposition we derive a quadratic Taylor-series
approximation to (3.19).
Proposition 3.4. If the fluctuations in yt around y, Rt around R, ξt around ξ, pit around pi
are small enough, pi and ∆ are close enough to 1, and if the steady state distortions φ vanish
due to the existence of an appropriate subsidy τ, the utility of the average household can be
approximated by:
Ut0 = −ΩEt0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0 [λx(ŷt − ŷ∗t )2 + pi2t + λRR̂2t ] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3), (3.21)
where t.i.s.p. indicate terms independent of stabilization policy, κ = (1− α)(1− αβ)(ω+
σ)/α, Ω = ucyθ(ω+σ)2κ ,
λx =
κ
θ
, (3.22)
λR =
ηR,FRλx
v(ω+ σ)
, (3.23)
and
ŷ∗t =
σgt + (1+ω)ât
ω+ σ
, (3.24)
where v = y/m > 0 and ηR,FR is the interest elasticity of money demand at the Friedman
rule steady state.
Proof see appendix 5.2.4.
Under the conditions given in Proposition 3.4, the relative weights of inflation, out-
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put gap and the nominal interest rates correspond to the results in Woodford (2003).
Our analysis differs from Woodford (2003), because the steady state values relate to
the lower bound and no longer to price stability as in his analysis.
Remarkably, only the weight to stabilize fluctuations in the nominal interest rate de-
pends on steady state values, v and ηR,FR. Since we approximate our model around
the deterministic steady state consistent with the Friedman Rule, the value for the
former is small and the value for the latter is large, implying a high preference to
stabilize variations in the opportunity costs to hold money.
To set up the optimal policy problem, we need to rewrite the relevant constraints,
i.e. the Euler-equation, the law of motion for F̂t and the aggregate supply curve in
terms of the welfare-relevant output gap, xt = ŷt − ŷ∗t :
R̂t = Etpit+1 + σ(Etxt+1 − xt) + nt, (3.25)
F̂t = (1− αβp¯iθ)(1+ω)xt + ut + αβp¯iθEt(θpit+1 + F̂t+1) (3.26)
and
pit = βEtpit+1 + η4xt +
κ∗(p¯i − 1)
1− αβp¯iθ F̂t + st. (3.27)
Here, nt, ut, st denote linear combinations of the elements of ξ̂t and η4 is a constant,
which are defined in appendix 5.2.5. Note, that the money demand condition does
not enter the set of relevant constraints of the policy problem. Nevertheless it in-
fluences the optimal decision via the quadratic loss function, in which it plays an
important role in determining the relative weight of interest rate variations.
3.4 Optimal monetary policy in the short run
Our approach to optimal policy in the short run is the timeless perspective. At
t = t0 the central bank respects prior commitments made in the infinite past, see
Woodford (2003). Hence, the associated optimality conditions will be time invariant
which marks the difference to a standard commitment approach. In particular, the
optimality conditions in the initial period do not differ from those in later periods.
We showed that the optimal policy in the long run is to follow the Friedman rule.
In this section we consider the implications for optimal policy in the short run, if
deflation – instead of zero inflation – is chosen as the optimal long-run target. In
particular, we consider the optimal reaction to various kinds of disturbances and
evaluate the resulting stabilization loss of both regimes.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal responses to a technology shock
3.4.1 Optimal response to shocks
Our impulse responses analysis distinguishes two cases. In the first case, our set of
equilibrium conditions is log-linearized around the optimal steady state in which
the inflation rate is equal to β+ e. In the second case, we follow the conventional
procedure and approximate around a steady state of zero inflation. The choice of a
point of expansion for the log-linearization affects both the loss function and equi-
librium conditions. Log-linearizing around the Friedman rule increases the relative
weight on the stabilization of the nominal interest rate and affects the coefficients in
the Phillips curve.
When we log-linearize around the optimal steady state corresponding to the Fried-
man rule, we find that the central bank essentially keeps the nominal interest rate
fixed in response to any of the shocks present in our model. Consider first the op-
timal response to a technology shock displayed in Figure 2. A first-order Taylor
expansion around zero inflation suggests that the central bank should lower the
annualized nominal rate by roughly 12 basis points and then gradually return to
the steady state. However, linearization around the Friedman rule implies that the
nominal rate is literally fixed. In line with this finding, the approximation around
the Friedman rule implies more volatile response of inflation and the output gap
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Figure 3.3: Optimal responses to a wage markup shock
than what is suggested by linearization around the zero inflation steady state. A
stronger stabilization of the nominal interest rate necessarily implies that the other
arguments in the loss function can only be stabilized less. Impulse responses to the
other shocks deliver a similar message: Linearization around the Friedman steady
state implies that the nominal interest rate is literally fixed. To understand this, note
that the interest elasticity of money demand, [σm(R − 1)]−1 becomes very large as
R approaches its lower bound. For our baseline calibration this elasticity is roughly
-4000 at R = 1 + β−1e. Despite the fact that the marginal utility of real balances is
close to zero, this large elasticity explains why the central bank wishes to hold the
nominal rate constant under the Friedman rule.
When deriving the quadratic policy objective we need to assume that price disper-
sion in the steady state was small. Does this assumption hold in our model? Note
from Figure 4 in appendix 3.5 that the dispersion measure is lower for deflation than
for inflation. Hence, the condition is more likely to be fulfilled when the model is
approximated around a deflationary steady state.6 To further reassure the reader,
we compare the impulse response functions from the linear-quadratic approach to
those obtained from linearizing the first order conditions of the non-linear time in-
variant Ramsey problem (5.39)-(5.44), as well as the constraints (5.45)-(5.49) and log-
6This depends crucially on the absence of strategic complementarities in price setting, see Levin,
López-Salido, and Yun (2006).
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linearize them around the optimal steady state (see appendix 5.2.6).7 The results of
this experiment are displayed in Figure 5 in appendix 3.5. The impulse responses
are remarkably similar indicating the accuracy of our linear quadratic approach.8
3.4.2 Welfare analysis
In this subsection we compare the welfare implications of the two policy regimes –
the long run deflation target according to the Friedman rule vs. zero inflation as the
long-run target. Using (3.21) a second-order accurate approximation to the utility of
the average household is given by:
Ut0 = Et0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0Ut ≈ 11− βU¯ −ΩEt0
∞
∑
t=t0
βt−t0λx(ŷt − ŷ∗t )2 + pi2t + λRR̂2t . (3.28)
The first part, the discounted steady state utility, is shown to be higher if the Fried-
man rule is optimal. The second part, the stabilization loss, that relates to the op-
timal policy reaction in the short run, is not necessarily lower under the Friedman
rule regime than under zero inflation. Which of those two parts dominates depends
on the calibration of the model, e.g. increasing the variances of the innovations am-
plifies the welfare loss due to short run fluctuations. In line with the spirit of the
timeless perspective, we do not compute welfare conditional on a particular initial
state vector at time t0. Our short run stabilization loss is given by the discounted
and weighted sum of unconditional variances:
SL = − 1
1− βΩ{var(pi) + λxvar(x) + λRvar(R̂)} = −
1
1− βΩL, (3.29)
Here L is proportional to the unconditional expectation of period utility.
In Table 2 below we list the relative loss differences under the two policy regimes
for a range of relative weights for the utility of real money balances given our base-
line calibration for other parameters. For this purpose we calibrate the stochastic
shock processes to match the standard deviations of real private consumption and
7We follow a procedure proposed by Khan et al. (2003), which is more recently applied in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007).
8 To induce the system of first-order conditions of the Ramsey planner to have the same steady
state as the one chosen as our expansion point of the linear-quadratic problem, we have to add a
constant to the first-order condition of the Ramsey planner for the nominal interest rate that is non-
zero. This constant picks up the steady-state slack that arises because the Friedman rule steady state
constitutes a corner solution. The constant plays no further role for the dynamics.
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government spending of U.S. data during the post-Volcker period.9 All exogenous
processes are assumed to be autocorrelated with coefficient 0.9. We have chosen a
standard deviation of the innovations to the taste shock of 0.0001, for the markup
shock 0.00015, for the government spending shock 0.0075 and for the technology
shock 0.0096.
The results in Table 2 show that the larger the preference parameter a1 the larger
is the weight for interest rate stabilization in the loss function, λR. Here, λZEROR
denotes the weight when the model is approximated around the zero inflation and
λFRR denotes the weight for the approximation around the Friedman rule steady
state.
The fourth column displays the difference in stabilization loss or business-cycle
costs under both regimes. To be more precise, it depicts how much steady state
consumption agents are willing to give up permanently to compensate for short run
fluctuations in the regime with zero inflation as long-run target, bccZERO, relative
to the Friedman rule regime, bccFR. Evidently, this difference is small, e.g. 0.0005%
under the baseline calibration with a1 = 1/99. The resulting stabilization loss, when
approximating around the Friedman rule steady state is superior to the stabilization
loss around zero inflation if a1 is large enough.
The (technical) intuition for this is a trade off effect between predictability and pos-
sible welfare losses in the neighborhood of the steady state of each regime. If the
Friedman rule is the expansion point, then the reduced form involves 4 jump vari-
ables, R̂t, xt, pit and F̂t, as well as 3 endogenous state variables, the multipliers on the
relevant constraints, (3.25)-(3.27). If zero inflation is chosen as the approximation
point, the reduced form does not involve F̂t and exhibits only the two multipliers
associated with the aggregate supply curve and the euler equation as endogenous
state variables. On the one hand, the fundamental solution in the Friedman regime
is characterized by an additional history dependent variable. This tends to increase
prediction power by reducing the forecast error variances of inflation, output gap
and the nominal interest rate.10 On the other hand, however, possible welfare losses
in the neighborhood of the zero inflation steady state are lower, steady state utility
is "flatter" around pi = 1 (see Figure 6 in appendix 3.5). If the relative weight of
9The quarterly data is logged and detrended via the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing pa-
rameter of 10,000. The obtained standard deviation of private consumption is 0.0123, for government
expenditures we obtain 0.0172.
10E.g. Woodford (2003b) or Walsh (2003b) find that history-dependence can be beneficial for social
welfare in forward-looking models. Note however, that in our case the models are not structurally
nested, since in the Friedman regime more jump variables must be pinned down.
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real money balances decreases, the additional state variable loses prediction power,
while possible welfare losses around the zero inflation steady state decrease.
While there is a cut-off value in terms of stabilization loss, overall utility composed
of steady state utility minus stabilization loss, is higher under the Friedman rule
than under zero inflation. The third but last column of Table 2 depicts this overall
difference in utility (denoted by dUCE) expressed in steady state consumption equiv-
alents of the Friedman rule steady state. Under the baseline calibration (a1 = 1/99)
agents are willing to give up permanently 0.64% of their consumption in the Fried-
man rule steady state until they are indifferent between the Friedman rule and the
zero inflation regime.
We address the issue of the lower bound approximately in a way proposed origi-
nally by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and more recently by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007). First, we compute the optimal steady state under the assumption that
the steady state nominal interest rate is at least slightly positive, R− 1 = β−1e > 0
in the Friedman rule regime, and R = β−1 > 0 under zero inflation. However, this
does not exclude an occasionally binding zero bound. The entries σFR and σZERO
shed light on how likely it is that the lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds
if the economy fluctuates around the Friedman rule e steady state or around price
stability. We calculate the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate under the
optimal policy implied by both policy regimes. The term σFR then expresses the size
of the interval from R = 1.0001 to the lower bound R = 1 in terms of this standard
deviation. The entry σZERO does the same, but now the approximation is computed
around a zero inflation steady state. Hence, larger values for σFR or for σZERO im-
ply that the lower bound is less likely to be binding. Note that our results imply
a low probability that the nominal interest rate hits the lower bound. Even for a
small relative weight of real money balances, a1 = 1/1000, the resulting standard
deviation for the nominal interest rate is small relative to e. A symmetric confidence
interval around R = 1.0001 of up to 66 standard deviations could be constructed
until the lower bound is included. If we decrease e, i.e. if the assumed lower bound
moves closer to zero, the corresponding number of standard deviations increases to
418 (see Table 3 in appendix 3.5). This implies that the effect to stabilize the nominal
interest (higher relative weight λFRR ) dominates the effect of the smaller distance to
the zero bound. Correspondingly, if zero inflation is chosen as the expansion point,
the probability to hit the lower bound is even higher (see the last column). We stress
that our attempt to approximating the probability of lower bound violations ignores
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certain feedback channels.11 Nevertheless, computing the variance of the nominal
interest rate is one way to gauge the severity of the lower bound constraint in linear
models.
3.5 Conclusion
We study optimal monetary policy in an economy without capital, where firms set
prices in a staggered way without indexation and real money balances are assumed
to provide utility. Accounting for a sizeable degree of nominal rigidity, the optimal
deterministic steady state that maximizes steady state utility is to follow the Fried-
man rule, even if the importance assigned to the utility of money is small relative to
consumption and leisure.
We approximate the model around this optimal steady state as the long-run policy
target and derive a second order approximation to households’ utility. Optimal in-
terest rate policy is shown to abstain from reacting sharply to changes in the state of
the economy. Instead of stabilizing inflation, the primary goal of the central bank is
to stabilize fluctuations in the nominal interest rate.
We stress that our model is not about direct and quantitative advice on optimal
monetary policy. It is too stylized for this purpose. The foremost contribution of
this paper is to challenge the conventional view that the Friedman rule loses out to
the goal of price stability once price stickiness is introduced. We show that a widely
used money-in-the-utility-function model implies that the Friedman rule is optimal
even when large amounts of price stickiness are present. When the economy fluctu-
ates around the Friedman rule steady state, central bankers should keep the nominal
interest stable over the business cycle. This result is explained by the large interest
elasticity of money demand that is obtained in our MIU model when the nominal
rate is close to zero. There is little empirical evidence on the behavior of money
demand in the major industrialized countries for very low interest rates. This is un-
fortunate as the interest elasticity at low interest rates is a key difference between
our MIU framework and the transactions technology employed in other papers that
come to different policy prescriptions. Therefore, future research on optimal mon-
etary policy in sticky price models benefits from a better understanding of money
11Recent work by Adam and Billi (2006) or Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) explicitly accounts for
the non-linear lower bound constraint and shows how the possibility of a binding constraint affects
agents’ decisions. They find, that the lower bound constraint may amplify the adverse effects of
shocks and trigger a stronger response of monetary policy.
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demand. Recent work by Ireland (2007) contributes to this issue and points towards
a change in U.S. money demand at low rates in the post 1980 period.
A.3 Additional figures
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σc σm ω β a1 a2 sc = c¯/y¯ µ¯w θ α e
2 2.5 0.5 0.99 1/99 25 0.8 7/6 6 0.66 0.0001
Table 3.1: Baseline calibration
a1 λZEROR λ
FR
R bcc
ZERO − bccFR dUCE σFR σZERO
1/20 2.3426 1472 0.0017% 1.3617% 317 41
1/50 1.6238 1020 0.0011% 0.8959% 220 31
1/99 1.2355 777 0.0005% 0.6423% 167 25
1/150 1.0463 658 0.0002% 0.5182% 142 23
1/189 0.9539 600 0.00% 0.4574% 129 21
1/250 0.8530 536 −0.0002% 0.3909% 116 20
1/500 0.6464 406 −0.0008% 0.2544% 88 17
1/1000 0.4899 308 −0.0014% 0.1506% 66 15
Table 3.2: Welfare Analysis: e = 0.0001
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Figure 3.4: Steady state price dispersion as a function of inflation.
78
0 2 4 6 8
−5
0
5 x 10
−3 interest rate
years after shock
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
Linear Quadratic
Ramsey
0 2 4 6 8
−0.1
0
0.1
inflation
years after shock
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
0 2 4 6 8
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
output
years after shock
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
0 2 4 6 8
−1
−0.5
0
consumption
years after shock
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
Figure 3.5: Impulse responses to a wage markup shock under optimal policy com-
puted by the linear quadratic approximation and by the time invariant Ramsey ap-
proach.
Figure 3.6: Welfare and inflation in the steady state for σc = σm = 1 and a1 = 1/2500
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a1 λZEROR λ
FR
R bcc
ZERO − bccFR dUCE σ(FR) σ(ZERO)
1/20 2.3426 928920 0.0017% 1.4543% 1999 41
1/50 1.6238 643870 0.0011% 0.9598% 1386 31
1/99 1.2355 488930 0.0005% 0.6904% 1054 25
1/150 1.0463 414910 0.0002% 0.5585 893 23
1/189 0.9539 378270 0.00% 0.4940% 814 21
1/250 0.8530 338230 −0.0002% 0.4233% 728 20
1/500 0.6464 256330 −0.0009% 0.2783% 552 17
1/1000 0.4899 19460 −0.0015% 0.1680% 418 15
Table 3.3: Welfare Analysis: e = 0.000001
80
4 Real Balance Effects, Timing and
Equilibrium Determination
This paper examines whether the existence and the timing of real balance effects contribute
to the determination of the absolute price level, as suggested by Patinkin (1949, 1965). As
the main novel result, I show that there exists a unique price level sequence that is con-
sistent with an equilibrium under interest rate policy, if beginning-of-period money yields
transaction services. Predetermined real money balances can then serve as a state variable,
implying that interest rate setting must be passive – a violation of the Taylor-principle – for
unique, stable, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences.
4.1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary and fiscal policy is known to affect the determination of
the price level and, under non-neutrality, the real equilibrium allocation. While
previous contributions to this line of research have primarily considered monetary
policy regimes that are characterized by constant money growth (see Matsuyama
1990, 1991; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1983), recent studies mainly focus on policy regimes
summarized by interest rate feedback rules, such as Taylor (1993), Benhabib et al.
(2001a); Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001b, 2003), Woodford (1994, 2003)
or Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). Correspondingly, researchers nowadays pay less at-
tention to the role of monetary aggregates and increasingly employ money demand
specifications that allow to neglect money for the analysis of equilibrium determi-
nation (see Dupor (2001); Woodford (2003) or Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005)). There
are two prominent results in this literature (Benhabib et al. 2001a). First, whether an
equilibrium allocation is neutral with respect to the absolute price level (nominal in-
determinacy) depends exclusively on the stance of fiscal policy and not on monetary
policy, preferences or technology. Second, standard assumptions on preferences and
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technology imply that the Taylor-principle ensures stability and uniqueness of equi-
librium sequences if fiscal solvency is guaranteed under all possible circumstances.
According to the Taylor-principle (activeness), monetary policy should aggressively
fight inflation by raising the nominal interest rate more than the increase in inflation
above target.
In this paper, I challenge these prominent findings. I do this by revisiting the role
of real balance effects and their timing for equilibrium determination as suggested
by Patinkin (1949, 1965). Throughout my analysis I assume that the intertemporal
government budget constraint is satisfied under all possible path of endogenous
variables. This implies that fiscal policy is not capable to pin down the price level
as suggested by the fiscal theory of the price level (see e.g. Leeper 1991; Sims 1994;
Woodford 1994, 1995, 1996).
As my main novel result, I show that if the beginning-of-period stock of money
facilitates transactions, predetermined real money balances can serve as an endoge-
nous state variable of the economy under interest rate policy. This cardinal function
of real money has been so far disregarded in the literature. Notably, linking the
provision of transaction services to beginning-of-period instead of end-of period
real money balances implies direct costs of inflation for the private sector beyond
the indirect costs imposed by reducing wealth – a realistic assumption supported
by the literature on the welfare costs of inflation (Chadha, Haldane, and Janssen
1998; Lucas 2000; Palenzuela, Camba-Méndez, and García 2003). In this case, a per-
fect foresight equilibrium displays nominal determinacy: it is is associated with a
unique price level sequence. Key to understand this result is that in the presence
of real balance effects optimal intra-temporal substitution between consumption
and leisure defines a function that links predetermined beginning-of-period nom-
inal money balances, deflated by current prices, to current consumption and vice
versa. This implies that whenever consumption is uniquely determined for all peri-
ods (real determinacy) so is the price level. However, real determinacy applies only
if real money balances and not just nominal balances are a relevant state variable.
But then interest rate policy should rather be passive than active – a violation of the
Taylor-principle – to avoid oscillatory or explosive equilibrium sequences, such that
a perfect foresight equilibrium is uniquely determined.
The intuition for the failure of the Taylor-principle as a stabilizing device can be
explained as follows. Suppose current inflation exceeds its long run equilibrium
value. According to the standard reasoning, an active interest rate setting – imply-
ing an increase in the expected real interest rate – dampens current consumption,
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such that this scenario can not be self-fulfilling. However, under real balance effects
and when beginning-of-period balances yield transaction services, the expected real
interest rate is further negatively related to the growth rate of real balances. Thus
an active interest rate setting leads by a standard money demand function to a de-
cline in the level and the growth rate of real balances, such that the sequences of
real balances and, thus, of consumption and inflation do not converge to the steady
state.
I set up a discrete time general equilibrium model with flexible prices, where real
money balances and consumption enter the utility function in a non-separable way,
that is consistent with a shopping time technology (McCallum and Goodfriend
1987). I apply two different specifications about the particular stock of money, that
enters the utility function: Either the stock of money at the beginning or at the end
of the period is assumed to yield transaction services. The idea of the former speci-
fication can be interpreted as the money-in-the-utility-function version of Svensson
(1985)’s timing of markets within one period, where the goods market is closed, be-
fore the asset market is opened. Then, households rely on the stock of money carried
over from the previous period for transactions in the goods market implying di-
rect costs of inflation. This formulation is applied for example in Woodford (1990),
McCallum and Nelson (1999) or more recently in Persson, Persson, and Svensson
(2006). The second specification – when the end-of-period-stock of money yields
utility – can be found in Woodford (2003) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). It can be
interpreted as a money-in-the-utility-function version for a reverse timing of mar-
kets, i.e. households can always adjust their money holdings within one period to
facilitate transactions. Notably, only the specification that ties liquidity services to
the beginning rather than to the end-of-period real money balances is consistent
with direct costs of inflation. The resulting real balance effects are commonly ne-
glected, since they are typically found to be very small (Lucas 2000 or Ireland 2004a).
I show, that the existence and the timing of real balance effects (not the magnitude)
can have substantial implications for equilibrium determination.
As the main contribution of the paper I find that in the presence of real balance
effects and interest rate policy, a uniquely determined price level is associated with
real money being a relevant state variable. I.e. with a history dependent evolution
of equilibrium sequences. This crucially affects the conditions for macroeconomic
stability: an interest rate policy that reacts to changes in current inflation has to be
passive for equilibrium sequences to be uniquely determined and to converge to
the steady state in a non-oscillatory way. Neither an interest rate peg nor a forward
looking interest rate rule lead to this result.
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Furthermore I show that when end-of-period money enters the utility function, the
equilibrium is characterized by nominal indeterminacy. This result corresponds to
the indeterminacy result by Sargent and Wallace (1975). In the perfect foresight
equilibrium under interest rate policy only real money balances but not nominal
balances and prices can be determined separately. In this case the Taylor-principle
ensures local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences. Under a constant
money growth regime, a perfect foresight equilibrium displays nominal determi-
nacy, but real money does not serve as a relevant state variable. Equilibrium se-
quences are, in any case, locally stable and uniquely determined. Remarkably, for
the economy to evolve in a history dependent way, it does not suffice, that monetary
policy is history dependent.
Related Literature
I now turn to the related literature. Most closely related to my paper is the work
by Benhabib et al. (2001a) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) who analyze equilib-
rium determination under flexible prices. Benhabib et al. (2001a) were among the
first to show that conditions for local stability and uniqueness under interest pol-
icy are highly sensitive to changes in preferences and technology. However, since
they employ a specification that corresponds to my end-of-period formulation they
find that nominal determinacy is a purely fiscal phenomenon. Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001) also examine whether the particular stock of money that enters the utility
function matters for local stability and uniqueness. They allow for two specifica-
tions, either the money stock after agents leave the asset market (which opens first)
or the amount of money balances after agents leave the goods market is assumed
to enter the utility function. The crucial difference to my approach is that in their
model, only the stock of money but not the (implicit) timing of markets changes
across the specifications. In particular, since the financial market always opens first,
agents do not rely on the stock of money carried over from the previous period to
purchase consumption. Correspondingly, predetermined real money balances can
not serve as a state variable, and the timing conventions analyzed in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) affect only conditions for local stability and uniqueness but not the
determination of the absolute price level.
Brückner and Schabert (2005) and Kurozumi (2006) analyze local stability and
uniqueness of equilibrium sequences in stochastic maximizing economies under
sticky prices, when beginning-of-period money yields transaction services. Employ-
ing a shopping-time specification, Brückner and Schabert (2005) too find that inter-
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est policy should react passively to changes in inflation to ensure local stability and
uniqueness of equilibrium sequences. Kurozumi (2006) studies determinacy and ex-
pectational stability of Taylor-rules in a non-separable money-in-the-utility-function
framework. He finds that conditions that ensure real determinacy and expectational
stability are highly sensitive to assumption on the stock of money that is assumed
to deliver transaction services. My contribution is to show that predetermined real
money balances play not only a role for learning, local stability and uniqueness of
equilibrium sequences under sticky prices. Moreover, predetermined real money
balances crucially affect the determination of the absolute price level under flexible
prices – a key role for money which has been disregarded in the aforementioned
studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model.
Section 3 analyzes nominal and real determinacy under flexible prices. In the first
part, I consider the case where the beginning-of-period stock of money provides
utility, while the results for the end-of-period specification are briefly summarized
in the second part.1 For both specifications, I derive the implications for equilibrium
determination and local stability under current and forward looking interest rate
rules, and for money growth rules. The last part of section 3 discusses my findings
and compares them to results in related studies. In section 4 I list the main results
when prices are set in a staggered way. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The model
In this section an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with representative
agents and perfectly flexible prices is developed. I consider a money in the utility
function specification that leads to real balance effects and assume either that the
stock of money at the beginning or at the end of the period yields transaction ser-
vices. Monetary policy is either specified in form of an interest rate feedback rule
or constant money growth. To check for the robustness of the results for the former
policy regime, I apply contemporaneous and forward looking interest rate rules.
Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. There is a continuum of
identical and infinitely lived households. At the beginning of period t, households’
financial wealth comprises money Mt−1 and nominally non-state contingent gov-
1My findings for the latter case relate to the results in Benhabib et al. (2001a), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001), Woodford (2003)
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ernment bonds Bt−1 carried over from the previous period. The households’ budget
constraint reads
Mt + Bt + Ptct ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Ptwtlt − Ptτt, (4.1)
ct denotes consumption, Pt the aggregate price level, wt the real wage rate, lt
working time, τt a lump-sum tax, and Rt the gross nominal interest rate on gov-
ernment bonds. Further, households have to fulfill the no-Ponzi game condition,
limt→∞(mt + bt)∏ti=1 pii/Ri−1 ≥ 0, where bt = Bt/Pt and mt = Mt/Pt denote real
bonds and real money balances. The objective of the representative household is
∞
∑
t=0
βtu (ct, lt, At/Pt) , β ∈ (0, 1), (4.2)
β denotes the subjective discount factor and At nominal balances, which will be
defined below. The instantaneous utility function is assumed to satisfy
uc > 0, ul < 0, ua > 0, ucc < 0, uaa < 0, ull ≤ 0, (4.3)
uca > 0, ucl = ual = 0, uccuaa − u2ca > 0, (4.4)
and the usual Inada-conditions, where at = At/Pt. According to (4.4) the cross
derivative uca is (strictly) positive, such that marginal utility of consumption rises
with real money balances. The resulting properties, i.e., non-separability and real
balance effects, typically emerge under more explicit specifications of transaction
frictions. As, for example, shown by Brock (1974) or Feenstra (1986), a money-in-
the-utility (MIU) function specification, which is equivalent to a specification where
purchases of consumption goods are associated with transaction costs that are either
measured by shopping time or real resources, is usually characterized by these prop-
erties. To be more precise, introducing these transaction frictions in a corresponding
model with a utility function v(ct, 1− lt) would lead to real balance effects, which
are equivalent to a MIU specification with uca > 0, if (but not only if) the labor sup-
ply elasticity is finite (see appendix 5.3.1). It should be noted that an infinite labor
supply elasticity will lead to be of particular interest in what follows.
To avoid additional complexities, I assume that the respective cross derivatives are
equal to zero ulc = ula = 0.2 The last assumption in (4.4), uccuaa − u2ca > 0, is im-
posed to ensure – together with (4.3) – the utility function to be strictly concave. The
conditions in (4.3)-(4.4) further ensure that real money balances and consumption
2This implies that the instantaneous utility function u(ct, at, lt) can be written as f (ct, at)− g(lt).
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are normal goods, i.e. that the utility function exhibits increasing expansion paths
with respect to money and consumption.
The variable At describes the relevant stock of money that provides – in real terms –
utility. Throughout the paper, I consider two cases, where At denotes money either
held at the Beginning of the period, Mt−1, or at the End of period, Mt :
At =
{
Mt−1 B-version
Mt E-version
.
The B-version, which, for example, relates to the money-in-the-utility function spec-
ifications in McCallum and Nelson (1999); Woodford (1990), is more recently applied
in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (2006). It can be motivated as the money-in-the-
utility-function version of Svensson (1985)’s timing of markets assumption within
one period where the goods market is closed before the asset market is opened. This
case is illustrated in 4.1. It means that the representative agent in period t relies on
the stock of money carried over from the previous period Mt−1 for transactions in
the goods market – implying that a surprise inflation immediately affects house-
holds’ utility. After the goods market is closed, households adjust their nominal
balances on the asset market according to their planned consumption expenditures
in t + 1.
-
t− 1 t t + 1
Goods Market Asset Market
ct−1, Pt−1 Mt−1
Money Holdings Mt−1 - u(ct, Mt−1Pt )
Goods Market Asset Market
ct, Pt Mt
Mt - u(ct+1, MtPt+1 )
Figure 4.1: Timing of markets under beginning-of-period money (B-version)
On the contrary, in the end-of-period specification (E-version), which can for exam-
ple be found in Brock (1974); Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), or Woodford (2003), the
stock of money held at the end of the period yields utility. This formulation can be
interpreted as the money-in-the-utility function version of a reverse timing of mar-
kets, i.e. the asset market is closed before the goods market is opened. In this case,
which is illustrated in figure 4.2, agents can freely adjust their nominal balances to
purchase consumption goods within period t. This implies that households are less
prone to be harmed by surprise inflation.
Maximizing (4.2) subject to (4.1) and the no-Ponzi game condition for given initial
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t− 1 t t + 1
Asset Market Goods Market
Mt−1 ct−1, Pt−1
Money Holdings: Mt−1- u(ct−1, Mt−1Pt−1 )
Asset Market Goods Market
Mt ct, Pt
Mt - u(ct, MtPt )
Figure 4.2: Timing of markets under end-of-period money (E-version)
values M−1 > 0 and R−1B−1 ≥ 0 leads to the following first order conditions for
consumption, money, labor supply, and government bonds:
λt =
{
uc (ct, mt−1/pit) B-version
uc (ct, mt) E-version
, (4.5)
it
λt+1
pit+1
=
{
ua (ct+1, mt/pit+1) /pit+1 B-version
β−1ua (ct, mt) E-version
, (4.6)
ul(lt) = −wtλt, (4.7)
λt = βRtλt+1pi−1t+1, (4.8)
where it = Rt − 1 denotes the net interest rate on government bonds, λt denotes
a Lagrange multiplier, pit the inflation rate pit = Pt/Pt−1. Note that beginning-
of-period real balances mt−1 enter the set of first order conditions only in the
B-version and only together with the current inflation rate – such that alterna-
tively one could have written the conditions in terms of Mt−1/Pt. Thus, in prin-
ciple, both versions are forward-looking. Nevertheless, I will show below that
beginning-of-period real money balances can restrict current consumption, if they
serve as a relevant state variable. The optimum is further characterized by the
budget constraint (4.1) holding with equality and by the transversality condition
limt→∞(mt + bt)∏ti=1 pii/Ri−1 = 0.
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms of mass one. Firms produce the
consumption good ct with the linear technology yt = ll. The only production factor
labor, supplied by households, is hired on a competitive labor market – implying
that profit maximization leads to zero profits and a real wage wt of unity. Total
output comprises private consumption.
The public sector consists of a fiscal and a monetary authority. I consider two widely
applied specifications for the monetary policy regime. The first regime is character-
ized by the central bank setting the nominal interest rate contingent on current or
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on future inflation.
Rt = ρ (pit) , or Rt = ρ (pit+1) , with ρ′ ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 1. (4.9)
I further assume that the steady state condition R = pi/β has a unique solution for
R > 1. According to the interest rate feedback rule (4.9), the response of the interest
rate to changes in inflation, ρpi, is non-negative. The second regime, is characterized
by the central bank holding the money growth constant:
mtpit/mt−1 = µ, µ ≥ 1. (4.10)
The fiscal authority issues risk-free one period bonds, receives lump-sum taxes from
households, and transfers from the monetary authority. I assume that tax pol-
icy guarantees government solvency (Ricardian fiscal policy), i.e. it ensures that
limt→∞(mt + bt)∏ti=1 pii/Ri−1 = 0.
4.3 Equilibrium determination under flexible prices
In this section, I assess how real balance effects, the timing of markets and monetary
policy affect the determination of the price level and of the perfect foresight equi-
librium. As described in the previous section, I consider two versions of the model
which differ with regard to the stock of money that enters the utility function, i.e.,
the B-version and the E-version, and I consider three types of monetary policy rules
described by (4.9) or (4.10). The equilibrium for a positive interest rate (Rt > 1) for
both versions can then be summarized as follows.
Definition 4.1. Given an initial money endowment M−1, a Ricardian fiscal pol-
icy τt∀ t ≥ 0 and a monetary policy (4.9) or (4.10), a perfect foresight equilibrium
(PFE) consists of set of sequences {ct, pit, mt, Rt}∞t=0 and a price level P0, satis-
fying ∀t ≥ 0 the transversality condition limt→∞(mt + bt)∏ti=1 pii/Ri−1 = 0,
and either ul(ct) = −uc
(
ct,
mt−1
pit
)
, uc
(
ct,
mt−1
pit
)
= βRtuc
(
ct+1, mtpit+1
)
/pit+1, and
(Rt − 1)uc
(
ct+1, mtpit+1
)
= ua
(
ct+1, mtpit+1
)
for the B-version or ul(ct) = −uc (ct, mt),
uc (ct, mt) = βRtuc (ct+1, mt+1) /pit+1, and (Rt − 1)uc (ct+1, mt+1) /pit+1 =
ua (ct, mt) /β for the the E-version.
Notably, in contrast to initial nominal balances M−1, which shows up in the con-
dition for optimal intra-temporal substitution ul(c0) = −uc
(
c0,
M−1
P0
)
for t = 0 in
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the B-version, there is no need to include an initial price level P−1 in the set of rel-
evant state variable under flexible prices: neither resources nor the optimal actions
of private agents or the government depend on the initial price level. This implies
that initial nominal balances and not initial real balances m−1 are the relevant state
variable.
The dependence of a given allocation on a particular absolute price level in the first
period P0 is often summarized by the notion “nominal determinacy”I˙t is crucial to
note that the role of the price level in the first period does not relate to the unique
determination of equilibrium sequences (including the inflation sequence) which is
summarized by the notion “real determinacy”. These properties are summarized in
the following Definition, which corresponds to the Definition applied in Benhabib
et al. (2001a).
Definition 4.2. The equilibrium displays real determinacy if there exists a unique set of
equilibrium sequences {ct, pit+1, mt, Rt}∞t=0. Given M−1, the equilibrium displays nominal
indeterminacy if for any particular set of equilibrium sequences {ct, pit+1}∞t=0, there exist
infinite many price levels P0 consistent with a perfect foresight equilibrium.
In the following Proposition I show that the two version, B and E, differ substan-
tially with respect the determinacy of the price level under interest rate policy.
Proposition 4.3. Consider that consumption and real money balances enter non-separably
into the utility function and that monetary policy targets the nominal interest rate according
to (4.9). Then the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy in the B-version and nominal
indeterminacy in the E-version.
Proof. In the B-version, for a given sequence {ct}∞t=0, if uca 6= 0, the condition
for optimal intra-temporal substitution between consumption and leisure, ul(ct) =
−uc
(
ct,
mt−1
pit
)
, defines implicitly a monotone function Mt−1/Pt = f (ct) for all t ≥ 0.
Thus a given sequence {ct}∞t=0 results in an unique sequence {Mt−1/Pt}∞t=0. Given
M−1, P0 is uniquely determined. In the E-version and interest policy, the equilib-
rium conditions determine just real money balances mt, and do not disentangle real
money balances m0 into its components M0 and P0. It follows that the perfect fore-
sight equilibrium is consistent with infinitely many pairs P0, M0, and the equilib-
rium displays nominal indeterminacy.
If consumption and real money balances enter non-separably into the utility func-
tion and the B-version applies, real determinacy is sufficient for the determination of
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P0, such that nominal determinacy applies. However, in the E-version, the equilib-
rium under interest policy displays nominal indeterminacy even if the equilibrium
is characterized by real determinacy.3 The latter results corresponds to the main re-
sult in Sargent and Wallace (1975). Since in the E-version there is an infinite number
of equilibrium pairs for nominal money balances and the price level, sunspot equi-
libria may occur. If the assumed welfare measure punishes fluctuations in prices,
Sargent and Wallace conclude that monetary policy should not target interest rates
but monetary aggregates. I show that their conclusion depends on the implicit tim-
ing of markets: it applies only for the E-version, when end of period is assumed to
yield transaction services, but not in the B-version when beginning of period money
delivers utility.
A PFE, which is characterized by real determinacy and, thus, a unique inflation se-
quence, can be associated with multiple price level sequences, even if beginning-of-
period money enters the utility function. If there are no real balance effects (uca = 0),
real money balances are determined residually by the forward-looking money de-
mand equation (Rt− 1)uc (ct+1) = ua
(
mt
pit+1
)
without any relation to initial nominal
balances. This implies that nominal balances and the price level can not be deter-
mined separably, and the price level is neutral with regard to the determination of
equilibrium sequences {ct, pit, Rt}∞t=0 under interest rate policy. Thus, two different
values for the initial price level together with an equilibrium inflation sequence lead
to two different price level sequences consistent with the PFE. Evidently, one can-
not uniquely determine a unique price level sequence if there are infinitely many
equilibrium inflation sequences.
In the next Proposition I show that the equilibrium under a constant money growth
rate is associated with a particular price level in the first period for both versions.
Proposition 4.4. Under a constant money growth rule the equilibrium displays nominal
determinacy for both versions B and E.
Proof. Given M−1, a constant money growth rule uniquely pins down a whole se-
quence for nominal balances {Mt}∞t=0. Given a sequence {mt}∞t=0, the whole se-
quence for the price level {Pt}∞t=0 is uniquely determined.
Independent of the existence of real balance effects, the PFE under a constant money
growth rule is associated with a unique price level sequence, whenever {mt}∞t=0 is
uniquely determined.
3By construction, the equilibrium in the E-version would be nominally determinate, if the interest
rate policy were to react exclusively on the current price level.
92
To summarize, under interest rate policy and if there are no real balance effects,
the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy in both versions. Given real de-
terminacy and the presence of real balance effects, the equilibrium in the B-version
exhibits nominal determinacy, while in the E-version the equilibrium is in any case
associated with multiple price level sequences under interest rate policy. Under a
constant money growth policy, the equilibrium is characterized by nominal deter-
minacy if real determinacy applies. Whether real determinacy is ensured or not
depends on monetary policy.
However, the exact conditions under which real determinacy is ensured depend
crucially on the stance of monetary policy and will be the focus of the following
analysis. I apply Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) approach to the analysis of a perfect
foresight equilibrium. For this, I focus on the model’s behavior in the neighborhood
of the steady state, and apply a linear approximation of the set of non-linear equi-
librium conditions. Throughout, I restrict my attention to locally stable equilibrium
sequences, i.e., to equilibrium sequences that converge to the steady state.
4.3.1 Beginning-of-period money
I start with the case where the beginning-of-period stock of money enters the util-
ity function. The deterministic steady state is then characterized by the following
properties: R = pi/β, −ul(c) = uc(c, m/pi), and uc(c, m/pi)
(
R− 1) = ua(m/pi, c).
A discussion of the existence and uniqueness of a steady state for R > 1 can be
found in appendix 5.3.2 . Log-linearizing the model at the steady state, leads to the
following set of equilibrium conditions:
εcam̂t−1 − εcapit = (σl + σc) ĉt, (4.11)
σc ĉt − εcam̂t−1 + εcapit = σc ĉt+1 − εcam̂t + (εca + 1)pit+1 − R̂t, (4.12)
(εca + σa) m̂t = −zR̂t + (σc + φac) ĉt+1 + (εca + σa)pit+1, (4.13)
where z ≡ R/(R − 1) > 1, σl ≡ lullul ≥ 0, σc ≡ −
cucc
uc > 0, σa ≡ − auaaua > 0,
εca ≡ aucauc > 0, and φac ≡ cuacua > 0, and f̂t denotes the percent deviation of a generic
variable ft from its steady state value f : f̂t = log( ft) − log( f ). These conditions
(and the transversality condition) have to be satisfied by the equilibrium sequences
for the steady state deviations of consumption, real balances, the inflation rate, and
of the nominal interest rate, {ĉt,pit, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 and a monetary policy regime satisfy-
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ing
R̂t = ρpipit, or R̂t = ρpipit+1, or m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit, (4.14)
where ρpi denotes the steady state inflation elasticity ρpi ≡ ρ′(pi)(pi/R) ≥ 0. Fol-
lowing Benhabib et al. (2001a), interest rate policy is called active or according to the
Taylor-principle if ρpi > 1, and passive if ρpi < 1. An active (passive) interest rate set-
ting leads to an increase (decrease) in the real interest rate in response to an increase
in the inflation measure. It should be noted that concavity of the utility function
implies: Υ ≡ σcσa − εcaφac > 0,4 which restricts the magnitude of real balance ef-
fects. A closer look at the equilibrium conditions (4.11) and (4.12) reveals that the
private sector behavior is not independent of the beginning-of-period value for real
balances m̂t−1, as they are (implicitly) assumed to lower households’ transactions
costs. Given that m̂t−1 is predetermined, the households’ behavior can induce the
economy to evolve in a history dependent way, i.e. predetermined real money bal-
ances can be a state variable. Defining [m̂t, ĉt,pit, R̂t]′ ≡ x̂t, the following Definition
summarizes this property.
Definition 4.5. Consider the fundamental solution for the equilibrium sequences {x̂t}∞t=0,
that satisfies the equilibrium conditions (4.11)-(4.13) and one monetary policy rule (4.14).
If there exists a locally stable and unique fundamental solution of the linear functional form
x̂t =

ηm
ηc
ηpi
ηR
 m̂t−1 = Λm̂t−1 ∀t ≥ 0 (4.15)
with ηi 6= 0 for i = m, c,pi, R, then predetermined real money balances are an endogenous
state variable.
It is crucial to note, that if real money balances are a state variable, then not only first
period values x̂0 are associated with a particular first period price level. Instead, the
whole set of equilibrium variables is indexed with a specific value for m−1 a at each
point in time, i.e. x̂t = Λ.t+1m̂−1, ∀t > 0. For a given initial value M−1, the set of
equilibrium sequences relies on a particular initial price level P−1. Since this mech-
anism applies to each period, the complete set of sequences for the absolute price
level {Pt}∞t=0 and nominal balances {Mt}∞t=0 is uniquely determined. Evidently, if
real money balances are a state variable, the equilibrium displays nominal determi-
nacy. But as will become clear below, the reverse must not be true.
4I view this as a realistic implication, given that estimates of εca and φac, are usually found to be
small. According to US estimates reported in Woodford (2003), εca does not exceed 0.005 and φac ≤ 2.
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Yet, m̂t−1 enters the equilibrium conditions jointly with the current inflation rate.
Thus, predetermined real money serves as a relevant endogenous state variable,
only if the current inflation pit rate is uniquely determined, which implies real de-
terminacy. Given real determinacy, nominal determinacy applies, whenever the
beginning-of-period stock of money enters the utility function. But monetary policy
is decisive for real determinacy, i.e. for the possibility to uniquely determine a price
level sequence. In the subsequent analysis, I will show that this requires the central
bank to set the nominal interest rate contingent on current inflation. Under an in-
terest rate peg, ρpi = 0, an inflation sequence and, therefore, a price level sequence
cannot be uniquely determined.5
In the following Proposition I establish the main novel result that real money bal-
ances serve as a state variable when current inflation is the policy indicator under
interest rate policy, and the labor supply elasticity 1/σl is finite.
Proposition 4.6. Consider that beginning-of-period money enters the utility function and
that the nominal interest rate is set contingent on changes in current inflation R̂t = ρpipit.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , predetermined real money balances
serve as a state variable. The equilibrium displays real determinacy and local stability
if and only if
(a) ρpi1 < ρpi < 1 for εca > σa2z−1 and σl > σl, leading to non-oscillatory equilib-
rium sequences, or ρpi ∈ (1, ρpi1), leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
(b) ρpi > 1 for εca < σa2z−1 or σl < σl, leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
where ρpi1 ≡ σl(εca+σa)+Υσl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ and σl ≡
Υ
(2z−1)εca−σa .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, predetermined real money bal-
ances do not serve as a state variable. Consumption ĉt cannot uniquely be determined,
while the equilibrium sequences {ĉt+1,pit, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally stable and uniquely
determined if and only if ρpi > 1.
Proof. See appendix 5.3.3.
Proposition 4.6 reveals that the requirements for local equilibrium stability and
uniqueness in terms of the policy parameter ρpi are not robust with regard to changes
5It should further be noted that a PFE displays nominal indeterminacy if there are no real balance
effects, εca = φac = 0. Nevertheless, one can always compute a price level sequence for a particular
initial price level and a sequence of inflation rates.
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in the elasticities εca and σl.6 For finite labor supply elasticities, σl > 0, prede-
termined real balances serve as an endogenous state variable. Correspondingly,
passiveness (ρpi < 1) – a violation of the Taylor-principle – is necessary for locally
stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences (see part 1a). An inter-
est rate peg, however, violates the conditions in part 1 of Proposition 4.6 and, thus,
implies real indeterminacy. On the contrary, if interest rate policy follows the Taylor-
principle (ρpi > 1), locally stable and unique equilibrium sequences are oscillatory,
which is hardly recommendable for a central bank that aims at stabilizing the econ-
omy. Thus, when beginning-of-period money relates to households’ consumption,
interest rate policy that reacts on current inflation should rather be passive than ac-
tive for macroeconomic stability and for the unique determination of the price level.
To see this, suppose that inflation exceeds its steady state value and equilibrium
sequences are non-oscillatory.7 Given that the inflation elasticity is positive, ρpi >
0, the nominal interest rate rises, which – ceteris paribus – causes households to
reduce their end-of-period real money holdings m̂t, by (4.13). According to (4.12),
the expected real interest rate is further negatively related to the growth rate of real
balances. Thus, an active interest rate setting – implying an increase in the real
interest rate – leads to a decline in the level and the growth rate of real balances,
such that the sequences of real balances and, thus, of consumption and inflation do
not converge to the steady state.
Notably, the equilibrium exhibits different properties if the marginal disutility of la-
bor is constant, i.e. if the inverse of the labor supply elasticity is zero (see part 2 of
Proposition 4.6). Then, the amount of labor supplied by the households is not re-
lated to their consumption expenditures and and the marginal utility of consump-
tion is always identical to its steady state value (see 4.11). In this case, the Euler
equation and money demand reduce to a constant real interest rate R̂t − pit+1 = 0,
and σam̂t = −zR̂t + φac ĉt+1 + σapit+1, such that the equilibrium is not associated
with a unique value for beginning-of-period real money and that current consump-
tion ĉt cannot be determined. Correspondingly, predetermined real money balances
do not serve as a state variable. The equilibrium sequences for ĉt+1, pit, m̂t, and R̂t
are then locally stable and uniquely determined for an active interest rate policy,
which contrasts the results for the case of finite labor supply elasticities, σl > 0,
presented in part 1 of Proposition 4.6.
6Note that for the sets (ρpi1, 1) and (1, ρpi1) (see part 1a. of Proposition 4.6) to be non-empty
σl > Υ[(z − 1)εca − σa]−1 and εca > σa/(z − 1), and, respectively, σl < Υ[(z − 1)εca − σa]−1 or
εca < σa/(z− 1) has to be satisfied.
7The latter property implies that current and expected future inflation are not negatively related.
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I now turn to the case where the central bank applies a forward looking rule, R̂t =
ρpipit+1.
Proposition 4.7. Consider that beginning-of-period money enters the utility function and
that the nominal interest rate is set contingent on changes in future inflation R̂t = ρpipit+1.
Then, consumption and inflation cannot uniquely be determined and predetermined real
money balances do not serve as a state variable.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , then ρpi > 1 is a necessary condition
for uniqueness and local stability of the equilibrium sequences
{ĉt+1,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are given by:
(a) 1 < ρpi for σl > σl2 and εca >
σa
z−1 ,
(b) 1 < ρpi < ρpi2, for σl < σl2 or εca <
σa
z−1 , or 1 < ρpi2 < ρpi if σl > σl and
εca >
σa
2z−1 , for σl ∈ (σl, σl2) or εca ∈ ( σa2z−1 , σaz−1),
(c) 1 < ρpi2 < ρpi < −ρpi1 for σl < σl or εca < σa2z−1 ,
where σl2 ≡ Υ(z−1)εca−σa and ρpi2 ≡
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
Υ+σl(εca+σa)−zεcaσl .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0 , then the equilibrium sequences
{ĉt+1,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally stable and uniquely determined if and only if ρpi 6=
1.
Proof. See appendix 5.3.4.
In comparison to Proposition 4.6 the most fundamental difference relates to the
role of beginning-of-period real balances, m̂t−1. If monetary policy applies a for-
ward looking interest rate rule, households’ optimal consumption decisions are
not affected by predetermined real money balances. I.e. real money balances
are not a state variable of the economy. The initial stock of real money balances
m−1 = M−1/P−1 is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation and thus, there are mul-
tiple price level sequences. Correspondingly, current inflation can not be pinned
down since it enters jointly with m̂t−1 and the equilibrium is consistent with in-
finitely many values for current inflation. Given that the current values for inflation
and consumption can not be determined, households adjust m̂t in accordance with
their planned future consumption ĉt+1, implying that their behavior is not history
dependent. On the contrary, if current inflation serves as a policy indicator, pre-
determined real money balances restrict households’ consumption decisions and
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initial real money balances are relevant for the equilibrium sequences ĉt,pit, m̂t, R̂t
at each point in time: predetermined real money balances are an endogenous state
variable (see Definition 3) and the perfect foresight equilibrium is characterized by
nominal determinacy. Remarkably in that case, by applying an interest rate rule, the
complete set of nominal sequences, the absolute price level and nominal balances,
can be uniquely determined.
Under an interest rate rule featuring current inflation, it turns out that there is no
robust value for the inflation elasticity that ensures local stability and uniqueness.
For example, when the real balance effect and the labor supply elasticity satisfy
εca >
σa
2z−1 and σl >
Υ
(2z−1)εca−σa , interest rate policy should be passive, ρpi < 1, while
the inverse, ρpi > 1, is required under εca < σa2z−1 or σl < σl (see Proposition 4.6).
When the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on expected future
inflation, activeness ρpi > 1 is always necessary (but not sufficient) for uniqueness.8
As in the previous case (see part 2 of Proposition 4.6), the equilibrium exhibits dif-
ferent properties if the labor supply elasticity is infinite σl = 0 as described in part
2 of Proposition 4.7. With a forward looking interest rate rule, the model then re-
duces to a set of static equilibrium conditions characterized by unique equilibrium
sequences {ĉt+1,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 for any non-zero inflation elasticity ρpi 6= 1.
Under a money growth regime equilibrium determination is less sensitive. Rul-
ing out unreasonable parameter values, I focus, for convenience, on the case where
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of money is not extremely
large, σa < z = R/(R− 1).9
Proposition 4.8. Suppose that beginning-of-period money enters the utility function and
that σa < z. Under a constant money growth rule, predetermined real money balances
do not serve as a state variable. The equilibrium sequences {ĉt+1,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t} ∀t ≥ 0
are locally stable and uniquely determined, and there exists a unique consistent price level
∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. See appendix 5.3.5.
A comparison of the results in the propositions 4.6-4.8 shows that the PFE displays
real determinacy, if and only if predetermined real money balances are an endoge-
nous state variable. This requires an interest policy contingent on current inflation.
8Non-emptiness of the sets for ρpi requires ρpi2 > 1 and −ρpi1 > ρpi2 , which is fulfilled for the
given restrictions on σl and εca in part 1b and 1c.
9It should be noted that σa < z is just a sufficient precondition for the result in Proposition 4.8 and
hardly restrictive if one assigns values for σa that relate to reasonable magnitudes of σc.
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Remarkably, the money growth regime leads to an equilibrium behavior being dif-
ferent from the behavior under both interest rate policy regimes. On the one hand,
the price level can always be determined if real balances are determined, given that
the value for the nominal stock of money is known in every period. On the other
hand, the initial values for the inflation rate pi0 and real money m̂−1 are irrelevant for
equilibrium determination, implying that there are – for different initial price levels
– multiple values for both which are consistent with a unique set of equilibrium se-
quences {ĉt+1,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0. I.e. the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy
but does not rely on predetermined real money balances as an endogenous state
variable. Put differently, for the economy to evolve in a history dependent way, it
is, therefore, not sufficient that monetary policy is conducted in a backward looking
way. Instead, it is the households’ consumption decision rather than a restriction
on the evolution of money, which is responsible for the equilibrium sequences to
depend on beginning-of-period money holdings. There is an analogy to the role
of physical capital in a standard real business cycle model with a depreciation rate
equal to one. Capital remains a relevant state variable, even though the model (vir-
tually) lacks an accumulation equation.10
4.3.2 End-of-period money
Next, I will briefly summarize the requirements for equilibrium determination un-
der the assumption that end-of-period money holdings enter the utility function.
In this case, the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy – unless monetary
policy follows a constant money growth rule. This specification has also been ex-
amined by Benhabib et al. (2001a) and by Woodford (2003) for interest rate poli-
cies, and by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) for money growth rules. The deterministic
steady state for this version is characterized by the following conditions, R = pi/β,
−ul(c) = uc(c, m), and uc(c, m) (R− 1) = ua(m, c).11 Log-linearizing the model
summarized in Definition 1 for At = Mt at the steady state with R > 1 leads to the
10Consider a real version of my model, with perfect competition, a production technology sat-
isfying yt = stkαt−1l
1−α
t , where kt−1 denotes the beginning-of-period stock of physical capital and
α ∈ (0, 1), and a capital depreciation rate of 100%. Nevertheless, capital serves as a relevant state
variable, i.e., kt−1 affects the equilibrium allocation in period t.
11A discussion of steady state uniqueness is provided in appendix 5.3.2.
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following set of equilibrium conditions:
εcam̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt, (4.16)
σc ĉt − εcam̂t = σc ĉt+1 − εcam̂t+1 − R̂t + pit+1, (4.17)
(εca + σa) m̂t = (φac + σc) ĉt − (z− 1) R̂t. (4.18)
The conditions (4.16)-(4.18), the transversality condition, and a monetary policy rule
(4.14) have to be satisfied by the equilibrium sequences {ĉt,pit, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0. In con-
trast to the B-version, consumption and inflation are independent of beginning-of-
period real balances. To put it differently, predetermined real money balances can
not serve as a state variable. Instead, the private sector behavior is entirely forward-
looking in the E-version with the consequence that the equilibrium displays nominal
indeterminacy under interest rate policy.
The following Proposition summarizes the conditions for equilibrium determina-
tion under interest rate policy.
Proposition 4.9. Suppose that end-of-period money enters the utility function and that the
central bank sets the nominal interest rate.
1. When current inflation enters the interest rate rule, R̂t = ρpipit, the equilibrium dis-
plays real determinacy and local stability if and only if ρpi > 1.
2. When future inflation enters the interest rate rule, R̂t = ρpipit+1, inflation cannot
uniquely be determined. The equilibrium sequences {ĉt,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally
stable and uniquely determined if and only if
(i) ρpi > 1 or ρpi <
(
1+ 2(z−1)σlεcaΥ+σl(εca+σa)
)−1
for σl > 0, and
(ii) ρpi 6= 1 for σl = 0.
Proof. See appendix 5.3.6.
As in the B-version, equilibrium determination depends on the particular interest
rate rule. When the nominal interest rate is set contingent on current inflation, infla-
tion can be determined for all periods. Under a forward looking interest rate policy,
one can only uniquely determine future inflation. In any case, the initial price level
and initial real balances are irrelevant for a REE, implying nominal indeterminacy
and the absence of an endogenous state variable. Uniqueness of equilibrium se-
quences is further ensured by an active interest rate policy, ρpi > 1, under both
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types of rules. For the special case, where the labor supply elasticity is infinite, any
forward looking interest rate rule satisfying ρpi 6= 1 leads to unique equilibrium
sequences {ĉt,pit+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0.
Turning to the case where the central bank holds the money growth rate constant, I
find that the equilibrium behavior closely relates to the one in the B-version.
Proposition 4.10. Suppose that end-of-period money enters the utility function and that the
money growth rate is held constant. Then, the equilibrium sequences {ĉt, m̂t, R̂t} ∀t ≥ 0
and {pit} ∀t ≥ 1 are locally stable and uniquely determined, and there exists a unique
consistent price level ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. See appendix 5.3.7.
Summing up, the specification of money demand has substantial consequences for
the determination of equilibrium sequences and for macroeconomic stability. The
beginning-of-period value for real money balances is only relevant for equilibrium
determination in the B-version under a non-forward looking interest rate rule. In the
E-version, where the households’ behavior lacks any backward looking element, the
initial value of real balances is irrelevant for any policy regime under consideration.
Whether beginning-of period real money is serving as a relevant endogenous state
variable or not, is, on the one hand, decisive for a unique determination of the price
level, and, on the other hand, crucially affects the conditions for local stability and
uniqueness under an interest rate policy regime: policy should rather be passive
than active, to avoid unstable or oscillatory equilibrium sequences. Under a con-
stant money growth regime, however, local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium
sequences and a unique price level sequence is ensured for both versions – regard-
less of the labor supply elasticity. Given that the stock of money is known in every
period, a unique sequence for real money balances suffices to pin down uniquely
the entire sequence for the absolute price level. Evidently, this does not require the
economy to evolve in a history dependent way.
4.3.3 Related results
The main novel results in this section refer to the case where beginning-of-period
money enters the utility function and the central bank applies an interest rate rule,
while some results for the alternative cases correspond to results in related stud-
ies on real balances effects and equilibrium determinacy in flexible price models.
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For example, my findings for the E-version (see part 1 of Proposition 4.9) resemble
the results in Benhabib et al. (2001a) and Woodford (2003) for non-separable utility
functions. They find that when current inflation serves as an indicator, active inter-
est rate setting is necessary and sufficient for local stability and uniqueness. This,
however, changes when beginning-of-period money provides utility, since equilib-
rium sequences are then – except for the case σl = 0 – unstable or oscillatory (see
Proposition 4.6). Thus, the literature has disregarded the role of predetermined real
balances as a relevant state variable, which substantially affects the real and nominal
determinacy properties.
If the monetary authority applies a constant money growth rule, then local stability
and uniqueness impose restrictions on preferences only in case where the stock of
money held at the beginning of the period provides utility. In particular, the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for real money balances should not
be too large (see Proposition 4.8), which corresponds to the results in Brock (1974),
Matsuyama (1990),Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) and Woodford (2003). Assuming
that end-of-period money provides transaction services, Brock (1974), Matsuyama
(1990) and Woodford (2003), show that local stability and uniqueness is ensured if
consumption and real balances are Edgeworth-complements, as in my framework.
Furthermore, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) find that the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for money can matter for local stability and uniqueness is guaranteed,
as in Proposition 4.8.
To unveil the role of non-separability for the results and to facilitate comparisons
with related studies (see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), I further briefly discuss
the case where money demand is separable, εca = φac = 0. Then, the model reduces
to
R̂t = pit+1, and σam̂t =
{
− (z− σa) R̂t for the B-version
− (z− 1) R̂t for the E-version
.
while consumption is exogenously determined. When utility is separable, the con-
ditions for uniqueness under money growth policy, which are presented in Propo-
sition 4.8 and 4.10, are unchanged. In contrast to the results for the non-separable
case, the particular stock of money that enters the utility function is now irrelevant
for equilibrium determination under interest rate policy: Equilibrium uniqueness
requires ρpi > 1 for R̂t = ρpipit and ρpi 6= 1 for R̂t = ρpipit+1, which accords to the
results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). As in the case of non-separable utility, cur-
rent inflation cannot be determined under a forward looking interest rate rule, while
under a money growth rule inflation is only indetermined in the first period.
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4.4 Imperfectly Flexible Prices
In a framework with monopolistic competitive firms and staggered price setting
as developed by Calvo (1983), the initial price level belongs to the set of relevant
state variables.12 Under this specification, real balances serve as a relevant prede-
termined state variable for all aforementioned policy rules, when the beginning-of-
period specification applies. If, however, the end-of-period stock of money enters
the utility function, households are entirely forward looking, and real money serves
as a relevant state variable only if monetary policy is history dependent, i.e., when
the central bank applies a money growth rule. Nonetheless, the determinacy prop-
erties under constant money growth and sticky prices correspond to those under
flexible prices. The main implications for equilibrium uniqueness and stability un-
der imperfectly flexible prices are as follows:
• When beginning-of-period money provides utility, interest rate policy has to
be passive to lead to locally stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium se-
quences, regardless whether current or future inflation enters the policy rule.
An active interest rate policy is associated with locally stable and unique equi-
librium sequences if and only if end-of-period money provides utility and cur-
rent inflation serves as the policy indicator.13
• As under flexible prices, the central bank can ensure equilibrium sequence to
be uniquely determined, locally stable, and non-oscillatory under both timing
specifications by holding the growth rate of money constant, provided that
real balance effects are not extremely large.
4.5 Conclusion
Real balance effects typically arise when transaction costs are specified in a general
equilibrium model in form of shopping time or real resource costs, which are re-
duced by money holdings. The fact that the equilibrium sequences for real balances
and consumption can then not separately be determined, is broadly viewed as neg-
ligible for the assessment of monetary policy, given that empirical evidence suggests
12Please refer to Schabert and Stoltenberg (2005) for details in that case.
13To be more precise, these results apply for finite labor supply elasticities. For the case of an
infinite labor supply elasticity there is a related paper by Brückner and Schabert (2005). Assuming
staggered price setting and a specific functional form for utility, they consider the implications of the
timing of markets on optimal monetary policy under discretion.
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real balance effects to be relatively small (Ireland 2004a). In contrast to this view, it
is demonstrated in this paper that the existence (not the magnitude) of real balance
effects has substantial implications for the determination of a rational expectations
equilibrium and of the price level under interest rate policy.
However, for real balance effects to contribute to price level determination, as for ex-
ample suggested by Patinkin (1949, 1965), predetermined real money balances have
to serve as a state variable. Remarkably, these properties require that the stock of
money at the beginning of the period yields transaction services, which corresponds
to Svensson’s timing assumption (1985) , that the goods market closes before the as-
set market opens. Hence, real money that has been acquired in the previous period
restricts households’ current consumption expenditures. Then, there exists a unique
initial price level that is consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., the
equilibrium displays nominal determinacy. In that case, interest policy should be
passive to ensure unique, non-oscillatory and locally stable equilibrium sequences
– a violation of the Taylor-principle. If, on the other hand, current consumption is
related to the end-of-period stock of money, then the equilibrium displays nomi-
nal indeterminacy, and the well-known principles for uniqueness and stability of
equilibrium sequences of a cashless economy (roughly) apply. Remarkably, these
results highlight, that the existence and timing of real balance effects jointly have
substantial implications for equilibrium determination.
If monetary policy follows a constant money growth rule, the conditions for equi-
librium uniqueness are likely to be ensured. Though the economy does not evolve
in a history dependent way, the entire path for the absolute price level is uniquely
determined in both versions. These results suggest that a central bank that aims to
avoid multiple, unstable, or oscillatory equilibrium sequences in an environment
where transaction frictions are non-negligible, should rather control the supply of
money than the nominal interest rate.
Yet, an optimal conduct of monetary policy will certainly require the supply of
money to be state contingent (as an interest rate feedback rule), which might be
associated with different determinacy implications than a constant money growth
regime.
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5 Technical Appendix
5.1 Technical Appendix to chapter 2
5.1.1 Additional details for the proof of Theorem 2.1
First, we consider the perfect information environment. The Lagrangian of the op-
timal risk-sharing problem can be written as
L = 1
4
(
u(ch1g) + u(c
l
1g) + u(y
h) + u(yl)
)
+
β
8
(
u(chh2g) + u(c
hl
2g) + u(c
lh
2g) + u(c
ll
2g) + 4u(0)
)
+ µ1
(
y¯− 1
2
(
ch1g + c
l
1g
))
+ µ2
(
y¯− 1
4
(
chh2g + c
hl
2g + c
lh
2g + c
ll
2g
))
+ λ
(
u(ch1g) +
β
2
(
u(chh2g) + u(c
hl
2g)
)
− u(yh)− β
2
(
u(yh) + u(yl)
))
,
where µ1, µ2, and λ denote the Lagrangian multipliers, y¯ ≡ (yh + yl)/2, and with
consumption under type-b policy already substituted in.
The first order conditions with respect to ch1g, c
hh
2g, and c
hl
2g are
1
4
u′(ch1g)− µ1
1
2
+ λu′(ch1g) = 0, (5.1)
β
8
u′(chh2g)− µ2
1
4
+ λ
β
2
u′(chh2g) = 0, (5.2)
β
8
u′(chl2g)− µ2
1
4
+ λ
β
2
u′(chl2g) = 0, (5.3)
and with respect to cl1g, c
lh
2g, and c
ll
2g are
1
4
u′(cl1g)− µ1
1
2
= 0, (5.4)
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β
8
u′(clh2g)− µ2
1
4
= 0, (5.5)
β
8
u′(cll2g)− µ2
1
4
= 0. (5.6)
The first order conditions can be analyzed in two steps. First, the optimal consump-
tion in the second period is independent of the second period endowment realiza-
tion. From (5.2) and (5.3) we immediately obtain chh2g = c
hl
2g ≡ ch2g. Similarly, from
(5.5) and (5.6) we get clh2g = c
ll
2g ≡ cl2g. Thus, the second period resource constraint
can be rewritten exactly as for the first period: (ch2g + c
l
2g)/2 = (y
h + yl)/2. Sec-
ond, agents prefer to smooth consumption between the first and the second period.
Substituting the Lagrange multipliers from (5.4) and (5.5) into (5.1) and (5.2) and
combining with the resource constraints we get
u′(yh + yl − ch1g)
u′(ch1g)
=
u′(yh + yl − ch2g)
u′(ch2g)
,
From the two steps we conclude that the socially optimal consumption of the high
endowment agents is constant over time
ch1g = c
hh
2g = c
hl
2g,
except for the type-b policy when all goods are taxed away.
When the high endowment agent participation constraints (2.2) and (2.3) are bind-
ing, then
u(ch1g) =
1
1+ β
(
u(yh) +
β
2
(
u(yh) + u(yl)
))
=
1+ β/2
1+ β
u(yh) +
β/2
1+ β
u(yl). (5.7)
Second, in the imperfect information environment the Lagrangian is
L = 1
2
(
u(ch1) + u(c
l
1)
)
+
β
8
(
u(chh2g) + u(c
hl
2g) + u(c
lh
2g) + u(c
ll
2g) + 4u(0)
)
+ µ1
(
y¯− 1
2
(
ch1 + c
l
1
))
+ µ2
(
y¯− 1
4
(
chh2g + c
hl
2g + c
lh
2g + c
ll
2g
))
+ λ
(
u(ch1) +
β
4
(
u(chh2g) + u(c
hl
2g)
)
− u(yh)− β
4
(
u(yh) + u(yl)
))
.
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Similarly to perfect information, it follows from the first order conditions that
ch1 = c
hh
2g = c
hl
2g,
and when participation constraint (2.7) is binding
u(ch1) =
1
1+ β/2
(
u(yh) +
β
4
(u(yh) + u(yl))
)
=
1+ β/4
1+ β/2
u(yh) +
β/4
1+ β/2
u(yl). (5.8)
Comparing (5.7) and (5.8) reveals that u(ch1g) < u(c
h
1) < u(y
h), and taking into
account ch1b = y
h we obtain ch1g < c
h
1 < c
h
1b.
5.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2.5
Let S(κ) be the set of sustainable allocations. The outside option is always in the
set of sustainable allocations, and the restrictions imposed by the participation con-
straints (2.27), (2.28) and consumption feasibility (2.29) define a bounded and closed
set. Therefore, for any precision of the public signal, S(κ) is nonempty and compact-
valued. Furthermore, it can be shown that the correspondence ϕ : [1/2; 1] → R8+,
which maps κ 7→ S(κ) is continuous. Given that the objective function (2.26) is also
continuous, by the Theorem of the Maximum (Bergé 1963) there exists a solution to
the optimal arrangement problem for any public signal precision, and the expected
utility of the socially optimal arrangement is continuous in signal precision.
In addition, the set of sustainable allocations is convex-valued due to the concavity
of the utility function, and the objective function is strictly concave. By the Maxi-
mum Theorem under Convexity the optimal arrangement is unique and continuous
in signal precision.
5.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2.6
Let {ci(pij, sk)} be the optimal arrangement. First, we show that for any state (pij, sk)
in the optimal arrangement the high income agents obtain at least as much as the
low income agents, i.e. ch(pij, sk) ≥ cl(pij, sk). By contradiction, assume there exist
inflation pij and signal sj such ch(pij, sk) < cl(pij, sk). Let the perfect risk sharing
allocation be defined as x¯(pij) ≡ (xh(pij) + xl(pij))/2, and consider an arrangement
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{c˜i(pij, sk)} given by
c˜h(pij, sk) = c˜l(pij, sk) = x¯(pij), c˜i(H˜) = ci(H˜),
with H˜ as the set of all possible states, excluding (pij, sk). By construction
the arrangement provides strictly higher utility for risk-averse households than
{ci(pij, sk)}. We are left to prove that the arrangement {c˜i(pij, sk)} is sustainable.
High income households undoubtedly accept the arrangement because it delivers
both higher current period consumption and higher future arrangement utility. Low
income households in state (pij, sk) obtain the same utility as the high income house-
holds. Given that the outside option is worse for low income households and the
high income households accept the arrangement, the low income households must
also accept the arrangement. Summing up, the arrangement {c˜i(pij, sk)} is sustain-
able and socially preferable over {ci(pij, sk)}. This contradicts that {ci(pij, sk)} is the
socially optimal arrangement.
Second, we show that for any state ch(pij, sk) ≤ xh(pij, sk). Again, by contradiction,
assume that there is a state such that ch(pij, sk) > xh(pij, sk). If the participation
constraint for the high productivity agent under pij inflation and sk signal holds
with equality then the future value of the arrangement is lower than the outside
option value, and taking into account that for the low productivity agent from the
resource constraint cl(pij, sk) < xl(pij, sk) the participation constraint for the low
productivity agent is violated. Therefore, the considered participation constraint for
the high productivity agent can only hold with a strict inequality. Then, consider a
consumption allocation { ˜˜ci(pij, sk)} given by
˜˜ch(pij, sk) = ch(pij, sk)− ε, ˜˜cl(pij, sk) = cl(pij, sk) + ε, ˜˜ci(H˜) = ci(H˜).
By continuity there exists ε > 0 such that the consumption allocation { ˜˜ci(pij, sk)} is
sustainable, and by concavity the constructed allocation provides higher utility then
the allocation {ci(pij, sk)}, which contradicts that {ci(pij, sk)} is the socially optimal
arrangement.
5.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.9
The cutoff point for β is characterized by the tightest participation constraint, which
is the one that becomes binding for any level of patience below the cutoff point.
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Among the participation constraints only constraints for high productivity agents
can be binding, which limits consideration to four cases.
There are two independent factors that determine the tightest participation con-
straint: the relative gain of deviation from perfect risk sharing to the outside option
for high income households, and the expected future gain of perfect risk-sharing ar-
rangement relative to the outside option. Without loss of generality, consider a case
such that
u(xh(pil))− u(x¯(pil)) ≤ u(xh(pih))− u(x¯(pih)) (5.9)
u(x¯(pil))− 12(u(x
h(pil)) + u(xl(pil))) < u(x¯(pih))− 12(u(x
h(pih)) + u(xl(pih))),
(5.10)
where x¯(pij) ≡ (xh(pij) + xl(pij))/2 is the perfect risk-sharing allocation. The first
inequality (5.9) states that the current period deviation for a high income household
is more attractive in the high inflation state. The second inequality (5.10) implies
that for the perfect risk-sharing arrangement the risk aversion effect dominates, i.e.
the perfect risk-sharing arrangement provides higher value in comparison to the
outside option under high inflation. Therefore, for any precision of the signal, the
participation constraint of high productivity agents under high current inflation and
a low future inflation signal is the one that imposes the tightest restriction. This
constraint holds with equality at the cutoff point
u(x¯(pih))− u(xh(pih)) + β¯κ(V¯rs(pil)−Vat(pil))
+ β¯(1− κ)(V¯rs(pih)−Vat(pih)) + β¯
2
1− β¯ (V¯rs −Vat) = 0, (5.11)
where V¯rs(pij) = u(x¯(pij)) and V¯rs = (u(x¯(pih)) + u(x¯(pil)))/2.
Solving (5.11), there exists a unique solution for β¯ in (0, 1) due to u(xh(pih)) −
u(x¯(pih)) > 0. Employing the implicit function theorem from (5.11) we get
dβ¯
dκ
=
β¯(1− β¯)(V¯rs(pih)−Vat(pih)− V¯rs(pil) +Vat(pil))
u(xh(pih))− u(x¯(pih)) + dV(κ) + 2β¯(dV(1/2)− dV(κ))
> 0,
where dV(κ) ≡ κ(V¯rs(pil)− Vat(pil)) + (1− κ)(V¯rs(pih)− Vat(pih)) and satisfies 0 ≤
dV(κ) ≤ dV(1/2).
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5.1.5 Proof of Lemma 2.10
First, we show that if participation constraints are violated under perfect risk shar-
ing for any state then the optimal consumption allocation satisfies
ch(pij, sk) > x¯(pij) > cl(pij, sk), (5.12)
where x¯(pij) again is the perfect risk sharing allocation in inflation state pij. Without
loss of generality, consider the participation constraint for households of high pro-
ductivity in the previous period under currently high inflation that receive a high
signal on future inflation. The constraint holds for the socially optimal arrangement
u(ch(pih, sh)) + β(κVrs(pih) + (1− κ)Vrs(pil)) + β
2
1− βVrs ≥
u(xh(pih)) + β(κVat(pih) + (1− κ)Vat(pil)) + β
2
1− βVat, (5.13)
but is violated by assumption under perfect risk sharing
u(x¯(pih)) + β(κu(x¯(pih)) + (1− κ)u(x¯(pil))) + β
2
1− β V¯rs <
u(xh(pih)) + β(κVat(pih) + (1− κ)Vat(pil)) + β
2
1− βVat, (5.14)
where V¯rs ≡ u(x¯(pih)) + u(x¯(pil))/2 denotes the value of the perfect risk-sharing
arrangement. The right hand side of (5.13) or (5.14) represents the total value of the
outside option. Combining (5.13) and (5.14) we get
u(ch(pih, sh)) + β(κVrs(pih) + (1− κ)Vrs(pil)) + β
2
1− βVrs >
u(x¯(pih)) + β(κu(x¯(pih)) + (1− κ)u(x¯(pil))) + β
2
1− β V¯rs (5.15)
Taking into account that the optimal contract delivers a value no larger than the
value of perfect risk sharing Vrs(pij) ≤ u(x¯(pij)), and Vrs ≤ V¯rs, from (5.15) we get
u(ch(pih, sh)) > u(x¯(pih))
or, combining with resource feasibility
ch(pih, sh) > x¯(pih) > cl(pih, sh).
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Similarly we can show that the same inequalities hold for the other public states.
Second, by contradiction, assume that there is one participation constraint for high
productivity agents that is not binding. The Lagrangian of the optimal contract
problem (2.26)-(2.29) can be written as
L = (1+ ∑
(pij,sk)∈H˜
λi(pij, sk))(u(ch(pij, sk)) + u(cl(pij, sk)))
+ µ(pij, sk)(ch(pij, sk) + cl(pij, sk)− 2x¯(pij)) + ξ(H˜), (5.16)
where (pij, sk) is the state for which the participation constraint is not binding, H˜
is the set of all possible states, excluding (pij, sk), λi(pij, sk) are the normalized La-
grange multipliers for the participation constraints, µ(pij, sk) are the Lagrange mul-
tipliers for resource constraints, and ξ(H˜) collects consumption and resources for
states in H˜, and respective multipliers. The Lagrange multiplier for the participation
constraint for state (pij, sk) is zero and is explicitly excluded from the Lagrangian.
Solving the optimal arrangement problem (5.16) we get
ch(pij, sk) = cl(pij, sk) = x¯(pij)
for the state (pij, sk), which contradicts the partial risk-sharing condition (5.12) stated
above.
5.1.6 Proof of Lemma 2.11
The socially optimal risk sharing arrangement under uninformative signals can be
analyzed as a fixed point problem in terms of the period value of the arrangement.
When signals are uninformative, the optimal arrangement is conditional only on
current inflation, and the number of binding participation constraints of high pro-
ductivity households reduces to two.
The fixed point problem is constructed as follows. Let w be the future one-period
value of an arrangement. We restrict attention to w ∈ [Vat, w¯), since per assump-
tion all participation constraints for high productivity agents are binding. The two
binding participation constraints can be written as
u(ch(pij)) +
β
1− βw = u(x
h(pij)) +
β
1− βVat ∀j, (5.17)
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and consumption feasibility is given by
ch(pij) + cl(pij) = xh(pih) + xl(pih) ∀j. (5.18)
The objective function of the optimal arrangement problem is
V(w) ≡ 1
4∑f ,j
u(c f (pij)).
The optimal arrangement should necessary solve the fixed point problem w =
V(w).
We show that V(w) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, therefore there ex-
ist at most two solutions to the fixed problem. From the participation constraints
(5.17) and consumption feasibility constraints (5.18) it follows that V(w) is strictly
increasing
V′(w) = 1
4
β
1− β
(
−2+ u
′(cl(pih))
u′(ch(pih))
+
u′(cl(pil)
u′(ch(pil)
)
> 0,
since perfect risk sharing is not sustainable per assumption. Strict concavity of V(w)
is implied by
d
dw
(
u′(cl(pij))
u′(ch(pij))
)
=
β
1− β
(
u′′(cl(pij)) + u′′(ch(pij))
u′(cl(pij))
u′(ch(pij))
)
(
u′(ch(pij))
)2 < 0.
By construction, one solution to the fixed point problem is Vat. The concavity of
V(w) implies that the derivative of V(w) at Vat is higher than at any partial risk-
sharing allocation. Therefore, the derivative of V′(w) at Vat must be greater than 1,
which implies
1
2
(
u′(xl(pih))
u′(xh(pih))
+
u′(xl(pil))
u′(xh(pil))
)
>
2− β
β
in order for the optimal arrangement to be different from the outside option.
From the other end, suppose there exists a socially optimal arrangement different
from the allocation in the absence of transfers and participation constraints are bind-
ing. Then the value of this arrangement must be a solution to the fixed point prob-
lem. This requires that the slope of V(w) at Vat must be necessarily larger than unity,
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due to the concavity of V(w) and because the allocation in the absence of transfers
must always be one solution of the constructed fixed point problem.
5.1.7 Proof of Theorem 2.12
Suppose Vrs(κ1) ≤ Vrs(κ2) for some κ1 < κ2. Consider an alternative consump-
tion allocation {c˜i(pij, sk, κ1)} for signal precision κ1 constructed on the basis of the
optimal allocation {ci(pij, sk, κ2)} for κ2 according to
u(c˜h(pij, sh, κ))
= −β (κ(Vrs(pih, κ2)−Vat(pih)) + (1− κ)(Vrs(pil, κ2)−Vat(pil)))
+ u(xh(pij))− β
2
1− β (Vrs(κ2)−Vat) (5.19)
u(c˜h(pij, sl, κ))
= −β ((1− κ)(Vrs(pih, κ2)−Vat(pih)) + κ(Vrs(pil, κ2)−Vat(pil)))
+ u(xh(pij))− β
2
1− β (Vrs(κ2)−Vat) (5.20)
and the corresponding allocation for low productivity agents given by consumption
feasibility. Vrs(pij, κ2) and Vrs(κ2) characterize the optimal allocation for κ2.
First, the alternative allocation {c˜i(pij, sk, κ1)} is consumption-feasible by construc-
tion.
Second, the alternative allocation {c˜i(pij, sk, κ1)} delivers strictly higher expected
utility than the optimal allocation for signal precision κ2, i.e. V˜rs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2),
where V˜rs(κ) ≡ 18 ∑ f ,j,k u(c˜ f (pij, sk, κ)). We prove this result by showing that high
productivity agents are indifferent between the optimal allocation and the alterna-
tive allocation, and low productivity agents strictly prefer the alternative allocation.
For signal precision κ2 by assumption the risk aversion and wealth effects do not
offset each other and the outside option is not the only sustainable arrangement.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the risk aversion effect dominates, i.e.
Vrs(pil, κ2)−Vat(pil) < Vrs(pih, κ2)−Vat(pih). Subtracting (5.20) from (5.19) we get
u(c˜h(pij, sh, κ))− u(c˜h(pij, sl, κ)) = (2κ − 1)β((Vrs(pil, κ2)−Vat(pil))
− (Vrs(pih, κ2)−Vat(pih))).
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Therefore, for any κ < κ2
u(ch(pij, sh, κ2)) < u(c˜h(pij, sh, κ)) ≤ u(c˜h(pij, sl, κ)) < u(ch(pij, sl, κ2)). (5.21)
For high productivity agents, the alternative allocation for κ1 and the optimal allo-
cation for κ2 deliver the same expected utility in any state pij, as can be seen from
adding (5.19) and (5.20).
For low productivity agents, the expected utility in state pij, defined by
W l(pij, κ) ≡ 12∑k
u(c˜l(pij, sk, κ))
is strictly decreasing in precision over κ ≤ κ2. This result follows from (5.19)-(5.21),
consumption feasibility, and risk-aversion of agents:
∂W l(pij, κ)
∂κ
= −1
2
(
u′(c˜l(pij, sh, κ))
u′(c˜h(pij, sh, κ))
− u
′(c˜l(pij, sl, κ))
u′(c˜h(pij, sl, κ))
)
×
(Vrs(pil, κ2)−Vat(pil))− (Vrs(pih, κ2)−Vat(pih)) < 0 ∀κ > 1/2,
and ∂W l(pij, 1/2)/∂κ = 0. In particular, this implies that V˜rs(pij, κ1) > Vrs(pij, κ2),
and therefore V˜rs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2).
Third, the alternative allocation {c˜i(pij, sk, κ1)} satisfies the participation constraints
for signal precision κ1. This results follows immediately from construction of the
alternative allocation, and from the finding in the previous step that the alternative
allocation for κ1 < κ2 provides strictly higher utility in all inflation states than the
optimal allocation for κ2.
Finally, the social value of the optimal allocation for κ1 is at least as large as for any
other feasible allocation compatible with participation constraints Vrs(κ1) ≥ V˜rs(κ1).
Therefore, V˜rs(κ1) > Vrs(κ2) is a contradiction to Vrs(κ1) ≤ Vrs(κ2).
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5.2 Technical Appendix to chapter 3
5.2.1 Constraints and CRRA preferences in the steady state
Suppose that the utility function is of the CRRA form. Given an output subsidy that
renders the steady state efficient, constraints (3.9)-(3.13), and the money demand
equation can be combined to solve for ∆, y, c, l, R and m in terms of inflation.
∆ =
(1− α)ρ θθ−1
1− αpiθ , (5.22)
with ρ = (1− αpiθ−1)/(1− α),
y = [
1
a2∆ωscσc
]
1
σc+ω , (5.23)
c = ysc, (5.24)
l = y∆ (5.25)
R =
pi
β
, (5.26)
m = [R/(R− 1)yσc a1scσc ]1/σm . (5.27)
5.2.2 Proof Proposition 3.3
Consider first the steady state utility if the inflation rate is zero. Correspondingly,
gross inflation and price dispersion are 1, such that yZERO = lZERO. Using (5.23)-
(5.27), one can compute yZERO = 1/sc1/(1+ω) = lZERO, cZERO = scω/(1+ω) and
mZERO = RZEROηR,ZEROa1scω/(1+ω). Then the period steady state utility of the av-
erage household is given by
uZERO = (1+ a1)
ω
1+ω
ln(sc)− 1
(1+ω)sc
− a1 ln(1− β) + a1 ln(a1). (5.28)
If pi = β+ e, then price dispersion is ∆FR > 1, and output equals
yFR = 1/(sc∆ωFR)
1/(1+ω) < yZERO, while lFR = (∆FR/sc)1/(1+ω) > lZERO.
Consumption and real money balances are then given by
cFR = (sc/∆FR)ω/(1+ω) < cZERO and mFR = RFRηR,FRa1(sc/∆FR)ω/(1+ω) > mZERO.
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In this case, the period steady state utility is
uFR = (1+ a1)
ω
1+ω
ln(sc)− ω
1+ω
(1+ a1) ln(∆FR)...
− ∆FR
(1+ω)sc
+ a1 ln(
1+ β−1e
β−1e
) + a1 ln(a1). (5.29)
Comparing (5.28) and (5.29), the Friedman rule yields higher utility as long as a1 >
a1. 
5.2.3 Derivation of the aggregate supply curve in case of trend de-
flation
The first order condition for firms is given by (3.5), which reads in loglinearized
terms: ̂˜Pit
Pt
= F̂t − K̂t. (5.30)
Using the definition of the price level, Pit/Pt = [(1− αpiθ−1t )/(1− α)]1/(1−θ), the left
hand side of (5.30) can be approximated to first order with
αp¯iθ−1
1− αp¯iθ−1pit, (5.31)
while the expression on the right-hand side can be approximated by (using the re-
cursive form of Ft and Kt):
F̂t = (1− αβp¯iθ)[ ̂uc(yt − Gt, ζt) + ŷt + m̂ct] + αβp¯iθEt(θpit+1 + F̂t+1) (5.32)
and
K̂t = (1− αβp¯iθ−1)[ ̂uc(yt − Gt, ζt) + ŷt +̂(1− τt)]
+ αβp¯iθ−1Et((θ − 1)pit+1 + K̂t+1). (5.33)
Note that under trend deflation αβp¯i < 1, while convergence has to be assumed,
if one approximates around trend inflation (Ascari 2004). Therefore the difference
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F̂t − K̂t is given by:
F̂t − K̂t = αβp¯iθ−1(p¯i − 1)θEtpit+1 + αβp¯iθ−1Etpit+1
+ αβp¯iθ−1Et(p¯iF̂t+1 − K̂t+1) + αβp¯iθ−1(1− p¯i)( ̂uc(yt − Gt, ζt) + ŷt)
+ (1− αβp¯iθ)m̂ct − (1− αβp¯iθ−1)̂(1− τt).
Adding and subtracting αβp¯iθ−1Et F̂t+1, then using (5.30) to substitute for Et(F̂t+1 −
K̂t+1), F̂t − K̂t and then for F̂t+1 with (3.18), results in:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ∗m̂ct + F̂tκ∗
(p¯i − 1)
1− αβp¯iθ
+ κ∗( ̂uc(yt − Gt, ζt) + ŷt) 1− p¯i1− αβp¯iθ − κ
∗ 1− αβp¯iθ−1
1− αβp¯iθ
̂(1− τt).
Using that ̂uc(yt − Gt, ζt) = −σŷt + σgt, and m̂ct = −(1+ω)ât + σŷt +ωŷt + µ̂wt −
σgt, results in
pit = βEtpit+1 + F̂tκ∗
(p¯i − 1)
1− αβp¯iθ + κ
∗ŷt[σ+ω+
(1− p¯i)(1− σ)
1− αβp¯iθ ]
+ κ∗σgt[
1− p¯i
1− αβp¯iθ − 1] + κ
∗[µ̂wt − (1+ω)ât + wτ
1− αβp¯iθ−1
1− αβp¯iθ τ̂t].
Applying the definition of ŷnt and making use of τ̂t = 0 in this setting, results in
(3.17) in the text.
5.2.4 Proof Proposition 3.4
The period utility function of the average household in equilibrium is given by:
∫ 1
0
[u(yt − Gt, ζt)− v(ljt) + z(mt)]dj = u(yt − Gt) + z(mt)−
∫ 1
0
v(ljt)dj.
To derive (3.21) we need to impose that, in the optimal steady state, real money
balances are sufficiently close to being satiated (see Woodford, 2003a, Assumption
6.1), the price dispersion associated with optimal inflation is sufficiently small, as
well as that optimal inflation is close enough to one.
The first summands can be approximated to second order by:
u(yt − Gt, ζt) = ucy[ŷt + (1− σ)2 ŷ
2
t + σgtŷt] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt‖3), (5.34)
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where we used that (xt − x) = x(x̂t + 0.5x̂2t ) +O(‖x̂t‖3), t.i.s.p denotes terms inde-
pendent of stabilization policy, ucζ = uc, ζ = 1, σ = σcsc−1, Ĝt = (Gt − G)/y, and
that gt = Ĝt + σ−1ζ̂t. The utility of real money balances can be approximated by:
z(m) = ucy[
zmm
ucy
m̂t + 0.5
zmm
ucy
(1− σm)m̂2t ] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖m̂t‖3).
We treat (R − 1)/R as an expansion parameter, implying that zm/uc − 0 = (R −
1)/R− 0 is at least of first order. Since we expand our model at a point near the zero
bound, this means that the marginal utility of real money balances is close to zero.
Applying a first-order approximation to the money demand equation, and using
that the coefficients σ/σm = uccscy(R − 1)/(Rzmmm) and sm = zmm/(ucy) are of
first order in (R− 1)/R, we can approximate z(mt) as:
z(mt) = −ucy 12σm(R− 1)v R̂
2
t + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, R̂t‖3), (5.35)
where we assumed that (R− 1)/R− 0 is of second order, implying that the linear
term drops out in the quadratic approximation.
The third part of households’ period utility can be approximated by:
v(lt) = vyy[ŷt +
1+ω
2
ŷ2t − (1+ω)âtŷt + ∆̂t] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, ∆̂0.5t , ς‖3), (5.36)
with vyy = v∆∆ = vl l. This approximation is based on the assumption that
∫ 1
0
(Pi/P)−θdi = (P˘/P)−θ − 1 = O(‖ς‖3). (5.37)
Here P˘ denotes the average long-term individual price and we collect in ς the dis-
tortions of the relative price due to price dispersion in the optimal steady state.1 It
follows that
∆t − 1 = θ2vari ln(Pit) +O(‖ p̂it, ξ̂t, ς‖
3),
and correspondingly ∆̂t are of second order. Connecting (5.34),(5.35) and (5.36) by
the relationship vy/uc = amc/µw = (1− φ), with
φ = 1− ρ(pi) 11−θ (1− τ)θ − 1
µwθ
1− αβpiθ
1− αβpiθ−1 ,
1This assumption depends on the absence of strategic complementarities in price setting (see
Levin et al. (2006)). Then, price dispersion in the steady state is lower for deflation than for infla-
tion (see Figure 4.)
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results in:
U(ct, lt, mt) = −ucy[−φŷt + σ+ω− φ(1+ω)2 ŷ
2
t − ŷt(σgt + (1− φ)(1+ω)ât)
+ (1− φ)θ
2
vari ln(Pit) +
1
2σm(R− 1)v R̂
2
t ] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3).
Using the sales tax as a sales subsidy by setting
1− τ = [ρ(pi) 11−θ θ − 1
µwθ
1− αβpiθ
1− αβpiθ−1 ]
−1,
the linear term in the welfare approximation above vanishes:
U(t) = −ucy
2
[(σ+ω)(ŷt − ŷ∗t )2 + θvari ln(Pit) +
1
σm(R− 1)v R̂
2
t ]
+t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3). (5.38)
The variance of ln(Pt(i)) is given by
vari(ln Pit) = αvari ln(Pit−1) +
α
1− αpi
2
t + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ς2/3‖3),
where we assumed that ln(pi) = 0+O(‖ς‖2). Iterating the equation above forward
starting from any vari ln(Pit0−1) in the period before policy applies, for t ≥ t0 results
in :
vari ln(Pit) =
t
∑
s=t0
αt−s α
1− αpi
2
s + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, ς2/3‖3),
where we used that the initial price dispersion vari ln(Pit0−1) is t.i.s.p.
Discounting, summing up and substituting for vari ln(Pit) in (5.38) results in (3.21)
in Proposition 3.4. 
5.2.5 Definition of the disturbances nt, ut and st
The exogenous fluctuations are defines as:
nt = η2Et(ât+1 − ât)− η1σEt(gt+1 − gt),
ut = η3 ât + (1− αβp¯iθ)µ̂wt + η3
σ
1− σ gt
and
st = η5 ât + η6σgt + κ∗µ̂wt .
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The constants ηi, i = 1, ..6 are defined as:
η1 =
ω
ω+ σ
,
η2 =
σ(1+ω)
ω+ σ
,
η3 = (1− αβp¯iθ)(1+ω) 1− σ
ω+ σ
,
η4 = κ∗[ω+ σ+
(1− p¯i)(1− σ)
1− αβp¯iθ ],
η5 =
η4(1+ω)
ω+ σ
− κ∗(1+ω)
and
η6 =
η4
ω+ σ
+ κ∗( 1− p¯i
1− αβp¯iθ − 1).
5.2.6 The optimal policy problem from a timeless perspective
Under the timeless perspective the first order necessary conditions with respect to
yt, ∆t, Kt, Ft, Rt and pit for all t ≥ t0 are given by:
uc(t)− ∆tvl(t)/at + zm(t)mc(t) + λ2t(1− τ)[ucc(t)yt + uc(t)]
+ λ3tµwt [vll(t)∆tyt/at + vl(t)]− λ5tucc(t) + λ5t−1
ucc(t)Rt−1
pit
.= 0 (5.39)
− ytvl(t)/at + λ3tvll(t)y2tµwt + λ4t − λ4t+1βαpiθt+1 .= 0 (5.40)
− λ1tρ(t)
1
1−θ − [λ2t − αpiθ−1t λ2t−1] .= 0 (5.41)
θ
θ − 1λ1t − [λ3t − αpi
θ
t λ3t−1]
.= 0 (5.42)
zm(t)mR(t) + λ5tβ
uc(t + 1)
pit+1
≤ 0, (5.43)
and
− λ1tKt α1− αpi
θ−2
t ρ(t)
θ
1−θ + λ2t−1αKt(θ − 1)piθ−2t + λ3t−1αFtθpiθ−1t ...
+ λ4t[θαpiθ−2t ρ(t)
1
θ−1 − αθpiθ−1t ∆t−1]− λ5t−1Rt−1
uc(t)
pi2t
.= 0. (5.44)
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Note that λ2t0−1, λ3t0 and λ5t0−1 are the multiplier requiring initial commitment.
The multipliers λ1t − λ5t are associated with the following constraints:
ρ(pit)
1
1−θ Kt =
θ
θ − 1 Ft (5.45)
Kt = uc(yt − Gt, ζt)(1− τ)yt + βαEtKt+1piθ−1t+1 (5.46)
Ft = vl(yt∆t/at)ytµwt + αβEtFt+1pi
θ
t+1 (5.47)
∆t = (1− α)ρ(pit) θθ−1 + α∆t−1piθt (5.48)
and
uc(yt − Gt, ζt) = βRtEt uc(yt+1 − Gt+1, ζt+1)
pit+1
, (5.49)
with ρ(pit) ≡ (1− αpiθ−1t )(1− α)−1 for Rt ≥ 1.
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5.3 Technical Appendix to chapter 4
5.3.1 Equivalence between explicit transaction frictions and
money-in-the-utility-function
In this appendix I examine the relation between the money-in-the-utility-function
specification, which is applied throughout the analysis in chapter 4, and explicit
specifications of transaction frictions, i.e., a shopping time specification and a spec-
ification where transactions are associated with real resource costs. For this demon-
stration, which relates to the analysis in Brock (1974) and Feenstra (1986), I assume
for both alternative specification that the objective of the representative household
is given by
∞
∑
t=0
βtυ (ct, xt) , υc > 0, υcc < 0, υx > 0, υcx = 0, and υxx ≤ 0, (5.50)
where x denotes leisure.
1. First I consider a conventional shopping time specification which relates to the
one applied in Brock (1974), McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) or Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004). For this purpose, I assume that households have to allocate
total time endowment, which is normalized to equal one, to leisure x, working
time l, and shopping time s, where the shopping time is assumed to depend
on the consumption expenditures and on real balances
1 ≥ xt + lt + st, where st = H(ct, At/Pt).
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), I assume that the shopping time
function H satisfies: Hc > 0, Hcc > 0, Ha < 0, and Haa > 0 and Hca ≤ 0.
Using that xt = 1− lt − st holds in the household’s optimum, the utility func-
tion can be written as
u(ct, lt, at) = υ (ct, 1− lt − H(ct, at)) ,
where uc = υc + υx(−Hc) Q 0, ua = υx(−Ha) > 0, ul = −υx < 0, ucc =
υcc + υxxH2c − υxHcc < 0, ucl = υxxHc ≤ 0, uaa = υxxH2a − υxHaa < 0, ual =
υxxHa ≥ 0, as well as ull = υxx. Hence, the marginal utility of consumption,
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which is given by
uca = υxxHaHc − υxHca,
is non-decreasing in real balances. If the shopping time function is non-
separable or if leisure enters the utility function in a non-linear way, then
marginal utility of consumption is strictly increasing in real balances.
2. Next, I closely follow the analysis in Feenstra (1986), and assume that pur-
chases of consumption goods are associated with real resource costs of transac-
tions φ(ct, at), which satisfy: φ ≥ 0, φ(0, a) = 0, φc > 0, φa < 0, φcc ≥ 0,
φaa ≥ 0, φac ≤ 0. Households’ budget constraint then reads
Mt + Bt + Ptφ(ct, at) + Ptct ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Ptwtlt + Ptωt − Ptτt. (5.51)
Maximizing (5.50) subject to (5.51), a no-Ponzi game condition, and xt ≤ 1− lt,
leads – inter alia – to the following first order conditions for consumption and
leisure:
λrt(1+ φc(ct, at)) = υc(ct), λrtwt = υx(1− lt),
where λrt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on (5.51). Note that the aggregate
resource constraint now reads yt = ct + φ(ct, at). Using the linear produc-
tion technology, I therefore obtain the following equilibrium condition: lt =
ct + φ(ct, at). Combining these conditions and using that wt = 1, leads to the
following expression for the marginal utility of consumption:
υc(ct) = υx(1− ct − φ(ct, at))(1+ φc(ct, at)).
Evidently, the equilibrium sequence of consumption is in general not inde-
pendent from real money balances due to the existence of transaction costs.
Differentiating the latter condition gives
dct
dat
=
υxφca − υxx(1+ φc)φa
υcc + (1+ φc)2υxx − φccυx .
Hence, consumption is positively related to real balances even if either the
cross-derivative φca vanishes or the labor supply elasticity is infinite, i.e. υxx =
0.
The corresponding properties of my MIU specification immediately show that an
equivalence between the latter and the shopping time specification in 1. requires
consumption and real balances to be Edgeworth-complements in the MIU version,
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if υxx < 0 or Hca < 0. In order to compare the MIU specification with the trans-
action cost specification in 2., I apply the first order condition for consumption and
labor, the aggregate resource constraint, and the production function, which imply
that the equilibrium sequence of consumption under a MIU specification satisfies
dct/dat = −uca(ucc + 1)ull)−1. Evidently, an equivalence between both specifica-
tions requires consumption and real balances to be Edgeworth-complements, i.e.
uca > 0, if φca < 0 or υxx < 0. Thus, υxx < 0, which implies a finite labor supply
elasticity is sufficient for the existence of real balance effects under both specifica-
tions of transaction frictions.
5.3.2 Existence and uniqueness of the steady state
In this appendix, I briefly examine the steady state properties of the model. I restrict
my attention to the case where the nominal interest rate is strictly positive, R− 1 >
0. I further omit, for convenience, bars which are throughout the paper used to mark
steady state values.
When the stock of money at the beginning of the period enters the utility func-
tion, the deterministic steady state is characterized by the following conditions:
−ul(c) = uc(c, m/pi), R = pi/β and ua(c, m/pi)(uc(c, m/pi))−1 = R − 1. For an
interest rate policy regime, it is assumed that the policy rule of the central bank,
R(pi), has a unique solution for the steady state relation R = pi/β, so that the
inflation rate can be substituted out. The first equation implies that c is an im-
plicit function of m, c = f (m), with f ′(m) = −uca[Rβ(ull + ucc)]−1 > 0. Using
this, the third equation can be used to determine the steady state value for m with
ua( f (m), m/pi)[uc( f (m), m/(Rβ))]−1 = R − 1. Differentiating the fraction on the
left hand side reveals that
dua/uc
dm
=
uc(uccuaa − u2ca) + ull(uaauc − uauca)
Rβu2c(ull + ucc)
< 0,
as I assumed concavity for u(c, a). It follows that a globally unique steady state
exists if and only if:
lim
m→0
ua( f (m), m/Rβ)
uc( f (m), m/(Rβ))
> R− 1.
Thus, steady state uniqueness relies on money to be essential (see Obstfeld and Ro-
goff, 1983): The marginal utility of real money balances should grow with a rate
that is higher than the rate by which 1/uc converges to zero when m approaches
zero. An analogous line of arguments in case of a money growth policy leads to the
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condition limm→0 ua(g(m), m/µ)[uc(g(m), m/µ)]−1 > µ/β− 1, where c = g(m) is
the implicit relation derived of the steady state condition −ul(c) = uc(c, m/µ) with
g′(m) = −uca[µ(ull + ucc)]−1 > 0. The condition for existence and uniqueness for
the interest rate policy regime if end-of-period money provides transaction services
is
lim
m→0
ua( fE(m), m)
uc( fE(m), m)
>
R− 1
R
,
with fE(m)′ = −uca[ull + ucc]−1 > 0. If the monetary authority applies a constant
money growth rule then limm→0 ua( fE(m), m)[uc( fE(m), m)]−1 > (µ/β− 1)/(µ/β)
must be satisfied.
5.3.3 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Consider a monetary policy regime that sets the nominal interest rate contingent on
changes in current inflation, R̂t = ρpipit.
First, I establish the conditions for local stability and uniqueness. Second, if the
labor supply supply elasticity is finite, I show that the existence of exactly one stable
eigenvalue (assigned to real money balances, ηm) implies non-zero coefficients ηi,
i = c,pi, R of the fundamental solution.
Reducing the model in (4.11)-(4.13) leads to the following system in inflation and
real money balances:
(
pit+1
m̂t
)
=
(
σlεca
σl+σc
+ 1 − σlεcaσl+σc
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
σc+σl
−Υ+σl(εca+σa)σc+σl
)−1
×
(
σlεca
σl+σc
+ ρpi − σlεcaσl+σc
zρpi 0
)(
pit
m̂t−1
)
(5.52)
= A
(
pit
m̂t−1
)
.
The characteristic polynomial of A can be simplified to
F(X) = X2 − XρpiΥ+ σl(εca + σa)− zσlεcaΥ+ σl(εca + σa) −
ρpizσlεca
Υ+ σl(εca + σa)
.
Consider the case the labor supply elasticity is finite σl > 0. In this case, the de-
terminant of A, det(A) = F(0) < 0, is strictly negative, indicating that exactly one
eigenvalue is negative. Local stability and uniqueness then requires that there exists
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exactly one root of F(X) = 0 with modulus less than one. To examine the conditions
for this, I use that F(X) further satisfies
F(1) = 1− ρpi,
F(−1) = (1+ ρpi)(Υ+ σl(εca + σa))− 2zσlεcaρpi
Υ+ σl(εca + σa)
.
These conditions imply that for F(1) > 0 and F(−1) < 0), the model is locally stable,
unique and non-oscillatory, since the stable eigenvalue is positive. If F(1) < 0 and
F(−1) > 0, equilibrium sequences are locally stable and unique, but oscillatory,
since the stable eigenvalue has a negative sign. Suppose that the real balance effect
and that the inverse of the labor supply elasticity are large enough such that εca >
σa(2z− 1)−1 and σl > σl, where σl ≡ Υ(2z−1)εca−σa . Then, F(−1) can be negative if ρpi
is sufficiently large. Local stability and uniqueness with F(1) > 0 and F(−1) < 0, is
then ensured by moderate inflation elasticities satisfying ρpi1 < ρpi < 1, where ρpi1 ≡
σl(εca+σa)+Υ
σl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ . Alternatively, local stability and uniqueness arise for F(1) < 0
and F(−1) > 0, which requires 1 < ρpi < ρpi1. Suppose that εca > σa(2z − 1)−1
or σl < σl. Then, F(−1) cannot be negative and local stability and uniqueness then
arise if ρpi > 1.
So far I established the conditions for the existence of exactly one root ηm To establish
the role of predetermined real money balances as a state variable, I need to show
further that the coefficients ηi, i = c,pi, R are non-zero if ηm is non-zero and stable.
Applying the method of undetermined coefficients to (4.11) results in the following
restrictions for the coefficients ηc and ηpi:
ηc =
εca(1− ηpi)
σc + σl
,
implying that for εca > 0 one not both coefficients can be zero. In particular, if ηpi
is neither zero nor 1, predetermined real money balances are a relevant endogenous
state variable for ρpi 6= 0. The money demand equation (4.13) implies that
ηpi = − ηmkzρpi(σc + σl)− ηmk 6= 0, 1
since k = Υ+ σl(εca + σa) > 0 due to strict concavity and ρpi 6= 0 (no interest rate
peg).
Now, consider the case where the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0. In this
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case det(A) = 0, indicating that the beginning-of-period value for real money bal-
ances is irrelevant for the determination of pit and m̂t. It follows that one eigenvalue
equals zero and the other eigenvalue is larger than one, if and only if ρpi > 1. Then,
the equilibrium sequences for m̂t, ĉt+1, pit and R̂t for t ≥ 0 are locally stable and
uniquely determined, while ĉt cannot be determined. 
5.3.4 Proof of Proposition 4.7
Consider a monetary regime in which future inflation serves as the policy indicator,
R̂t = ρpiEtpit+1. Substituting for consumption with (4.11) and inserting the forward-
looking feedback rule, the model in (4.11)-(4.13) can be reduced to
(
pit+1
m̂t
)
=
(
σlεca
σl+σc
+ 1− ρpi − σlεcaσl+σc
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
σc+σl
− zρpi −Υ+σl(εca+σa)σc+σl
)−1
×
(
σlεca
σl+σc
− σlεcaσl+σc
0 0
)(
pit
m̂t−1
)
(5.53)
= B
(
pit
m̂t−1
)
.
The characteristic polynomial of B is given by
F(X) = X(X− ρpizσlεca
(Υ+ σl(εca + σa))(1− ρpi) + ρpizσlεca ).
Evidently, real money balances are not a relevant state variable, and one can only
solve for m̂t, Etpit+1, Et ĉt+1 and R̂t ∀t ≥ 0. For a finite labor supply elasticity, σl > 0,
local stability and uniqueness requires the other eigenvalue (one is equal to zero) to
be unstable. A positive unstable root arises if monetary policy is active and σl > σl2
or if 1 < ρpi < ρpi2 for σl < σl2 or εca < σa/(2z− 1). A negative unstable root exists if
ρpi > ρpi2, given that σl > σl and εca > σa/(2z− 1), for σl < σl2 or εca < σa/(2z− 1).
Thus, 1 < ρpi2 < ρpi < −ρpi1 leads to a locally stable and unique equilibrium with
a negative root for σl < σl or εca < σa/(2z− 1). When the labor supply elasticity is
infinite, σl = 0, then the Euler equation reads (1− ρpi)pit+1 = 0. Thus, the model
displays local stability and uniqueness if and only if ρpi 6= 1. 
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5.3.5 Proof of Proposition 4.8
Under a constant money growth regime the nominal interest rate can be substituted
out so that the reduced form system of the model in (4.11)-(4.13) reads (where I
omitted the exogenous state)
v1ĉt+1 − (v2 + 1) m̂t +v2pit+1 = −σc ĉt + εcam̂t−1 − εcapit, (5.54)
εcam̂t−1 = (σl + σc) ĉt + εcapit, (5.55)
where v1 ≡ (σc(1− z) + φac) z−1 and v2 ≡ (εca(1− z)− z + σa) z−1, and m̂t =
m̂t−1 − pit. After eliminating consumption with (5.55) and inflation with the lin-
earized money growth rule (4.14), I get the following difference equation in m̂t :
m̂t+1 =
z(σlεca + σl + σc)
z(σlεca + σl + σc)− (Υ+ σlεca + σlσa) m̂t.
Once m̂t is determined, which requires an unstable root, one can solve for pit and ĉt
∀t ≥ 1, while the initial values for consumption ĉ0 and inflation pi0 cannot be deter-
mined. Local uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium sequences
{m̂t,pit+1, ĉt+1, R̂t}∞t=0 thus require
∣∣∣ z(σlεca+σl+σc)z(σlεca+σl+σc)−(Υ+σlεca+σlσa) ∣∣∣ > 1. If z(σlεca + σl +
σc)− (Υ+ σlεca + σlσa) > 0, then the root is positive and unstable. Rearranging and
using Υ = σcσa − εcaφac shows that this conditions is satisfied for z > σa. 
5.3.6 Proof of Proposition 4.9
Consider the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent
on changes in current inflation, R̂t = ρpipit. After substituting for consumption and
eliminating m̂t and m̂t+1 with the static money demand equation (4.18), one obtains
the following difference equation (where I omitted the exogenous state):
(d + 1)ρpipit = (dρpi + 1)pit+1,
where d ≡ (z− 1)σlεca[Υ+ σl(εca + σa)]−1 > 0. Therefore ρpi > 1 is necessary and
sufficient for local stability and uniqueness of the equilibrium sequences of inflation
pit, real balances m̂t, consumption ĉt and the nominal interest rate, R̂t ∀ t ≥ 0.
Now, consider the case where future inflation serves as the policy indicator, R̂t =
ρpipit+1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0, then the model in (4.16)-
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(4.18) reduces to:
pit+2 =
ρpi(1+ d)− 1
dρpi
pit+1.
Evidently, one cannot determine current inflation rate pit. One obtains a unique and
locally stable solution for expected inflation, and the current values of consumption,
real money balances and the nominal interest rate, if the eigenvalue of this equation
is positive and unstable, which requires ρpi > 1. Alternatively, ρpi < [1 + 2d]−1
ensures local stability and uniqueness, where one eigenvalue is smaller than −1.
When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, then uniqueness of a equilibrium
sequence for pit+1 ∀t ≥ 0 is guaranteed by ρpi 6= 1.
5.3.7 Proof of Proposition 4.10
Under a constant money growth policy, m̂t = m̂t−1 − pit, the model in (4.16)-(4.18)
can – by eliminating the nominal interest rate – be reduced to:
εcam̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt, (5.56)
γ1ĉt+1 + γ2pit+1 + γ3m̂t = (γ1 +
σc + φac
z
)ĉt, (5.57)
where γ1 = σc(z− 1)z−1 > 0, γ2 = (1+ εca)(z− 1)z−1 > 0 and γ3 = (εca + σa)z−1 >
0. Eliminating consumption with (5.56) and inflation with the linearized money
growth rule leads to the following difference equation in real money balances:
m̂t+1 =
[σl(1+ εca) + σc](z− 1) + Υ+ σl(εca + σa)
[σl(1+ εca) + σc](z− 1) m̂t,
which evidently exhibits an unstable root. Thus, one can uniquely determine end-
of-period real balances m̂t , current consumption ĉt, the nominal interest rate R̂t
∀t ≥ 0, while inflation pit can only be determined for t ≥ 1 . 
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